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  To date, the debate over private prisons has focused largely on the 
relative efficiency of private prisons as compared to their publicly-run 
counterparts, and has assumed that, if private contractors can run the 
prisons for less money than the state without a drop in quality, then 
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states should be willing to privatize. This “comparative efficiency” 
approach, however, has two significant problems. First, it is 
concerned exclusively with efficiency, despite the fact that the 
privatization of prisons arguably implicates more urgent values. 
Second, it accepts the current state of public prisons as an 
unproblematic baseline, thus failing to consider the possibility that 
neither public prisons as presently constituted nor private prisons in 
the form currently on offer are adequate to satisfy society's 
obligations to those it incarcerates. In this Article, Professor Dolovich 
examines the private prisons issue from a third perspective, that of 
liberal legitimacy. On this standard, if penal policies and practices are 
to be legitimate, they must be consistent with two basic principles: the 
humanity principle, which obliges the state to avoid imposing 
punishments that are gratuitously inhumane; and the parsimony 
principle, which obliges the state to avoid imposing punishments of 
incarceration that are gratuitously long. After sketching the 
foundation for this legitimacy standard, Professor Dolovich then 
applies it to the case of private prisons. Approaching the issue of 
private prisons from this perspective helps to reframe the debate in 
two ways, both long overdue. First, it allows for a direct focus on the 
structure and functioning of private prisons, without being derailed by 
premature demands for comparison with public-sector prisons. It thus 
becomes possible to assess directly the oft-heard claim that the profit 
incentive motivating prison contractors will distort the decisions made 
by private prison administrators and lead to abuses. Second, it makes 
it possible to see that the state’s use of private prisons is the logical 
extension of policies and practices that are already standard features 
of the penal system in general, thus throwing into sharper relief 
several problematic aspects of this system that are currently taken for 
granted. In this sense, the study of private prisons operates as a 
“miner’s canary,” warning that not just the structure of private 
prisons, but also that of American punishment practices more 
broadly, may need reconsideration.  
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INTRODUCTION 
During the 1980s and 1990s, the population of America’s prisons 
and jails soared to unprecedented levels.1 Watching the cost of 
incarceration rise accordingly and finding themselves responsible for 
many more inmates than they were able to accommodate in existing 
facilities, state officials turned to the private sector for help. They 
were met by entrepreneurs offering a range of services designed to 
appeal to the overtaxed prison administrator, including everything 
from the siting and building of new prisons to the day-to-day 
management of whole inmate populations. By 2003, over 90,000 
 
 1. See infra notes 56–60 and accompanying text. 
042706 01__DOLOVICH.DOC 5/23/2006  8:43 AM 
440 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 55:437 
inmates across the country were housed in prisons and jails run by 
for-profit prison-management companies.2 
This emergence of privately run, for-profit prisons, or “private 
prisons,”3 sparked a heated debate,4 at the heart of which has been 
 
 2. See PAIGE M. HARRISON & JENNIFER C. KARBERG, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BULLETIN NO. NCJ 203947, PRISON AND JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 
2003, at 1 (2004), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/pjim03.pdf (reporting that 
private prison facilities held 94,361 inmates at midyear 2003). In the late 1990s, the capacity of 
private prisons was reportedly as high as 120,000 beds. Clifford J. Rosky, Force Inc.: The 
Privatization of Punishment, Policing, and Military Force in Liberal States, 36 CONN. L. REV. 879, 
903 (2004); Ahmed A. White, Rule of Law and the Limits of Sovereignty: The Private Prison in 
Jurisprudential Perspective, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 111, 112, 112 n.2 (2001). But according to the 
United States Department of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics, the number of inmates actually 
incarcerated in private facilities in 1999 was just shy of 70,000. See ALLEN J. BECK & JENNIFER 
C. KARBERG, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BULLETIN NO. NCJ 
185989, PRISON AND JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2000, at 1 (2001), available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/pjim00.pdf (reporting that the number of private prison 
inmates at midyear 2000 was up 9.1 percent from the previous year, which would have put the 
actual number of inmates housed in private facilities in 1999 at 69,093). By midyear 2003, this 
number reached its apparent high of 94,361. HARRISON & KARBERG, supra. The figure of 
120,000 thus appears exaggerated as an indicator of the actual market share of private prisons. 
 3. See RICHARD W. HARDING, PRIVATE PRISONS AND PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY 2 (1997) 
(defining private prisons as “arrangements whereby adult prisoners are held in institutions 
which in a day-to-day sense are managed by private sector operators whose commercial 
objective is to make a profit from such activities”). 
 4. This debate, which continues today, has generated a voluminous literature. E.g., id.; 
CAPITALIST PUNISHMENT: PRISON PRIVATIZATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Andrew Coyle et al. 
eds., 2003); ADRIAN L. JAMES ET AL., PRIVATIZING PRISONS: RHETORIC AND REALITY (1997); 
CHARLES H. LOGAN, PRIVATE PRISONS: CONS AND PROS (1990); PRIVATE PRISONS AND THE 
PUBLIC INTEREST (Douglas C. McDonald ed., 1990); PRIVATIZATION AND THE PROVISION OF 
CORRECTIONAL SERVICES (G. Larry Mays et al. eds., 1996); PRIVATIZING CORRECTIONAL 
INSTITUTIONS (Gary W. Bowman et al. eds., 1993); MICK RYAN & TONY WARD, PRIVATIZATION 
AND THE PENAL SYSTEM: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE AND THE DEBATE IN BRITAIN (1989); 
MARTIN P. SELLERS, THE HISTORY AND POLITICS OF PRIVATE PRISONS: A COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS (1993); DAVID SHICHOR, PUNISHMENT FOR PROFIT: PRIVATE PRISONS/PUBLIC 
CONCERNS (1995); Christine Bowditch & Ronald S. Everett, Private Prisons: Problems Within the 
Solution, 4 JUST. Q. 441 (1987); John J. DiIulio, Jr., What’s Wrong with Private Prisons, 92 PUB. INT. 
66 (1988); Sean McConville, Aid from Industry? Private Corrections and Prison Crowding, in 
AMERICA’S CORRECTIONAL CRISIS: PRISON POPULATIONS AND PUBLIC POLICY 221 (Stephen D. 
Gottfredson & Sean McConville eds., 1987); Douglas C. McDonald, Public Imprisonment by Private 
Means, 34 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 29 (1994) [hereinafter McDonald 1994]; Alida V. Merlo, Ethical 
Issues and the Private Sector, in CORRECTIONS: DILEMMAS AND DIRECTIONS 23 (Peter J. Benekos 
& Alida V. Merlo eds., 1992); David E. Pozen, Managing a Correctional Marketplace: Prison 
Privatization in the United States and the United Kingdom, 19 J.L. & POL. 253 (2003); Ira P. Robbins, 
Privatization of Corrections: Defining the Issues, 40 VAND. L. REV. 813 (1987) [hereinafter Robbins 
1987]; Ira P. Robbins, The Legal Dimensions of Private Incarceration, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 531 (1988) 
[hereinafter Robbins 1988]; Rosky, supra note 2; E.V. Savas, Privatization and Prisons, 40 VAND. L. 
REV. 889 (1987); Douglas W. Dunham, Note, Inmates’ Rights and the Privatization of Prisons, 86 
COLUM. L. REV. 1475 (1986); Brian B. Evans, Note, Private Prisons, 36 EMORY L.J. 253 (1987); 
042706 01__DOLOVICH.DOC 5/23/2006  8:43 AM 
2005] PRIVATE PRISONS 441 
one basic question: should responsibility for offenders convicted by 
the state be delegated to private, for-profit contractors, or should 
incarceration continue to be administered exclusively by public 
institutions staffed by state employees? The private prisons issue has 
thus widely been viewed as a choice—even a competition—between 
alternative organizational forms. 
For the most part, debate on this issue has focused on the 
relative efficiency of private prisons as compared to their publicly run 
counterparts and has assumed that, if private contractors can run the 
prisons for less money than the state without a drop in quality, then 
states should be willing to privatize.5 There are, however, at least two 
significant problems with this “comparative efficiency” approach.6 
First, it is exclusively concerned with the value of efficiency. Such a 
focus may be appropriate in many contexts in which privatization is 
contemplated, but it is not so in the prison context. Incarceration is 
among the most severe and intrusive manifestations of power the 
state exercises against its own citizens. When the state incarcerates, it 
strips offenders of their liberty and dignity and consigns them for 
extended periods to conditions of severe regimentation and physical 
vulnerability. Before seeking to ensure efficient incarceration, 
 
James Theodore Gentry, Note, The Panopticon Revisited: The Problem of Monitoring Private 
Prisons, 96 YALE L.J. 353 (1986). 
 5. See, e.g., Lisa Belkin, Rise of Private Prisons: How Much of a Bargain?, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 27, 1989, at A14 (“I’m an old state bureaucrat. . . . I don’t have any philosophies. If they 
can do it cheaper than the state can, more power to them.” (quoting Bob Owens, internal 
auditor for the Texas Department of Corrections)); Nzong Xiong, Private Prisons: A Question 
of Savings, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 1997 at C5 (“I think as long as it does not cost any more than it 
costs the state then we should consider privatization. . . . We should compare and explore the 
options out there that would save the taxpayers money.” (quoting Donald Campbell, 
commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Corrections)). The authors of a 1996 report by 
the United States General Accounting Office explain the divide as follows: 
Proponents of privatization assert that the experiences of several states demonstrate 
that private contractors can operate prisons at less cost than the government, without 
reducing the levels or quality of service. In contrast, other observers say there is little 
or no valid evidence that privatization of corrections is a cost-effective alternative to 
publicly run facilities. 
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRIVATE AND PUBLIC PRISONS: STUDIES COMPARING 
OPERATIONAL COSTS AND/OR QUALITY OF SERVICE 1 (1996). 
 6. “Comparative efficiency” is my own term. Certainly, not all participants in the private 
prisons debate explicitly adopt the perspective of comparative efficiency. See, e.g., sources cited 
infra note 9. But the assumptions of comparative efficiency direct and shape the discussion even 
among those who are not necessarily committed to this approach. 
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therefore, it must first be determined if the particular penal practice 
at issue is even legitimate.7 
Second, in its drive to assess the relative performance of private 
prisons, comparative efficiency accepts the current state of public 
prison conditions as an unproblematic baseline. Comparative 
efficiency asks: how do private prisons compare with their public-
sector counterparts? And in terms of conditions of confinement, this 
standard is satisfied when conditions in private prisons are shown to 
be as good as conditions in the public prisons they seek to replace. 
Whether the baseline set by public prisons is itself good enough to 
meet any justifiable objective standard is never considered. The 
conversation as defined by comparative efficiency is thus framed to 
sidestep, rather than directly engage, the fact that conditions in many 
prisons—public and private alike—fall far short of satisfying society’s 
obligations to those it incarcerates.8 
Not all participants in the private prisons debate take 
comparative efficiency to be the appropriate standard. For a small 
group of critics, what matters most is not the relative efficiency of 
private prisons but their perceived lack of legitimacy.9 These critics 
 
 7. True, some versions of comparative efficiency do seek to assess the relative quality and 
safety of private prisons, two aspects of incarceration that are arguably of central relevance to 
the legitimacy of prison sentences. But even in such versions, quality and safety tend to be 
viewed as mere components of an overall efficiency analysis that continues to view cost as the 
central issue. 
 8. In many American prisons and jails, inmates are plagued by, among other horrors, 
sexual violence, overcrowding, an ongoing threat of physical assault, seriously inadequate 
medical care, and extended sensory deprivation. See, e.g., Sharon Dolovich, Legitimate 
Punishment in Liberal Democracy, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 307, 438–40 (2004) (discussing 
overcrowding in prisons); Wilbert Rideau, The Sexual Jungle, in LIFE SENTENCES 73, 74 
(Wilbert Rideau & Ron Wikberg eds., 1992) (describing the sexual violence that “plagues” 
prisons); Mikel-Meredith Weidman, The Culture of Judicial Deference and the Problem of 
Supermax Prisons, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1505, 1525–29 (2004) (describing the imposition of 
extended sensory deprivation in supermax prisons); Wil S. Hylton, Sick on the Inside: 
Correctional HMOs and the Coming Prison Plague, HARPER’S MAG., Aug. 2003, at 43 
(describing inadequate medical care in prisons); Adam Liptak, Ex-Inmate’s Suit Offers View 
into Sexual Slavery in Prisons, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2004, at A1 (recounting the story of a 
“homosexual inmate forced into sexual slavery” in a Texas prison). 
 9. See e.g., DiIulio, supra note 4, at 83 (“The central moral issues surrounding private 
prison . . . management have little to do with the profit motive of the privatizers and much to do 
with the propriety . . . of delegating the authority to administer criminal justice to nonpublic 
individuals and groups.”); Robbins 1987, supra note 4, at 828 (emphasizing the need to consider 
the public-interest and forfeiture-of-governmental-power concerns involved in privatizing 
prisons); White, supra note 2, at 112 (“[C]ritiques of the private prison tend to focus narrowly 
on the institution’s practical, legal, or general normative failures . . . to the exclusion of any 
sustained focus on the private prison’s implications for the changing relationship between state 
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share the view that incarceration is an inherently public function and 
thus that recourse to private prisons is inappropriate regardless of the 
relative efficiency of this penal form.10 
By introducing into the debate a concern for the legitimacy of 
private prisons, this “inherent public function” approach makes a 
laudable attempt to shift the inquiry beyond the bounds of 
comparative efficiency and into the terrain of the more explicitly 
normative.11 Yet this alternative framework also has its shortcomings. 
For one, its dismissal of the relevance of private prisons’ practical 
implications for the prisoners themselves seems both coldhearted and 
blind to the significance of the humanity of actual sentences served 
for the legitimacy of a given punishment.12 Moreover, although its 
governing standard—legitimacy—is more appropriate for the prison 
context than efficiency, the inherent-public-function approach also 
accepts the status quo as an unproblematic baseline for analysis, and 
thus is ultimately trapped in the same unduly narrow frame as 
comparative efficiency. On both approaches, the only relevant 
 
and society and the way the law mediates the relationship.”); Michael Walzer, At McPrison and 
Burglar King, It’s . . . Hold the Justice, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 8, 1985, at 10 (emphasizing that “it 
is a moral and political—not economic—question”). 
 10. But see LOGAN, supra note 4, at 5, 49–61, 236–50 (“[A]ny potential problem with 
private prisons [is] at least matched by an identical or closely corresponding problem among 
prisons that are run by the government.”); Douglas C. McDonald, When Government Fails: 
Going Private as a Last Resort, in PRIVATE PRISONS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST, supra note 4, 
at 184–88 (arguing that the authority to punish is not an exclusive right of the state, but 
ultimately resides in the people, and therefore may be transferred, and asserting that “[i]f 
conditions and treatment are acceptable, it should not matter that private individuals have been 
rewarded”). 
 11. Comparative efficiency, like many cost-benefit approaches, tends to present itself as 
value neutral, but it too is a normative view. Describing one’s aim as identifying the approach 
that minimizes costs and maximizes benefits is just another way of saying that actors should 
pursue the course of action that stands to generate the best possible consequences. And this, of 
course, is simply a paraphrase of the central organizing principle of consequentialism, the moral 
theory which teaches that “the rightness or wrongness of an action always depends on the 
consequences of the action, on its tendency to lead to intrinsically good or bad states of affairs.” 
BERNARD WILLIAMS, MORALITY: AN INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS 82–83 (2d ed. 1993). 
 12. The insistence of the inherent-public-function approach on the irrelevance of the 
practical consequences of prison privatization likely stems from the desire of these critics to 
escape the powerful force field of comparative efficiency, which operates to crowd out all 
considerations except practical consequences. Yet understandable though this resistance is, to 
the extent that it denies the moral relevance of actual conditions of confinement, it will 
necessarily operate with a conception of legitimacy that is only partially satisfying at best. It will, 
moreover, appear wholly insensitive to the needs and interests of the prisoners themselves and 
thus be vulnerable to charges of “intellectual indulgence” or “moral or ideological 
fundamentalism.” HARDING, supra note 3, at 23–24. 
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question is the comparative one—that of whether states should keep 
operating the prisons themselves or be willing to turn this task over to 
private, for-profit contractors. Neither approach, therefore, is able to 
consider the possibility that neither public prisons as presently 
constituted nor private prisons in the form currently on offer 
represents an acceptable choice.13 
In this Article, I approach the private prisons issue from a third 
perspective, that of liberal legitimacy.14 Liberal legitimacy offers what 
 
 13. As noted above, see supra text accompanying note 8, comparative efficiency can be 
blind to the violence and other abuses in private prisons, deflecting any concerns in this regard 
with the incontrovertible observation that public prisons, too, are violent and abusive. But the 
inherent-public-function approach, in turn, can be blind to the violence and other abuses in 
public prisons, deflecting concerns in this regard with the more questionable assertion that the 
nature of actual punishments imposed is irrelevant to the legitimacy determination. Indeed, on 
the inherent-public-function approach, it seems as if, so long as the prisons retain their public 
aspect—so long, that is, as prison administrators and guards continue to draw their paychecks 
directly from the government—any punishment of incarceration is legitimate, however arbitrary 
or severe the sentence, and however appalling the conditions of confinement. 
 14. Thus far, little consideration has been given in the private prisons literature to the 
liberal perspective, although there are some notable exceptions. Michael Walzer, in a brief but 
influential article in The New Republic, puts his argument against private prisons—at the time of 
his writing, a brand-new phenomenon—in terms of citizens’ political obligations in a liberal 
democracy, but he does no more than sketch his concerns. See generally Walzer, supra note 9. 
Andrew Rutherford, at the close of an account of private prisons in England, suggests that the 
state’s use of private prisons raises “the fundamental normative issue of viewing punishment in 
a liberal democratic state as something that must be used with restraint.” Andrew Rutherford, 
British Penal Policy and the Idea of Prison Privatization, in PRIVATE PRISONS AND THE PUBLIC 
INTEREST, supra note 4, at 42, 65. Here, however, Rutherford simply introduces the issue and 
does not explore it further. Ahmed White goes farther than anyone else in developing a critique 
of private prisons grounded both in a liberal theoretical framework and in the actual details of 
the structure and functioning of private prisons. See generally White, supra note 2. His approach 
is thus closest to my own. White, however, concentrates on issues of sovereignty and what he 
calls the “rule of law.” Id. at 114. He objects to private prisons on the basis that, by contracting 
with private actors to run the prisons, the state blurs the lines of sovereign accountability, with 
troubling effects. See id. at 144 (explaining that his “arguments against the privatization of 
prisons focus on the sovereignty-restraining ambition of the rule of law and on the perversion of 
this ambition by the diffusion and extension of sovereignty”). In this claim, White may well be 
right, but I am concerned with a different set of liberal values. Moreover, I aim to provide a 
theoretical framework that captures the general objections underpinning what I view as the 
nascent liberal critique already present in the private prisons literature. White’s concern with 
ensuring the accountability of the sovereign, although certainly warranted, does not in my view 
reflect either what is most troubling about the state’s use of private prisons from a liberal 
perspective or the concerns motivating much of the resistance to private prisons one finds in the 
literature. Finally, in a recent article, Clifford Rosky brings to bear what he calls a “liberal 
theory of force” on the question of privatizing three governmental functions, each of which 
implicates the state’s monopoly on force: the military, policing, and private prisons. See Rosky, 
supra note 2, at 973–1024 (“Through the lens of liberal thought, we consider carefully why and how 
liberal states must ‘monopolize’ force.”). With respect to private prisons, Rosky ultimately finds 
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the private prisons debate has thus far lacked: an independent 
normative standard for assessing the legitimacy of penal policies and 
practices in a liberal democracy.15 On this standard, if our penal 
policies and practices are to be legitimate, they must be consistent 
with two basic principles: the humanity principle, which obliges the 
state to avoid imposing punishments that are gratuitously inhumane;16 
and the parsimony principle, which obliges the state to avoid 
imposing punishments of incarceration that are gratuitously long.17 In 
each case, gratuitous punishment is that which cannot be justified to 
all members of society under fair deliberative conditions.18 In this 
Article, I sketch the foundation for this legitimacy standard. I then 
apply its conditions to the case of private prisons. Doing so reveals 
 
that the supply of the means of criminal punishment (i.e., prisons) may be privatized consistent 
with his liberal theory, so long as the demand for such punishment remains exclusively in public 
hands. Id. at 1024. In this way, Rosky distinguishes prisons from the military, the private supply 
of which, he argues, is foreclosed on his liberal theory. Id. at 1015. But while Rosky’s article 
finds no like ground in his liberal theory of force for viewing private prisons as illegitimate, id. at 
1021, this in no way goes to show that there are not other reasons, consistent with a broader 
liberal perspective than Rosky adopts, why one might object to their use. In this Article, I 
consider other such reasons. 
 15. By “liberal democracy,” I mean a society committed to the baseline liberal democratic 
values of individual liberty, dignity, and bodily integrity; limited government; the primacy and 
sovereignty of the individual; and the entitlement of all citizens to equal concern and respect. 
See Dolovich, supra note 8, at 312–14. 
 16. As will be seen, on this model, inhumane punishment may be legitimately imposed only 
under extremely limited circumstances, which are likely to be met, if ever, in only a very small 
number of cases. See infra text accompanying notes 121–23. Thus, for purposes of the present 
discussion, which is concerned not with liminal cases but with mass incarceration, any conditions 
of inhumane punishment must be presumed to be gratuitous. 
 17. Elsewhere, I argue that, to satisfy the parsimony principle, punishments may only be as 
severe as necessary to appreciably deter offenses causing harm of equal or greater severity. 
Dolovich, supra note 8, at 378–404, 408–09. But it is not necessary to accept this particular view 
as to the limiting terms of the parsimony principle to agree that society should punish only so 
much as can be justified under fair deliberative conditions, and no more. The more general (and 
less controversial) version offered in the text is thus sufficient for present purposes. 
 18. In sketching this standard and its accompanying principles, I draw on earlier work in 
which I argue that, in a society committed to the baseline liberal democratic values, punishment 
policies are legitimate to the extent that they are consistent with principles of punishment all 
would accept as just and fair under conditions of strict impartiality. Id. at 313–14. As this 
formulation suggests, the approach I adopt is a self-consciously Rawlsian one. For further 
consideration of this approach, see generally Simone Chambers, Democratizing Humility, 7 
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 465 (2004); Stephen P. Garvey, Lifting the Veil on Punishment, 7 BUFF. 
CRIM. L. REV. 443 (2004); Sharon Dolovich, Idealism, Disproportionality, and Democracy: 
Reply to Chambers and Garvey, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 479 (2004). 
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the extent to which punishments served in private prisons fall short of 
society’s obligations to those it incarcerates—and why they do so.19 
Liberal legitimacy thus rejects the comparativist’s impulse that 
has thus far defined the private prisons debate. The question here is 
not: how do private prisons compare with public prisons? It is instead: 
to what extent is the use of for-profit private prisons consistent with 
society’s obligations to those it incarcerates? 
 
 19. Although liberal legitimacy is distinct from the inherent-public-function approach, its 
operative legitimacy standard helps to flesh out the animating claim of those critics who argue 
that incarceration is inherently a public function and thus that private prisons are inherently 
illegitimate. The inherent-public-function approach is motivated by the idea that prison 
administration must be guided solely by public values. From this perspective, the worry is that 
private prison providers will be motivated, not by a commitment to the public interest, but by 
the desire to maximize their own financial gain—and that where this aim conflicts with the 
public interest, it will be contractors’ own personal interests and not the public interest that will 
take precedence. This view, however, tends to leave unexplained the precise public values that 
would be ill served by this arrangement, leaving its concerns easily dismissed by the dominant 
comparative efficiency approach. For if, as comparative efficiency holds, efficiency is the highest 
public value, all that need be done to ensure that private contractors serve the public interest is 
to make it financially rewarding for them to run the prisons efficiently. Absent an alternative 
conception of the relevant public values, it is difficult for the inherent-public-function approach 
to explain why this response misses the point. 
Liberal legitimacy, although not identical with the inherent-public-function approach, 
provides the substantive account of the public values missing from this latter approach, thereby 
helping to clarify the nature of its claim. For liberal legitimacy, the public interest lies in 
ensuring legitimate punishment, defined as punishments that satisfy the twin principles of 
humanity and parsimony. Or, to put it less formally, for liberal legitimacy, public values are 
realized when conditions of confinement are as humane as possible and criminal sentences are 
imposed only when, and to the extent that, they are absolutely necessary. These two concerns 
seem to me to be precisely those that, at bottom, motivate the inherent-public-function 
approach—that, when the prisons are run by people committed first and foremost to their own 
financial gain (1) any conflict between the well-being of inmates and the contractors’ bottom 
line will be resolved against the inmates, thereby compromising the conditions of confinement; 
and (2) sentencing policy will be shaped, not on the basis of legitimate considerations bearing on 
the nature of criminal punishment, but instead on the basis of what serves the interests of 
parties who stand to benefit financially from increased incarceration. Viewed from the inherent-
public-function perspective, either of these circumstances would raise appropriate skepticism 
about the justification for the punishment itself, and would thus reflect both an insufficient 
respect for, and a failure of responsibility toward, those society incarcerates. 
The inherent-public-function objection is sometimes characterized as an “expressive” 
concern, the notion presumably being that even should there be no actual divergence between 
the decisions of a state official and those of a private prison provider, the delegation of power 
over the prisons to private actors “expresses” an inadequate commitment to the realization of 
public values. But if I am right that the conception of the public interest that informs this 
objection is in fact the one articulated by the theory of liberal legitimacy I advance in this 
Article, it is not the “expressive” effects of introducing private interests into prison 
administration (that is, what the policy “says”), but the actual normative conflict between the 
private interests of prison contractors and the public interest so understood, which raises 
questions for the inherent-public-function approach as to the appropriateness of private prisons. 
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Asking this latter question helps to reframe the debate in two 
ways, both long overdue. First, it allows for a direct focus on the 
structure and functioning of private prisons, and thus for the 
development of a rich understanding of how the private prison system 
actually works and precisely where it fails, without being derailed by 
premature demands for comparison with public-sector prisons.20 Most 
notably, it allows for direct assessment of the claim that the profit 
incentive motivating prison contractors will distort the decisions made 
by private prison administrators and lead to abuses. This claim is 
often raised by opponents of private prisons. Yet it is rarely pursued 
in any sustained way, for whenever it is voiced, it is either dismissed 
outright as unsupported21 or quickly deflected by reference to the 
admittedly incontrovertible fact that public prisons, too, are rife with 
abuse. By contrast, assessing private prisons against the standard of 
liberal legitimacy not only allows but demands a thorough analysis of 
the concern that prison contractors’ profit motive will lead to cutting 
corners in ways likely to harm inmates. It thus enables an 
understanding of the dangers posed by private prisons that is at once 
more comprehensive and more nuanced than is possible from within 
the comparativist frame. 
Second, confronting the ways in which private prisons are at odds 
with society’s obligations to those it incarcerates provides the basis 
for a far-reaching critique of several practices that currently inform 
prison administration more broadly. The possibility that studying 
 
 20. This is not to say that comparison between public and private prisons is never in order. 
Certainly, policymakers facing the question of whether to privatize their prisons will rightly be 
interested in comparisons between public and private prisons. But before any such comparison 
can be undertaken, it is first necessary to understand the systems to be compared, and 
comparative efficiency as a framework for approaching the issue preempts rather than facilitates 
such an understanding. It is thus not comparison per se to which I am opposed, but rather 
premature comparison on inappropriate measures—which is precisely where comparative 
efficiency leads. 
 21. For example, contemplating the question of qualified immunity for private prison 
guards in McKnight v. Rees, 88 F.3d 417 (6th Cir. 1996), the Sixth Circuit expressed concern 
with the fact that “for-profit corporations—and indirectly the employees of those 
corporations—seek to realize what the name implies, a profit,” and that, “[a]ccordingly, private 
corporations running correctional facilities have a greater incentive to cut costs by infringing 
upon the constitutional rights of prisoners in order to ensure the profitability of the enterprise,” 
id. at 424 n.4. In his dissent in Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399 (1997), in which the 
Supreme Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit’s decision in McKnight v. Rees, Justice Scalia 
dismissed this concern as “implausible,” and chided the panel for having “offered no evidence 
to support its bald assertion that private prison guards operate with different incentives than 
state prison guards, and g[iving] no hint as to how prison guards might possibly increase their 
employers’ profits by violating constitutional rights,” id. at 421 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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private prisons might afford a fresh perspective on society’s penal 
practices in general has not been seriously considered by those 
engaged in the private prisons debate. In fact, a guiding premise of 
this debate has been that for-profit private prisons represent a radical 
departure from the way the public prison system otherwise operates. 
But this premise is false. Although private prisons do have some 
distinctive features, the differences between public and private 
prisons are mostly differences of degree. The use of private prisons is 
thus neither an isolated nor an aberrant approach to punishment, but 
is rather the logical extension of policies and practices that are 
already standard features of our prison system. Examining private 
prisons from the perspective of liberal legitimacy exposes this 
overlap, thereby throwing into sharper relief several problematic 
aspects of the penal system as a whole that are currently taken for 
granted. In this sense, the study of private prisons operates as a 
“miner’s canary,”22 warning that not just the structure of private 
prisons, but also that of American punishment practices more 
broadly, may need reconsideration.23 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I offers a brief account of 
the history and reemergence in the late twentieth century of private 
sector involvement in American corrections. Part II addresses the 
question of how to translate a commitment to the baseline liberal 
democratic values into the basis for public-policy critique. In doing so, 
it presents the framework of liberal legitimacy to be applied to 
private prisons. Part III considers the use of private prisons from the 
perspective of the humanity principle. In particular, it examines the 
incentives prison contractors face to reduce costs in ways likely to 
cause harm to inmates, and argues that existing mechanisms for 
checking contractors’ tendencies in this direction are inadequate to 
the task. Drawing on this analysis, Part III identifies two practices of 
prison administration that threaten the health and safety of prisoners: 
 
 22. See LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER’S CANARY: ENLISTING RACE, 
RESISTING POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY 1 (2002) (“Miners often carried a canary 
into the mine . . . [because] the canary’s more fragile respiratory system would cause it to 
collapse from noxious gases long before humans were affected. . . . The canary’s distress 
signaled that it was time to get out of the mine because the air was becoming too poisonous to 
breathe.”). 
 23. For-profit private prisons are thus worthy of study not only for their own sake, but also, 
as David Sklansky has put it in a related context, for “what [they] can teach us about what we 
thought we already knew.” David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1165, 1171 
(1999). 
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(1) the contracting out to for-profit entities for the provision of 
essential prison services to save states money on the cost of 
corrections, and (2) the delegation to prison officials of considerable 
power and discretion over prisons and prison conditions absent 
adequate accountability mechanisms. Although, as Part III shows, the 
dangers these practices create are heightened in private prisons—a 
fact that explains the elevated levels of violence in private prisons as 
compared with public prisons24—these practices are standard fare in 
public prisons as well. Part III thus concludes by identifying steps 
prison officials ought to take to curtail these practices or mitigate 
their harmful effects, even where the prisons themselves are run by 
public employees. Finally, Part IV examines private prisons from the 
perspective of the parsimony principle. In contrast to Part III, Part IV 
introduces a set of considerations that has not previously been 
addressed as such in the literature.25 It is thus necessarily more 
speculative and suggestive than Part III. Still, Part IV does identify a 
further practice that threatens the legitimacy of punishment in 
general: political advocacy in the sentencing-policy arena by actors 
with a strong financial interest in increased incarceration rates and 
longer prison sentences. As Part IV suggests, this practice creates 
reason for concern whether the advocacy groups in question are 
private prison providers, correctional officers’ unions, or voters in 
rural districts who view prison building as a possible source of 
economic development. 
 
 24. See infra Part III.E. 
 25. Some of the issues on which I draw, in particular that of the possibility of abuse of 
discretion on the part of private prison guards in the internal prison disciplinary and parole 
processes, have been addressed before. See, e.g., Warren L. Ratliff, The Due Process Failure of 
America’s Prison Privatization States, 21 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 371, 373 (1997) (“[Most] 
statutes that authorize private prisons are constitutionally inadequate, because they allow 
private contractors to exercise inappropriate discretion concerning inmates’ liberties.”); 
Dunham, supra note 4, at 1475 (“[C]omprehensive safeguards are necessary to ensure the 
protection of inmates’ constitutional rights in private prisons.”); Gentry, supra note 4, at 363 
(noting the “perverse incentives” that exist for private prisons to “create demand for [their] own 
product, . . . by fomenting violence among current inmates in order to scuttle parole chances [or] 
arbitrarily reducing good time”). But these previous discussions have largely been undertaken 
in the more conventional terms of system design (Gentry) or constitutional standards (Dunham, 
Ratliff), rather than from any explicit concern with the resulting legitimacy of the punishments 
imposed. 
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I.  THE EMERGENCE OF THE MODERN PRIVATE PRISON 
A. Historical Antecedents 
The involvement of private interests in American corrections 
began long before the current generation of private prison companies 
emerged—indeed, even before the existence of the prison as we know 
it. Before addressing the modern private prison, it is worth briefly 
considering some of this earlier history, which raises themes that will 
inform later analysis. 
In colonial America, the meting out of criminal punishment was 
purely a local matter and could include any of a range of sanctions, 
among them fines, flogging, the stockade, banishment, and the 
gallows—but not imprisonment.26 As in eighteenth-century England, 
jails were merely holding chambers for debtors or for those 
individuals awaiting trial or punishment.27 Jailors paid for the running 
of the jails themselves and were reimbursed by the county according 
to a fee schedule.28 They also routinely supplemented their income by 
taking bribes from prisoners in exchange for certain privileges and 
charging prisoners for meals and alcohol.29 The less money spent on 
upkeep, the more money the jailor made; jails were thus generally 
overcrowded and extremely unsanitary.30 
It was in the late eighteenth century that criminal punishment in 
America came to take the form of incarceration for a set period in a 
penal facility.31 In the early penitentiaries, prison labor was 
introduced as part of rehabilitative programs,32 but it quickly became 
 
 26. David J. Rothman, Perfecting the Prison: United States, 1789–1865, in THE OXFORD 
HISTORY OF THE PRISON 110, 112 (Norval Morris & David J. Rothman eds., 1995). 
 27. Randall McGowen, The Well Ordered Prison: England, 1780–1865, in THE OXFORD 
HISTORY OF THE PRISON, supra note 26, at 79, 80–81. 
 28. SHICHOR, supra note 4, at 25–26. 
 29. Id.; see also SELLERS, supra note 4, at 48–49. As Shichor describes, this system of 
private jailors making profits off their charges was the norm in England in the eighteenth 
century, when jailors sold inmates food and alcohol, charged family members for visiting 
privileges, and exacted fees from prisoners for every “service” rendered, including “putting 
people in irons, taking the irons off, ‘first locking up,’ providing copies of court papers, various 
privileges, and even being discharged.” SHICHOR, supra note 4, at 21–22. 
 30. SHICHOR, supra note 4, at 24–25. 
 31. Id. at 26; Rothman, supra note 26, at 114–15. 
 32. Alexis M. Durham, III, The Future of Correctional Privatization: Lessons from the Past, 
in PRIVATIZING CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS, supra note 4, at 33, 35–36; Rothman, supra 
note 26, at 117. 
042706 01__DOLOVICH.DOC 5/23/2006  8:43 AM 
2005] PRIVATE PRISONS 451 
the means through which state governments could recoup the costs to 
the state treasury of imprisoning criminals. Indeed, the history of 
nineteenth-century American prisons is a history of contracting 
between the state and private interests for the use of convict labor in 
efforts on both sides to achieve financial gain. These contracts took 
many forms. In some cases, as with New York’s Auburn penitentiary, 
contractors would supply the raw material and collect the finished 
product at the end, with the work taking place at the prison.33 In 
others, as in Louisiana, the state leased its entire penitentiary to a 
private contractor, who then assumed the cost of running the facility 
in exchange for the labor of its inmates.34 The most common 
arrangements, however, involved the leasing of convict labor for work 
on plantations, on railroads, in mines, or in other labor-intensive 
industries.35 
Although convict leasing was found throughout the nineteenth-
century United States, it was most widely used in the Southern states 
after the Civil War. This development was in part a function of the 
serious financial straits of the former Confederate states in the 
postwar years; convict leasing offered a way both to defray the costs 
of incarceration and to rebuild the shattered Southern economy.36 At 
the war’s end, demand for convict labor was high, as those who had 
previously relied on slave labor found themselves in need of a pool of 
cheap workers. Both in response to this demand and as a way for 
white society to reassert its power over the newly emancipated black 
population,37 the Southern states began to increase dramatically the 
sentences exacted against petty criminals, the vast majority of whom 
 
 33. GUSTAVE DE BEAUMONT & ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, ON THE PENITENTIARY 
SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES AND ITS APPLICATION IN FRANCE 69 (Francis Lieber trans., S. 
Ill. Univ. Press 1964) (1833); SHICHOR, supra note 4, at 29. Beaumont and Tocqueville spoke 
highly of this method, noting in particular the efforts made by prison administrators to contract 
out different phases of production to different private parties, in order to contain the influence 
of each individual contractor. SHICHOR, supra note 4, at 33. 
 34. Durham, supra note 32, at 36. In the case of Louisiana, the contractor McHatton, Pratt, 
and Company paid nothing to the state beyond the cost of running the facility. Id. In Texas, 
after experimenting with convict leasing, the “state leased its entire penitentiary operation to 
private interests.” Id. at 37 (quoting S.J. MARTIN & S. EKLAND-OLSON, TEXAS PRISONS: THE 
WALL CAME TUMBLING DOWN 6 (1987)). Texas resumed control over the penitentiary in 1875, 
after a legislative commission reported squalid living conditions, inadequate food and medical 
treatment, and brutal corporal punishment. Id. at 41. 
 35. DAVID M. OSHINSKY, “WORSE THAN SLAVERY”: PARCHMAN FARM AND THE 
ORDEAL OF JIM CROW JUSTICE 56–61 (1996). 
 36. SHICHOR, supra note 4, at 35. 
 37. OSHINSKY, supra note 35, at 37–40. 
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were former slaves. For example, in 1876, the Mississippi legislature 
passed a “major crime bill,” known as the “Pig Law,” which redefined 
the crime of grand larceny to include “the theft of a farm animal or 
any property valued at ten dollars or more.”38 Violation of this law, 
which was “aimed directly” at the newly freed slaves, meant up to five 
years in state prison.39 Moves like this one accompanied the 
legalization of convict leasing and ensured sufficient convicts to meet 
the demand.40 
Convict leasing uniformly meant the severe abuse of leased 
convicts, thoroughly inadequate living conditions, and utter 
indifference as to whether they lived or died.41 Because the prisons 
ensured a steady supply of convicts, from the contractors’ perspective 
one convict was as good as another.42 Many contractors therefore 
routinely worked their charges literally to death.43 
Historical accounts of inmate labor contracts in nineteenth-
century America reveal that the practice was plagued by more than 
inmate abuse. In addition, state after state found itself being 
outmaneuvered and taken advantage of by the private parties with 
 
 38. Id. at 40. 
 39. Id. As a consequence of this change, Oshinksy reports, the number of state convicts 
quadrupled in just three years, “from 272 in 1874 to 1,072 by 1877.” Id. 
 40. See id. at 31–42 (describing the simultaneous rise of convict leasing and the enactment 
of crime bills aimed primarily at imprisoning African Americans for extended periods of time). 
 41. In Tennessee, for example, an 1889 legislative commission investigating the treatment 
of convicts leased to the Tennessee Coal and Iron Company found the dwellings to be “‘rough 
board shanties unfit for the habitation of human beings’ and found that inmates were subjected 
to ‘cruel and inhuman whippings with a heavy strap on the[ir] naked backs . . . for failure to get 
out the tasks . . . and for nearly everything.’” Durham, supra note 32, at 42 (quoting PRISONS 
AND PRISONERS: HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS 107 (S. Chaneles ed., 1985)). In Kentucky, in 1882, 
leased convicts were “forced to work in waist-deep water in winter, some were killed in cave-ins, 
and beatings were the ‘mainstay of discipline.’” SHICHOR, supra note 4, at 42 (quoting Kentucky 
Corrections Cabinet, Changing Faces, Common Walls: History of Corrections in Kentucky 5 
(1982)). And that same year in Alabama, the new warden of the state penitentiary described the 
inmates as “worn-out, battered men who lived like animals in disgusting quarters, where they 
‘breathed and drank their bodily exhalation and excrement.’” OSHINSKY, supra note 35, at 78. 
This particular warden concluded that the system of convict leasing “is a disgrace to the State 
[and] a reproach to the civilization.” Id. 
 42. “Before the war we owned the negroes. If a man had a good nigger, he could afford to 
take care of him; if he was sick get a doctor. . . . But these convicts: we don’t own ‘em. One dies, 
get another.” Id. at 55 (quoting an unnamed Southern employer in 1883 on the practice of 
convict leasing). 
 43. In the years 1877–1879, the death rate of convicts leased to railroads was 16 percent in 
Mississippi, 25 percent in Arkansas, and 45 percent in South Carolina. SHICHOR, supra note 4, 
at 36. For a chilling state-by-state history of convict leasing in the post–Civil War South, see 
OSHINSKY, supra note 35, at 55–84. 
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whom the state had contracted for the labor of its convicts. In 
California, for example, the state tried in 1858 to rescind a contract 
for the labor of inmates at San Quentin when it became known that 
the contractor, John McCauley, had “blatant[ly] violat[ed]” the terms 
of the contract “to squeeze as much out of the arrangement as 
possible.”44 McCauley had “ignored the physical needs of the convicts, 
ignored the orders sent down from Sacramento, ignored the 
suggestions of his own prison officers, ignored everything but his 
profit.”45 McCauley fought the rescission in court and won, and the 
state, which had entered the contract in the first place to save money 
on the running of San Quentin, had to pay over $200,000 to buy him 
out.46 
The predominant theme of accounts of prison labor contracts 
gone awry is the state’s vulnerability to nonperformance by its 
contracting partner once the state had divested itself of responsibility 
for its prisoners. In Virginia,47 Nebraska,48 and Tennessee,49 the story 
was the same: the state leased its convicts to private interests, 
discovered violations of the contract terms directed to increasing the 
profit of the contractor, and found itself unable to cancel the contract. 
 
 44. Durham, supra note 32, at 44–45. 
 45. Id. at 45 (quoting K. LAMOTT, CHRONICLES OF SAN QUENTIN 52–53 (1961)). 
 46. Id. “What had initially been intended to be a cost-effective solution to California’s 
penal needs turned out to be an expensive debacle that resulted in severe abuses of inmates and 
widespread public embarrassment.” Id.; see also SHICHOR, supra note 4, at 39–41 (describing the 
California experience in detail). California’s experience was not atypical. In 1875, Louisiana 
filed a lawsuit against lessee Samuel James, who had for two years failed to make payments for 
his inmate labor. Despite the lawsuit, James continued both to withhold payments and to violate 
the state’s laws against working convicts outside the prison walls. Durham, supra note 32, at 44. 
In this case, James’s political connections—he was friends with the governor—delayed state 
action, and it was not until 1881 that he began to make good on the money owed. Id.; see also 
John J. DiIulio, Jr., The Duty to Govern: A Critical Perspective on the Private Management of 
Prisons and Jails, in PRIVATE PRISONS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST, supra note 4, at 155, 159. 
Kentucky had a similar experience: despite reports from the state’s investigation committee of 
inmate abuse, unsafe working conditions, and other contractual violations, the contractor’s 
political connections—he was “considered to be one of the most influential persons in the 
state”—kept the state from acting on the committee’s recommendations. SHICHOR, supra note 
4, at 42. 
 47. See Durham, supra note 32, at 44 (“[T]he state’s reliance upon the private sector gave 
private companies the advantage in disputes over contractual issues.”). 
 48. See id. at 45 (“Despite these obvious violations [in penitentiary conditions], it took two 
years before the contract could be terminated, and even then the state was required to buy out 
the contract.”). 
 49. See W.J. Michael Cody & Andy D. Bennett, The Privatization of Correctional 
Institutions: The Tennessee Experience, 40 VAND. L. REV. 829, 834–38 (1987) (recounting the 
decline and eventual abolition of Tennessee’s convict leasing system). 
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The reasons for this incapacity varied from state to state and included 
the lessee’s political connections (as in Louisiana and Kentucky),50 the 
state’s dependence on the contractor to provide for the prisoners’ 
needs (as in New York, where in 1851 the wardens of Auburn 
penitentiary were forced to give significant concessions to the 
contractor running an on-site carpet shop or leave “idle more than 
300 inmates” and risk the loss of necessary revenue),51 and the risk 
that courts would side with the contractors (as in California), thus 
forcing the state to pay dearly to regain state control of its prisons. In 
each case, for these various reasons, once the contracts had been 
signed, the balance of power shifted to the contractors. 
It would be a mistake to draw too many conclusions from this 
history for the current chapter of private sector involvement in 
prisons. The contemporary experience is governed by a set of norms, 
not in place a century ago, forbidding the economic exploitation and 
physical abuse of inmates.52 Today, there is also a stricter standard of 
political accountability,53 an extensive public bureaucracy with the 
capacity to regulate and administer complex institutions,54 and the 
default expectation that the state bears the burden of financing the 
prison system.55 But as will be seen, this history does introduce certain 
themes arising from private involvement in corrections that are still 
relevant today. 
 
 50. See supra note 46. 
 51. Durham, supra note 32, at 43. 
 52. This is not to say that these norms are necessarily honored. On the systematic and 
persistent economic exploitation of prison labor in America since the Civil War, see generally 
Robert P. Weiss, “Repatriating” Low-Wage Work: The Political Economy of Prison Labor 
Reprivatization in the Postindustrial United States, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 253 (2001). 
 53. See, e.g., HARDING, supra note 3, at 27–31 (outlining strict tenets of accountability that 
“the state must require of private contractors and which citizens must require of the state”). 
 54. See McConville, supra note 4, at 224–25 (arguing that the highly developed regulatory 
competency of the modern state has positive “implications for the safe and controlled revival of 
entrepreneurial imprisonment”). 
 55. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 4007 (2000) (establishing that “[t]he expenses attendant upon the 
confinement of persons arrested or committed under the laws of the United States, as well as 
upon the execution of any sentence of a court thereof respecting them, shall be paid out of the 
Treasury of the United States”); Cody & Bennett, supra note 49, at 846 (explaining that the 
“chief difference” between the modern move to privatize prisons in Tennessee and the state’s 
“past practice of convict leasing” is “today’s recognition that the State should bear the burden 
of funding the prison system”). But see Fox Butterfield, Many Local Officials Now Make 
Inmates Pay Their Own Way, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2004, at A1 (“To help cover the costs of 
incarceration, corrections officers and politicians are more frequently billing inmates for their 
room and board, an idea popular with voters.”). 
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B. The Corrections Crisis of 1980s America 
The reemergence of private contractors in American corrections 
is traceable to the dramatic growth in incarceration nationwide over 
the past three decades. In 1985, there were over 740,000 people 
behind bars,56 up from 226,000 ten years previously.57 By 1990, this 
number had hit 1.1 million,58 by 1995, it was almost 1.6 million,59 and 
by 2003 it was over 2.1 million.60 For legislators and prison officials 
around the country, this incarceration explosion created some vexing 
practical problems: Where to put all the convicted offenders? And 
how to pay the bills? 
Initially, state officials nationwide responded to the first of these 
problems—finding room for all the bodies—by shipping convicted 
offenders to existing penal facilities and letting the wardens sort it out 
themselves. The limitations of this approach, however, were soon 
clear, as prisons and jails quickly came to be operating well over 
capacity. Eventually, the courts began issuing orders requiring 
government officials to relieve the overcrowding,61 and it became 
 
 56. HINDELANG CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESEARCH CTR., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 2002, at 478 (2004), available at http:// 
www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/sb2002/sb2002-section6.pdf. 
 57. Steve Cettinger, U.S. Prison Population Hits All-Time High, CORRECTIONS MAG., 
Mar. 1976, at 10. 
 58. HINDELANG CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESEARCH CTR., supra note 56, at 478. 
 59. Id. 
 60. HARRISON & KARBERG, supra note 2, at 1. The incarceration rate in the United States 
thus went from 105 per 100,000 people in 1975, to 200 per 100,000 people in 1985, to an 
astonishing 714 per 100,000 people by 2003. PAIGE M. HARRISON & ALLEN J. BECK, BUREAU 
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BULLETIN NO. NCJ 205335, PRISONERS IN 
2003, at 2 (2004) (incarceration rate in 2003), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/ 
pdf/p03.pdf; PAIGE HARRISON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INCARCERATION RATES FOR 
PRISONERS UNDER STATE OR FEDERAL JURISDICTION, PER 100,000 RESIDENTS (2000) 
(incarceration rate in 1985); POPULATION ESTIMATES PROGRAM, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
HISTORICAL NATIONAL POPULATION ESTIMATES: JULY 1, 1900, TO JULY 1, 1999, at 1 (2000) 
(incarceration rate in 1975), available at http://www.census.gov/popest/archives/1990s/ 
popclockest.txt; Cettinger, supra note 57, at 10 (same). 
 61. See JOSEPH I. HALLINAN, GOING UP THE RIVER: TRAVELS IN A PRISON NATION 164 
(2001) (“By 1984, . . . prisons in thirty-two states and the District of Columbia were under court 
orders or consent decrees . . . . That same year, more than seventeen thousand inmates were 
released from state prisons due to overcrowding.”); Bowditch & Everett, supra note 4, at 442 
(“In 1985, at least one correctional institution in each of 33 states was under court order to 
reduce overcrowding.”). By 1989, the number of prisons under court order to relieve 
overcrowding was up to forty-three. Belkin, supra note 5, at A14. And this problem has not 
gone away. In 1998, thirty states were housing prisoners in jails and other facilities because of 
overcrowding. ALLEN J. BECK & CHRISTOPHER J. MUMOLA, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
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apparent that more prisons had to be built. But this solution, too, had 
its problems: building prisons is not cheap,62 and the building process 
itself can be complicated and time consuming.63 Jurisdictions urgently 
needing new prisons thus faced—and still face—serious obstacles to 
getting new facilities up and running. 
Nor was the second practical problem caused by the rapidly 
increasing incarceration rate—how to foot the bill—fully contained in 
the cost of building new prisons or renovating old ones. Prisons also 
have operating expenses, and these costs, too, can be high.64 
Corrections officials have to be trained and their salaries and benefits 
paid; inmates’ food, clothing, medical care, programming, security, 
and so on, must be provided for; overhead must be covered. In all, by 
the mid-1980s, many states were facing serious budgetary problems 
traceable to the increased cost of running their prison systems, and 
these problems have only grown in intensity as incarceration rates 
have continued their upward climb. 
 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BULLETIN NO. NCJ 175687, PRISONERS IN 1998, at 7 (1999), available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/p98.pdf. 
 62. In 1985, a new high-capacity medium-security facility could cost upwards of $140 
million, the equivalent of more than $240 million in 2003 dollars. See Prototype Prison Late, 
ENGINEERING NEWS-RECORD, Dec. 19, 1985, at 33 (reporting that the cost of the “3800-bed 
medium security [prison] at Vacaville[,] . . . the first new state prison built in California in 22 
years[,]” was estimated to cost $144.7 million, up from the original estimate of $122.5 million); 
see also Gail S. Funke, The Economics of Prison Crowding, 478 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & 
SOC. SCI. 86, 91–92 (1985) (estimating the total cost of a five-hundred-bed medium-security 
prison at $41 million to $44 million, not including site acquisition). 
 63. Typically, when a state or locality seeks to build a new jail or prison, it must ask the 
voters to approve a bond issue to finance the project. However, despite voter support for 
criminal justice policies that emphasize incarceration, voter approval for the financing of new 
facilities is frequently withheld. See Dana C. Joel, The Privatization of Secure Adult Prisons, in 
PRIVATIZING CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS, supra note 4, at 51, 58 (“In the 1980s, an average 
of 60 percent of all local referenda for jail bonds was rejected.”); see also Richard Harding, 
Private Prisons, in 28 CRIME & JUSTICE 265, 270 (Michael Tonry ed., 2001) (“Prisons were not 
high on voters’ priority lists [in the 1980s and 1990s] and prison construction bond proposals 
were voted down.”). And even in cases when voter approval is secured, the process of seeing a 
publicly funded capital project to fruition can be a lengthy one, with many procedural steps not 
required when building projects are privately financed. See Herman B. Leonard, Private Time: 
The Political Economy of Private Prison Finance, in PRIVATE PRISONS AND THE PUBLIC 
INTEREST, supra note 4, at 66, 73 (explaining that this process can involve public budgetary 
hearings on the appropriation of funds, referenda on the bond issue itself, design competitions, 
and time to conform to statutory obligations accompanying the raising of new public buildings). 
 64. For example, in 1985, the estimated annual cost of running a five-hundred-bed 
medium-security facility was $7 million per year, or some $14,000 per prisoner. Funke, supra 
note 62, at 93. To give some idea of the total operating cost of American prisons at that time, in 
1985, there were 742,579 people incarcerated in the country, HINDELANG CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
RESEARCH CTR., supra note 56, at 478, up from 225,903 in 1975, Cettinger, supra note 57, at 10. 
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C. Enter the Private Sector 
It was under these circumstances that the states turned to the 
private sector for help. The help offered took two forms. First, the 
private sector offered to assist states with the capital financing of 
prison construction, a version of private sector involvement known as 
“nominal privatization.”65 Second, private firms offered to take over 
the day-to-day management of entire penal facilities, pledging to run 
the prisons at a lower cost than the state would otherwise pay. At the 
time these firms emerged, this latter form of privatization— 
“operational privatization”66—was not a new idea; in the late 1970s, 
the federal Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) had begun 
contracting with private firms for the building and operation of 
holding facilities for illegal immigrants awaiting hearings or 
deportation.67 What was new was the status of those to be housed in 
the privately managed facilities—adults convicted of crimes and 
sentenced to state custody as punishment.68 Notwithstanding this 
 
 65. Leonard, supra note 63, at 70–71. Nominal privatization locates the ownership of penal 
facilities in private hands. Id. at 69. Forms of nominal privatization range from prisons built “on 
spec” by private firms acting independently in the hope of winning government contracts to 
house prisoners, to “lease purchase” agreements, which may directly involve the relevant public 
agency in the building process although the financing comes entirely from the private sector. Id. 
at 68–69; see also Jan Elvin, A Civil Liberties View of Private Prisons, 65 PRISON J. 47, 48 (1985) 
(describing a 1983 E.F. Hutton brochure entitled “Innovative Alternatives to Traditional Jail 
Financing”). Building prisons on spec has become more widespread in recent years as local 
communities, seeking to foster economic development, have teamed up with private prison 
providers to build prisons as a means of attracting government contracts to house convicted 
offenders. See Sasha Abramsky, Incarceration, Inc.: Private Prisons Thrive on Cheap Labor and 
the Hunger of Job-Starved Towns, THE NATION, July 19, 2004, at 22, 24–25 (noting the trend of 
on-spec private prisons in small, sparsely populated Texas counties). 
 66. Leonard, supra note 63, at 69–70. 
 67. See McDonald 1994, supra note 4, at 30 (describing the INS’s early use of “contracting 
with private firms to detain illegal immigrants pending hearings or deportation”). By 1988, 
almost one-third of the 2,700 people then held by the INS were in privately run detention 
centers. Id.; see also James Austin & Garry Coventry, Are We Better Off? Comparing Private 
and Public Prisons in the United States, 11 CURRENT ISSUES IN CRIM. JUST. 177, 183 (1999) 
(describing the early privatization of juvenile detention centers). 
 68. Privately managed jails also house individuals charged with crimes and awaiting trial. 
Sarah Armstrong & David Moulton, Policy Considerations in the Privatization of Local 
Detention Facilities, in CONTRACTING OUT GOVERNMENT SERVICES 122, 127 (Paul Seidenstat 
ed., 1999); David Sedore, Private Prisons Don’t Lock in Savings: There’s Little Evidence to 
Support the Decade-Old Notion that Letting Businesses like Wackenhut Build and Run Lock-Ups 
Is Saving Tax Dollars, BROWARD DAILY BUS. REV., May 16, 1997, at A8 (explaining that the 
Florida “[l]egislature began its experiment with private prisons [in the 1980s], awarding CCA a 
contract to run the Bay Correctional Facility, a local jail in Panama City that houses prisoners 
awaiting trial”). 
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difference, the process of privatizing the prisons took the same form 
as with the previously privatized INS facilities: states deciding which 
facilities to privatize and issuing a request for proposals (RFP),69 firms 
bidding for the contract, and the winning firm getting a set payment 
per inmate per day in exchange for assuming responsibility for 
running the facility and providing for inmates’ needs. There are 
variations on this standard arrangement,70 but the basic idea in each 
case is the same: “the state remains the ultimate paymaster and the 
opportunity for private profit is found only in the ability of the 
contractor to deliver the agreed services at a cost below the 
negotiated sum.”71 
The present Article focuses on this latter, operational form of 
privatization.72 The state’s motivation in relying on the private sector 
in this way is a simple one—to find a way to house the growing 
inmate population while keeping costs down.73 And the prison-
 
 69. See HARDING, supra note 3, at 71–74 (outlining the primary stages in the establishment 
of a private prison). RFPs articulate the agency’s specific requirements for the proposed 
institution. Private firms answer with proposals that include detailed descriptions of the facility 
they plan to build. Michael Keating Jr. advises that agencies should encourage collaboration 
between operations management and legal advisors at an early stage in an RFP’s development 
to avoid the dilution of specified standards that would lead to “an equally murky contract.” 
Michael Keating, Jr., Public Over Private: Monitoring the Performance of Privately Operated 
Prisons and Jails, in PRIVATE PRISONS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST, supra note 4, at 130, 143. 
 70. In the case of operational privatization, the responsibility delegated to private 
correctional firms can range from day-to-day operation of a facility, to the increasingly common 
full-service “DCFM” contracts (for “design, construct, finance and manage”) which blend 
nominal and operational forms of privatization, to intermediate variants. HARDING, supra note 
3, at 12–13. 
 71. Id. at 2. 
 72. At the same time, issues relating to prison construction are not irrelevant to this 
analysis. In particular, as will be seen, decisions as to when and where to build prisons generate 
parsimony concerns much like those raised by operational privatization. See infra Part IV. 
 73. See HALLINAN, supra note 61, at 167 (“The success of private prisons . . . is driven by a 
single premise: They are cheaper than their public counterparts.”); Harding, supra note 63, at 
310 (describing the origins of prison privatization in the United States as “less about doing a 
different job more innovatively than doing the same job less expensively”). Some private prison 
advocates also argue that privatization would lead through innovation to an increase in the 
quality and safety of prisons. See, e.g., McConville, supra note 4, at 240 (“[T]here seems every 
reason to believe that private correctional concerns would make an appreciable and welcome 
contribution to an easing of crowding problems.”). As Harding puts it, however, “[t]he notion of 
improving prisons and correctional regimes was not overly prominent in U.S. debates about 
privatization. . . . [Privatization] might well improve prisons and conditions, but that was not the 
main point.” Harding, supra note 63, at 272. 
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management companies themselves are equally financially 
motivated—the aim was, and is, to make a profit.74 
The first private entity formed to take advantage of this new 
business opportunity was Corrections Corporation of America 
(CCA), founded in Nashville in 1983.75 CCA’s founders had no 
experience in corrections, but from the start, the company’s 
management personnel were drawn from the public sector, including 
former state corrections commissioners,76 at least one former head of 
the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP),77 and any number of former 
state prison wardens and superintendents.78 Wackenhut Corrections 
Corporation, the prison-management division of global security giant 
Wackenhut Security, Inc.,79 entered the market soon after. Both CCA 
and Wackenhut were turning a profit by the late 1980s, and by the 
mid-1990s, they together controlled 75 percent of the American 
private prison market.80 
 
 74. See, e.g., Robbins 1987, supra note 4, at 816 (“We’ll hopefully make a buck at it. I’m not 
going to kid any of you and say we are in this for humanitarian reasons.” (quoting the director 
of program development of Triad American Corporation, “a multimillion dollar Utah-based 
company that had been considering proposing a privately-run county jail in Missoula, 
Montana”)). 
 75. HALLINAN, supra note 61, at 164; see Alan Mobley & Gilbert Geis, The Corrections 
Corporation of America aka the Prison Realty Trust, Inc., in PRIVATIZATION IN CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 207, 209 (David Shichor & Michael J. Gilbert eds., 
2001) (detailing the history of CCA’s founding). CCA “was financed in part by some of the 
same investors that had helped launch both the Hospital Corporation of America and Kentucky 
Fried Chicken.” Aric Press, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: Private Prisons in the 1980s, in 
PRIVATE PRISONS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST, supra note 4, at 19, 19. 
 76. For example, CCA Executive Vice President T. Don Hutto was formerly corrections 
commissioner in both Arkansas and Virginia. J. Robert Lilly & Paul Knepper, The Corrections-
Commercial Complex, 39 CRIME & DELINQ. 150, 159 (1993) (listing the many former public 
corrections officials subsequently employed by private prison companies). 
 77. Michael Quinlan, former CEO of CCA, was director of the Bureau of Prisons from 
1987 to 1992. Mobley & Geis, supra note 75, at 207, 216. 
 78. See HALLINAN, supra note 61, at 173–74 (offering a list of “former [prison] wardens 
and superintendents who had jumped ship to work in the private sector,” and explaining that 
“[t]he ranks of big companies like [CCA] are peppered with them”). In this regard, CCA is 
hardly alone, as the roster of officers of any number of private prison-management companies 
will attest. See Lilly & Knepper, supra note 76, at 158–59 (listing the many former public 
corrections officials subsequently employed by private prison companies). 
 79. See Press, supra note 75, at 19 (“The new [private prison] industry attracted serious 
money men from, among others: a division of Bechtel, the giant defense contractor; [and] 
Wackenhut, the nation’s largest private security firm . . . .”). In 2003, Wackenhut Corrections 
changed its name to “GEO Group.” PR NEWSWIRE, The GEO Group, Inc. to Start Trading on 
the New York Stock Exchange Under New Name and New Ticker Symbol, Jan. 20, 2004. 
 80. Xiong, supra note 5, at C5. 
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From the start, these companies faced a serious challenge, one 
that remains for any company trying to make money from running a 
prison. If the state is to reduce the cost of its prisons through 
contracting out to the private sector, the contract price must be less 
than the total cost the state would otherwise incur in operating the 
facility.81 And if private providers are likewise to make money on the 
venture, they must spend less to run the prisons than the contract 
price provides. For such arrangements to be remunerative for both 
parties, therefore, private prisons must be run at a considerably lower 
cost than the state would otherwise incur. At the same time, 
contractors must not allow either the quality of conditions of 
confinement or inmate safety to drop below existing levels; even 
staunch advocates of private prisons have insisted that “concern with 
cost savings should not outweigh considerations of quality.”82 
In practice, private prison providers have seemed little 
concerned with meeting this challenge. Instead, the anecdotal 
evidence suggests that contractors have prioritized economy above all 
 
 81. Indeed, some states make such cost savings a condition of contracting, writing the 
requirement right into the statutes. The Tennessee statute, for example, provides that no contract 
bid may be accepted unless “[t]he cost of the private operation and the cost to the state to monitor 
the private operation, shall be at least five percent (5%) less than the state’s cost for essentially the 
same services.” TENN. CODE ANN. § 41-24-104(c)(2)(B) (2004); see also FLA. STAT. ANN.  
§ 957.07(1) (West Supp. 2004) (“The Department of Management Services may not enter into a 
contract or series of contracts unless the department determines that the contract or series of 
contracts . . . will result in a cost savings of at least 7 percent over the public provision of a similar 
facility.”). 
It can be difficult to calculate precisely the full cost to the state of running its prisons. The 
“true cost to government” is obscured by the fact that “several costs of operating prisons and 
jails are not borne by the correctional agency but by a number of different agencies or different 
government accounts.” DOUGLAS MCDONALD ET AL., PRIVATE PRISONS IN THE UNITED 
STATES: AN ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT PRACTICE 36 (1998). These hidden costs can include, 
among others, employee benefits, some inmate medical care, utilities, and “the true cost of 
insurance,” which “may be overlooked, as governments generally self-insure by paying for 
unpredictable costs when they are incurred, rather than spreading these costs over all years.” Id. 
At the same time, “[a] parallel problem exists with respect to identifying all costs to government 
for contracting,” because “[p]rivate firms may not always bear all the costs of imprisonment.” 
Id. Among those activities “sometimes necessary to support private facilities” that “were paid 
by government” include “inspection and licensing,” “personnel training,” some “high-cost and 
catastrophic” medical or dental care for inmates, inmate transportation, case management, 
“background checks for visitors and volunteers,” pardon and parole review, “accounting and 
banking of inmate funds,” “payment of inmate wages,” and emergency response. Id. at 36–37. 
These hidden costs create problems for the state, both in trying to fix an appropriate contract 
price and in trying to determine whether privatization indeed saves money. But private prison 
contractors do not face this same problem, for their opportunity for making money lies solely in 
their capacity to run the prison for less than the contract price. 
 82. LOGAN, supra note 4, at 120. 
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else, with disturbing results for the inmates themselves. Consider, for 
example, CCA’s Youngstown, Ohio, facility. When the Youngstown 
facility opened in 1997, CCA filled the medium-security prison with 
prisoners from the overburdened Washington, D.C., prison system.83 
The incoming D.C. inmates included a number of violent inmates 
classified as “maximum-security, high-risk,” which CCA 
“reclassified” as medium security to fill the beds without having to 
equip the facility to handle maximum-security inmates.84 Over the 
next eighteen months, the Youngstown facility saw more than forty-
four assaults and two fatal stabbings,85 including one inmate who was 
stabbed to death when a shortage of beds in the administrative 
segregation unit (a prison’s protective custody area) led prison 
officials to house the victim with two men who had been threatening 
his life.86 
At CCA Youngstown, economizing also took other forms. 
Former employees of the prison, for example, reported receiving a 
“rundown” by their employers, “saying two slices of bread per inmate 
costs this much. If you can cut corners here, it would mean a possible 
raise for us.”87 At Youngstown, even the “toilet paper was rationed,” 
to the point that “inmates were forced to go without it, using their 
bedsheets instead.”88 
Other incidents elsewhere suggest Youngstown is not unique for 
either its cost cutting or the troubling effects of such measures.89 This 
 
 83. 60 Minutes: Private Prisons Break Rules to Make a Profit (CBS television broadcast 
May 2, 1999). 
 84. Id.; see also HALLINAN, supra note 61, at 180 (explaining that CCA Youngstown “was 
not supposed to accept maximum-security inmates,” but that “when they arrived, CCA did not 
object,” for doing so would have cost the company $14,659 per day in lost revenue”). 
 85. Cheryl W. Thompson, Ohio Issues Restraining Order for Prison Firm; Control of 
Facility Cannot Be Changed, WASH. POST, Nov. 19, 1998, at B4. 
 86. All Things Considered (NPR broadcast Mar. 27, 1998), available at 1998 WL 3644336. 
 87. Mark Tatge, Employees Criticize Privately Run Facilities, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, 
Aug. 30, 1998, at 18A (quoting Daniel Eshenbaugh and Robert Oliver, former correctional 
officers at the CCA Youngstown facility). 
 88. Id. 
 89. In 1996, for example, minimally trained employees of a Capital Corrections Resources-
run jail in Brazoria County, Texas, were captured on videotape “forcing prisoners to crawl, 
kicking them and encouraging dogs to bite them.” Prison Privatization Is No Panacea, 
HARTFORD COURANT, Aug. 24, 1997, at C2. At the time of the beating, the jailers had “had only 
40 hours of classroom training.” Kim Bell, Texas Jail Says Incident Was Overblown, ST. LOUIS 
POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 26, 1997, at 1A. At a CCA-run INS facility in Houston, “inmates were 
contained in large dormitories, each containing between 50 and 60 beds with no privacy 
whatsoever; no lockers; [and] no screening around the toilets or showers, which were open to 
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is not surprising, for efforts by private prison providers to cut costs 
even at the expense of inmates is the entirely predictable result of the 
existing structure of private prison contracts. Indeed, as I show, there 
is good reason to think that, where both the state and the contractor 
seek financial advantage, the challenge private prison contractors 
face—of running the prisons for less money than the state would 
otherwise pay without also bringing about a drop in the quality of 
prison conditions—cannot be met. There is, moreover, a further 
concern to which the use of private prisons gives rise, that fostering 
the private prison industry could create a powerful constituency with 
a financial interest in longer prison sentences, and the political clout 
to push sentencing policy in this direction, regardless of whether such 
punishments are consistent with the demands of legitimate 
punishment. These two possibilities lie at the root of the liberal 
critique of private prisons. But before this critique can be pursued, 
more must be said about the foundation of the legitimacy standard on 
which it rests. 
II.  A LIBERAL STANDARD OF LEGITIMATE PUNISHMENT 
Legitimate punishment in liberal democracy has several 
components.90 Of these, two in particular bear most centrally on the 
legitimacy of penal policies and practices: the humanity principle, 
which obliges the state to avoid imposing punishments that are 
gratuitously inhumane, and the parsimony principle, which obliges 
 
view by both male and female staff.” Ellen Simon, Prisons for Profit: Who’s Minding the Rights 
of Inmates When Justice Goes to the Lowest Bidder?, 19 HUM. RIGHTS 22, 24 (Spring 1992) 
(quoting a British Prison Officers’ report). Dunham recounts a list of practices traceable to 
private prison providers’ “excessive cost consciousness,” Dunham, supra note 4, at 1495, 
including the housing of “sixteen aliens for two days in a cell designed for only six persons,” id. 
(citing Medina v. O’Neill, 589 F. Supp. 1028, 1041 (S.D. Tex. 1984)), failing “to provide 
adequate meals, staffing, and sanitation,” id., and “failing to attend to the medical needs of an 
indigent prisoner because, in part, the prisoner could not pay for his treatment,” id. (citing 
Ancata v. Prison Health Servs., 769 F.2d 700, 704 (11th Cir. 1985)). See infra text accompanying 
notes 236–38 (describing conditions that led the INS to close its Elizabeth, New Jersey, facility 
run by Esmor Correctional Services and conditions at Louisiana’s Tallulah Correctional Center 
for Youth, run by Trans-American Corporation, which was finally closed in 2004); see also 
Kathleen Kenna, “You Better Be Damn Careful”: Tour of US Prisons Suggests Ontario Should 
Think Twice About Private Jails, TORONTO STAR, Nov. 28, 1999, at F1 (reporting that, in South 
Carolina, “[t]he state cancelled a contract with CCA after allegations of brutality at a young 
offender facility” in which “[o]ne teen was allegedly hog-tied more than 30 times by guards as 
punishment,” and “[o]thers were squeezed 18 to a one-person cell with no toilets, only cups”). 
 90. See Dolovich, supra note 8, at 408–09, 411 (summarizing the five principles under which 
the punishment of criminals in a liberal democracy is legitimate). 
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the state to avoid imposing punishments of incarceration that are 
gratuitously long. In each case, gratuitous punishment is that which 
cannot be justified to all members of society under fair deliberative 
conditions.91 These principles reflect familiar liberal ideals: that 
society owes particular obligations of respect and consideration 
toward fellow human beings, especially those rendered helpless, 
dependent, and vulnerable by actions society itself has undertaken, 
and that any violation of the liberty and dignity of citizens by the state 
demands compelling justification. 
In what follows, I provide a foundation for these ideals in the 
theory of legitimate punishment in liberal democracy I have 
developed in greater detail elsewhere.92 Doing so grounds the 
intuitions informing the liberal principles of humanity and parsimony, 
and thereby enriches our understanding of the obligations incurred 
when the state punishes convicted offenders. 
A. A Rawlsian Model of Legitimate Punishment 
State punishment represents a dilemma for liberal democratic 
societies.93 For while punishment as a form of state power protects 
citizens from crime, it also represents the exercise of extremely 
oppressive force—at times even deadly force—by the state against its 
own citizens. A central challenge for any liberal theory is thus to 
establish the principles under which, in the name of criminal 
punishment, the state may legitimately burden, perhaps severely, the 
liberty, dignity, and bodily integrity of sovereign citizens. 
How is the content of such principles to be determined? As I 
have elsewhere argued,94 following Rawls, if the exercise of the state’s 
power to punish in a liberal democracy is to be legitimate, it must be 
justifiable on terms that all those subject to this power would accept 
as just and fair under conditions of strict impartiality. Why conditions 
of strict impartiality? In a liberal democracy, all citizens are entitled 
to equal consideration and respect. All citizens, moreover, may be 
presumed to have an urgent interest in the greatest possible 
 
 91. See supra note 18. 
 92. Those familiar with that previous work may prefer to skip this Part. 
 93. See discussion supra note 15. 
 94. See Dolovich, supra note 8, at 313–15 (developing a theory of legitimate punishment 
through application of a Rawlsian model of deliberation by parties in an original position, 
operating behind a veil of ignorance that has been suitably framed for a social context in which 
the problem of punishment is salient). 
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protection of what I have called their “security and integrity,” that is, 
security from assault on and interference with their physical and 
psychological integrity and well-being.95 These goods are fundamental 
to the exercise of individual freedom and self-development. They are 
also at great risk of violation by both crime and punishment. All 
citizens thus have an important stake in the terms on which state 
punishment is imposed on criminal offenders. But if these terms were 
established absent conditions of strict impartiality, there would be a 
danger that those parties with the most power and influence would 
simply choose principles of punishment that would most protect the 
security and integrity of people like themselves and do little to 
protect the security and integrity of society’s most vulnerable 
members. Indeed, the most powerful citizens might even choose 
principles of punishment that put the urgent interests of the most 
vulnerable citizens at risk, if doing so would benefit themselves in any 
way. Of particular relevance to the present project, for example, they 
might impose punishment regimes that burden the security and 
integrity of the most vulnerable in order that they themselves could 
benefit financially.96 
Applying Rawls’s model of the “original position” with its “veil 
of ignorance”97 to the problem of punishment guards against this 
possibility. Behind the veil of ignorance, the parties selecting the 
principles of punishment know nothing of their own personal 
particulars or conception of the good. They can therefore only 
safeguard their own urgent interest in the greatest possible protection 
of their security and integrity if they choose principles that would also 
safeguard the like interest of all others. In this way, the strict 
impartiality of the modified Rawlsian model98 ensures that parties 
 
 95. See id. at 352–55. 
 96. The Mississippi legislature arguably did just this in passing its 1876 “Pig Law.” 
Oshinsky, supra note 35, at 40; see also supra notes 37–40 and accompanying text. 
 97. Behind the veil of ignorance, deliberating parties know nothing about the specifics of 
their own society or the particulars of their personal identity and social position. See JOHN 
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 137 (1971) (“Somehow we must nullify the effects of specific 
contingencies which put men at odds and tempt them to exploit social and natural circumstances 
to their own advantage.”). 
 98. The model is modified for the particular problem of punishment. See Dolovich, supra 
note 8, at 350–52, where I argue that to apply Rawls’s model to the problem of punishment, its 
assumption of strict compliance by citizens in a well-ordered society must be replaced by the 
assumptions of a partially compliant society, in which (1) not all citizens may be relied on to act 
justly; (2) criminal justice institutions are flawed and untrustworthy and recognized as such; and 
(3) society’s background conditions are unjust and known to be so. 
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choosing principles of punishment will consider the various options 
from all possible social positions—including that of society’s least 
powerful and most vulnerable members. This standard of strict 
impartiality thus ensures equal consideration and respect for the 
liberty, dignity, and bodily integrity of all sovereign citizens. 
B. The Humanity and Parsimony Principles Derived 
The question then becomes: what constraints on the state’s 
criminal justice policies would emerge from the deliberative model 
just described? Elsewhere, I identify several such constraining 
conditions.99 That analysis yields two principles, those of humanity 
and parsimony, which bear directly on the legitimacy of penal policies 
and practices. Space does not permit me here to provide full 
analytical support for this assertion, but brief consideration of the 
perspective of the deliberating parties in the original position should 
be sufficient to motivate the claim.100 
Behind the veil, the parties know nothing of their own social 
position or personal particulars, but they do know that they will have 
some conception of the good that they will want to realize. They also 
know that they are choosing principles of punishment for a partially 
compliant society, that is, a society with some measure of crime, 
where innocent people are sometimes wrongfully convicted and 
punished, and in which social goods are unjustly distributed.101 The 
parties will thus anticipate a threat to their security and integrity from 
both crime and punishment,102 and they will seek principles that best 
protect these goods. How are they to do so? Behind the veil, the 
parties would reason according to the “leximin” variant of the 
“maximin” rule.103 Maximin holds that under conditions of 
 
 99. See id. at 408–09, 411. 
 100. For further discussion on the theoretical grounding of these two conditions, see 
discussion infra Part III.A (on the humanity principle) and infra Part IV.A (on the parsimony 
principle). 
 101. For more on the conditions of partial compliance in the punishment context, see 
Dolovich, supra note 8, at 350–51. 
 102. For a response to the objection that parties in the original position will have no reason 
to fear punishment, see infra note 110. 
 103. See RAWLS, supra note 97, at 152–53 (“The maximin rule tells us to rank alternatives by 
their worst possible outcomes: we are to adopt the alternative the worst outcome of which is 
superior to the worst outcomes of the others.”). On the variant of maximin Rawls calls the 
“lexical difference principle”: 
[I]n a basic structure with n relevant representatives, first maximize the welfare of the 
worst-off representative man; second, for equal welfare of the worst-off 
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uncertainty,104 those wishing to maximize their prospects should 
assume that, once the veil is lifted, they will end up in the position of 
society’s worst off.105 Leximin then directs deliberators to select those 
principles that would guarantee the best possible result for the worst-
off citizen who stands to be affected, and not to be “much concerned 
for what might be gained” by those who wind up in more fortunate 
positions.106 
The parties will thus select those principles of punishment that 
provide the greatest possible protection for the security and integrity 
of the worst off. This means the parties would not agree to principles 
that could compromise the security and integrity of the worst off in 
order that other better-off members of society might satisfy their less 
urgent interest in accruing financial advantage—an interest that is less 
urgent because it is unconnected to the protection of anyone’s 
security and integrity.107 This stance can be understood as constituting 
a priority rule—call it “the priority of the most urgent interests”—to 
 
representative man, maximize the welfare of the second worst-off representative man, 
and so on until the last case which is, for equal welfare of all the preceding n–1 
representatives, maximize the welfare of the best-off representative man. We may 
think of this as the lexical difference principle. 
Id. at 83. This principle has come to be known as “leximin.” See Dolovich, supra note 8, at 382. 
For a more detailed discussion of the parties’ need for leximin in the process of selecting the 
principles of punishment for a partially compliant society, see id. at 379–85. 
 104. Some readers may object that risk rather than uncertainty is the more appropriate 
description of the situation facing the parties behind the veil. For a justification of the position 
taken here, see Dolovich, supra note 8, at 342–46. 
 105. The “worst off” position here is judged on the basis of citizens’ security and integrity. 
This is because, in considering the principles of punishment, the worst-off person who stands to 
be affected by the application of state punishment in any given case will be either the proposed 
target or the crime victim whose violation may thereby be prevented. In either circumstance, the 
most urgent concern facing the parties will be the greatest possible protection of their security 
and integrity. 
 106. JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 98 (2001). 
 107. Protection of an individual’s financial interests is not in all cases distinct from 
protecting his or her security and integrity. Consider, for example, “a crooked telemarketer who 
specializes in swindling elderly people out of their life savings.” Personal communication with 
David Dolinko, UCLA School of Law (Aug. 17, 2004). The apprehension, conviction, and 
incarceration of this criminal could be said to be motivated in part by the desire, “[v]ia 
deterrence, . . . to enhance the financial security of elderly people who are vulnerable to 
swindlers.” Id. But such cases are distinguishable from those that the parties in the original 
position would reject. What the parties would reject are principles that would compromise their 
own security and integrity to enhance another’s financial position or otherwise to secure the 
financial interests of other persons where those interests are unconnected to preserving the 
security and integrity of those others. It is financial interest in this sense for which the parties 
would be unwilling to sacrifice their own more urgent interest in the protection of their security 
and integrity. 
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govern the selection of the principles of punishment.108 Security and 
integrity are necessary preconditions for the exercise of all other basic 
liberties, prior even to material goods.109 The parties, consistent with 
the priority of the most urgent interests, would therefore reject any 
principles authorizing punishment that would only enhance anyone’s 
less urgent financial interests at the expense of the more urgent 
interest of the worst off in the protection of their security and 
integrity. 
Both the humanity principle and the parsimony principle flow 
from this priority rule. Behind the veil, the parties cannot be 
confident that, once the veil is lifted and they enter society as citizens, 
they will not end up as either crime victims or targets of 
punishment.110 They also know that incarceration represents a serious 
violation of the security and integrity of the target.111 They will thus 
choose principles of punishment that impose incarceration only 
 
 108. Cf. RAWLS, supra note 106, at 47 (“[T]his priority rule rules out exchanges (‘trade-offs,’ 
as economists say) between the basic rights and liberties covered by the first principle and the 
social and economic advantages regulated by the difference principle.”). 
 109. Without the protection of one’s security and integrity, the provision of adequate 
material resources can mean little for the possibility of exercising even the basic liberties. For 
further elaboration of this argument, see Dolovich, supra note 8, at 352–56. 
 110. It might be objected that the veil of ignorance only obscures the parties’ knowledge of 
morally arbitrary attributes, and that whether one is a target of state punishment is not morally 
arbitrary but instead the product of morally blameworthy conduct. However, the issue for the 
parties is not whether guilty offenders are to be held morally responsible for their actions (they 
are, see id. at 336–42), but whether, once the veil is lifted and the parties enter society as 
citizens, they could wind up as convicted offenders facing punishment. The parties would thus 
face a very practical question: whether, despite the conditions of partial compliance and their 
ignorance of the nature of their own (morally arbitrary) attributes, they could nevertheless be 
fully confident that they would always be in sufficient control over their (morally relevant) 
actions to guarantee that they would always be able to avoid any criminal actions for which they 
would be held fully responsible and punished, perhaps severely. And as I have elsewhere 
indicated, id. at 319, the answer to this question must be no, for three reasons. First, the danger 
of wrongful convictions in a partially compliant society means that even innocent people could 
find themselves facing criminal punishment once the veil is lifted. Second, although all citizens 
in a partially compliant society are stipulated to have the basic moral powers to the requisite 
minimum degree, the parties still know that they are human beings, with all the qualities of 
impulsiveness, bad judgment, proneness to error, and other limitations this status entails. And 
third and finally, an unjust distribution of goods in a partially compliant society means that 
citizens will differ dramatically in terms of both the pressures and temptations they face to 
offend against others, and the economic and moral resources with which they are equipped to 
resist such pressures and temptations. For these reasons, the parties cannot with confidence say 
in advance that they themselves will never end up as convicted offenders facing state 
punishment once the veil is lifted. For a more complete response to this objection, see id. at 
317–20, 364–77. 
 111. Id. at 356–57. 
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when—and only to the extent that—doing so will maximize the 
security and integrity of the worst-off person who stands to be 
affected.112 To the extent that a prison sentence would worsen the 
condition of the target vis-à-vis that person’s security and integrity 
without improving anyone else’s condition vis-à-vis their security and 
integrity, it would be viewed as merely gratuitous and thus beyond 
the scope of punishments the state may legitimately authorize.113 
Hence the parsimony principle, which prohibits gratuitously severe 
punishments.114 
To this point, humane punishment has been assumed. The 
parsimony principle is thus concerned exclusively with length of 
sentence. But what of inhumane punishment? Under some extremely 
limited circumstances, imposing inhumane punishment may be 
consistent with maximizing the security and integrity of the least-well-
off person who stands to be affected.115 In the vast majority of cases, 
however, the imposition of any inhumane punishment would not 
satisfy these limited circumstances. And where it would not do so, it, 
too, would be merely gratuitous, and consequently illegitimate. 
Hence the humanity principle, which prohibits gratuitous inhumane 
punishment. 
To identify the principles of legitimate punishment is no 
guarantee that the punishments actually imposed will in fact be 
legitimate. Many hurdles to effective implementation still exist.116 
Perhaps chief among them is ensuring that the political process that 
translates the principles into policies remains unaffected by 
illegitimate influences. Such legislative-stage processes are as 
vulnerable as deliberation over the basic principles themselves to 
being skewed toward serving the interests, urgent or otherwise, of the 
politically powerful at the expense of the urgent interests of more 
vulnerable citizens. Ideally, to guard against any such abuses, parties 
deliberating at the legislative stage as to how to implement the 
principles of legitimate punishment would do so as if behind a 
“modified veil.” Such a veil would continue to screen out individuals’ 
knowledge of their personal particulars while allowing full access to 
 
 112. Id. at 385–94; see also supra notes 105–06 and accompanying text. 
 113. Dolovich, supra note 8, at 379–85. 
 114. Note that, in cases in which any incarceration at all would be unjustified, a sentence of 
even one day would be gratuitously severe and thus in violation of the parsimony principle. 
 115. Id. at 411–16; see also infra notes 121–23 and accompanying text. 
 116. Dolovich, supra note 8, at 419–28. 
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the facts about society that are necessary to crafting meaningful 
policy.117 
In the real world, the legislative process falls somewhat short of 
this ideal. State officials, however, are still obliged to do what they 
can to secure the necessary conditions for legitimate punishment and 
to avoid taking steps likely to corrupt these conditions. This 
imperative may be thought of as an “integrity condition,” against 
which any criminal justice policy must be measured. Where legislators 
fail to satisfy this condition, the criminal justice system may come to 
lack integrity, a circumstance that could lead not only to illegitimate 
punishment but also to citizens’ widespread mistrust of the society’s 
criminal justice institutions. This danger, although certainly present 
where the issue is the humanity of conditions of confinement, is 
particularly salient in the parsimony context, where the issue is the 
severity of the sentences imposed. It is thus in the discussion of the 
parsimony principle that consideration of the integrity condition will 
most inform the analysis.118 
III.  PRIVATE PRISONS AND THE HUMANITY PRINCIPLE 
A. Understanding the Humanity Principle 
The humanity principle, concerned with the conditions of 
confinement under which a given sentence is served, forbids 
 
 117. On the modified veil and its purposes at the legislative stage, see RAWLS, supra note 97, 
at 200–01. The modified veil relevant at the legislative stage is to be distinguished from the 
modifications made to Rawls’s model of the well-ordered society, relevant at the initial stage at 
which the principles of punishment are determined. See Dolovich, supra note 8, at 351 
(describing the modifications necessary to render Rawls’s model applicable to the problem of 
punishment). 
 118. In what follows, I consider the state’s use of private prisons in light of the principles of 
humanity and parsimony. In doing so, I directly consider the structure and functioning of private 
prisons, and the political context in which they operate. This approach may create the 
impression that my framework for analysis is not liberal at all, but is instead consequentialist. 
Concern with consequences, however, is not the exclusive province of consequentialists. True, 
the liberal perspective as I have sketched it here requires a determination whether the state’s 
use of private prisons is consistent with the requirements of humanity and parsimony, which are 
themselves abstract principles. But to make this determination, it must be established whether 
the use of this penal form is in fact humane, and whether it is in fact consistent with the 
obligation to avoid imposing punishments of unjustified severity. It is therefore necessary to 
consider the practical consequences of private prisons, both for the inmates themselves and for 
the processes that determine the sentences imposed. That this is so does not make this approach 
consequentialist, any more than the utilitarian commitment to the principle of the “greatest 
happiness for the greatest number” renders that moral theory deontological. 
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gratuitous inhumane punishment.119 Inhumane punishments are those 
punishments imposed under conditions that degrade, humiliate, or 
otherwise seriously compromise essential aspects of the moral 
personhood of the target.120 I take it as uncontroversial that 
punishments of this sort would include those that subject targets to 
nontrivial deprivations of the basic necessities of human life—
adequate food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and so on—as well as 
those that pose an ongoing threat of physical or sexual assault. 
Inhumane punishment may not always be incompatible with the 
demands of liberal legitimacy in a partially compliant society.121 
However, the circumstances under which such punishment might be 
legitimate are highly circumscribed, and at the very least would be 
subject to two main limiting conditions.122 First, where the state’s 
legitimate purposes can be achieved through either humane or 
inhumane forms of punishment, the state must impose only the 
former. And second, any inhumane punishment imposed must not be, 
in either duration or form, more severe than necessary to serve 
legitimate purposes. Each of these conditions is imposed for the same 
reason: any inhumane punishment beyond these points would be 
merely gratuitous and, therefore, illegitimate.123 
The limiting conditions on inhumane punishment required by the 
liberal perspective understand “gratuitous” punishment through the 
lens of the priority of the most urgent interests. Put more formally, no 
punishment that compromises the essential aspects of the target’s 
moral personhood may be imposed unless it can be reasonably certain 
and necessary to appreciably deter violations of the equally urgent 
interests of others who are as badly off as the incarcerated. It 
therefore follows that no inhumane punishment may be imposed in 
order to maximize the less urgent interests of anyone in their own 
financial gain, for any such inhumane punishment would necessarily 
be merely gratuitous. 
How might this principle prohibiting gratuitous inhumane 
punishment be applied in the policy realm? For one thing, it would be 
an insufficient justification for inhumane treatment that money would 
 
 119. See Dolovich, supra note 8, at 409–19 (elaborating and defending this principle). 
 120. For further discussion of this notion, see id. at 409–11. 
 121. See id. at 409–19. This is not to say that the imposition of such punishment would be 
affirmatively legitimate on this model—it is merely to say that it may not be clearly ruled out. 
 122. See id. at 417–18. 
 123. See id. at 411–12. 
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be thereby freed up that could be put towards improving the 
prospects of free citizens. Instead, inhumane punishment that could 
otherwise have been prevented through greater financial investment 
would be justified on this principle only if it can be shown both that 
the money saved thereby is necessary to improve the condition of the 
worst-off person in society with respect to their most urgent interests, 
and also that this expected improvement is not mere speculation or 
vaguely anticipated future benefit, but is reasonably certain to result 
if the necessary resources are shifted away from the prisons.124 Where 
these twin conditions cannot be satisfied, the humanity principle 
obliges the state to spend the money necessary to prevent gratuitous 
inhumane punishment. The state is not required to spend more on 
inmates’ upkeep than is necessary to satisfy the minimum standard of 
the humanity principle, although in some cases prudence or other 
considerations may counsel doing so. Luxury accommodations are 
not required. Where, however, the state is faced with a choice 
between protecting prisoners from inhumane conditions of 
confinement or funding some other appealing project, it is obliged to 
spend the money to protect its inmates unless the competing project 
equally implicates the most urgent interests of other citizens who are 
as badly off as the incarcerated.125 
B. Framing the Issues 
In the private prisons debate, the dominant framework for 
assessing the desirability of private prisons is what I have termed 
comparative efficiency.126 For this approach, the motivating question 
is how private prisons compare with their public-sector counterparts, 
 
 124. This “reasonably certain to result” standard reflects the fact that the parties would not 
agree to principles that could compromise their most urgent interests on the basis of mere 
speculation or vague anticipated future benefits. For further discussion of this standard, see id. 
at 402–03. 
 125. States committed to honoring this fundamental obligation will at times face the difficult 
situation in which there are insufficient resources both to prevent the imposition of inhumane 
punishment and also to ensure the preservation of the conditions of moral personhood of other 
members of society who are as badly off as the inmates facing inhumane treatment. Presuming 
that the money saved on incarceration may be reasonably certain to satisfy the most urgent 
needs of other such citizens, such a case would indeed represent a dilemma. Either way, in 
seeking to satisfy the most urgent needs of society’s worst off, the collectivity will fall short, and 
the humanity principle may well remain unsatisfied. However, in a society committed to 
imposing only legitimate punishment, this inadequacy would be recognized as such, and its 
remedy would be made a priority when sufficient funds became available. 
 126. See supra note 7. 
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and the central operating assumption is that if private contractors can 
run the prisons for less money than the state without the quality of 
prison conditions falling below existing levels, then the state should 
be willing to privatize. 
It is important, however, not to let the impulse to comparative 
assessment distract from the main purpose. My goal in this Part is not 
to vindicate one form of penal management over another. It is instead 
to understand the structure and functioning of private prisons, in 
order to assess the extent to which the state’s use of private prisons is 
consistent with the demands of the humanity principle. Only with this 
understanding will it be possible to see clearly the problems private 
prisons present, and to determine which of these problems are unique 
to private prisons and which represent tendencies found in the prison 
system as a whole. 
This is not to suggest that comparison between public and private 
prisons is never in order. Ultimately, the humanity principle is 
concerned with the health, safety, and well-being of the incarcerated, 
and if these conditions turn out to be markedly better in one prison 
form than another, this difference ought to matter to those committed 
to legitimate punishment.127 But it is crucial that such comparisons not 
be premature, that they not preempt a thoroughgoing analysis, and 
that they not be allowed to obscure the troubling structural problems 
that plague both public and private prisons as currently constituted. 
They must, moreover, be made on the basis of an appropriate 
measure: not cost, but legitimacy, understood here in terms of the 
humanity of conditions of confinement. 
Any adequate analysis of the structure and functioning of private 
prisons requires an understanding of the motives of the two parties to 
the private prison contract. The private contractors’ motives in both 
seeking and performing the contract are straightforward: to profit 
from the venture.128 This very singularity of purpose is what is thought 
by many to make private prisons so appealing, for private prisons 
 
 127. See Stephen P. Garvey, Private Prisons: What to Do? (Feb. 20, 2005) (unpublished 
manuscript on file with the author) (applying the Dolovich and DiIulio principles of punishment 
to an imagined legislative proposal to contract with a private firm to run some state prisons). 
 128. I use the term “profit” here in the broad sense of “gaining financial advantage.” 
Particular private prison companies may have a range of strategic aims, from growing the 
company to paying handsome returns to shareholders. Whatever the business model, however, 
the contractors driving the move to private prisons over the past two decades in the United 
States (as well as in the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand) are in it to make money 
in some fashion or other. See supra note 74. 
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seem to offer the state the possibility of harnessing the profit motive 
to serve public ends, whatever those ends may be.129 As for the state, 
in the American context, the central aim is to save money on the cost 
of corrections.130 
The remainder of this Part considers the implications for the 
humanity of conditions of confinement in a system in which both the 
prison contractor and the state are driven by economic interests. 
Section C explores the likely effects of this incentive system on the 
behavior of prison contractors, and Section D evaluates the efficacy 
of existing accountability mechanisms. Having explored the incentive 
structure and the regulatory landscape of private prisons, it will then 
be possible to make sense of one notable difference between public 
and private prisons: the elevated rates of violence in private prisons. 
This phenomenon is discussed in Section E, which argues that, so long 
as the state’s use of private prisons is motivated by a desire to save 
money on the cost of corrections, private prisons are likely to be more 
violent and less humane even than state-run prisons. 
This is not, however, to vindicate public prisons as currently 
constituted. Despite somewhat lower levels of violence, public prison 
conditions continue to be at odds in many respects with the demands 
of the humanity condition.131 Section F, therefore, looks to public 
prisons themselves, and finds that several of the most disturbing 
features of private prisons are also present in the public context. It 
then identifies some lessons to be learned from the analysis of private 
 
 129. See supra note 73. That the central motivating aim of government contractors is profit 
making is a basic assumption of the privatization literature and of the privatization movement 
itself. Indeed, in his important book on privatization, John Donahue uses the term “profit-
seeker” as the place holder for the private, for-profit parties seeking government contracts. See 
JOHN D. DONAHUE, THE PRIVATIZATION DECISION: PUBLIC ENDS, PRIVATE MEANS 39 (1989) 
(distinguishing “two basic types of agents—profit-seekers and civil servants,” and explaining 
that “[t]he profit-seeker, in exchange for a price, agrees to deliver a product”). 
 130. See sources cited supra note 73 (explaining the centrality of cost savings to the appeal 
of private prisons for state officials). When surveyed, state agents identified cost as “only the 
fourth most important motivation” for their choice to privatize. Harding, supra note 63, at 267, 
283; see also MCDONALD ET AL., supra note 81, at 16 (listing “reducing overcrowding,” “speed 
of acquiring additional beds,” and “gaining operational flexibility” as the top three objectives of 
state officials “for [c]ontracting with [p]rivate [c]orrectional [f]irms”). But as Harding puts it, 
this result “is not entirely reconcilable with the contemporaneous rhetoric and may represent a 
retrospective attempt to put a better public face on things.” Harding, supra note 63, at 267, 283; 
see also sources cited supra note 5 (quoting public officials for whom cost saving is the primary 
concern when considering prison privatization). 
 131. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 8 (noting the various dangers faced by prisoners as a 
result of conditions in public prisons). 
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prisons for the penal system in general—lessons that, if heeded, could 
render conditions in all our prisons more consistently humane.132 
The first step in the analysis is to consider how private prisons 
might be expected to operate absent effective governmental 
regulation and oversight. The point here is not that no such regulation 
exists. But to move too hastily to asserting effective oversight short-
circuits any possibility of fully understanding just what dangers are 
created by the state’s use of private prisons. Before it is possible to 
achieve this understanding, it is necessary to clarify exactly how the 
“profit seeking” behavior of private contractors might affect the 
running of the prisons were it allowed to operate unchecked. 
C. A Thought Experiment: The Profit Motive Unconstrained 
To determine how for-profit private prisons might be expected to 
operate absent effective restraints on contractors’ profit motive, 
consider the current structure of private prison agreements. Under 
the current system, the state agrees to pay a flat rate per inmate per 
day, and the contractor agrees to bear all the costs of running the 
prison. If the contractor is to make money, it must meet this 
contractual obligation for less than it earns from the state. 
Private prison contracts thus contain a built-in incentive for the 
contractor to economize in two key respects. First, contractors will be 
tempted to reduce the amount spent on meeting inmates’ needs. In a 
prison, every aspect of inmates’ lives is dictated by the institution: 
when, what, and how much they eat; whether they get leisure time, 
adequate medical care, protection from harm, or access to 
rehabilitative or educational programming; the content and design of 
their beds and their cells; and when they shower and for how long. No 
detail of their lives remains unregulated. In a private prison, each of 
these aspects of inmates’ lives offers the potential for increasing profit 
margins.133 Absent effective checks, efforts on the part of private 
 
 132. Much of the argument that follows is consistent with the insights of economists, 
corporate-law scholars, and others who have explored the issue of “agency costs” in the context 
of delegated power more generally. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, Agency Theory: An 
Assessment and Review, 14 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 57, 57–59 (1989) (collecting sources). What is 
new in the argument I offer is a sustained analysis of the agency-cost problem in the private 
prisons context and of the putative solutions to it, and an emphasis, not on financial costs, but 
on the human cost of such arrangements, which from the perspective of liberal legitimacy is 
paramount. 
 133. Beaumont and Tocqueville observed over a century ago the effects of such incentives, 
arguing that 
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prison administrators to cut operational costs could thus lead to 
decisions that deprive inmates of basic human needs, a hallmark of 
inhumane punishment. 
Second, profit-seeking contractors will be tempted to cut the cost 
of labor. As one industry observer explains, because two-thirds or 
more “of a prison’s budget goes to staffing and training,” private 
providers “must reduce expenditures in these areas if they are going 
to make a profit.”134 How might such cost cutting lead to inhumane 
conditions of confinement? The more effective correctional officers 
are at maintaining a secure prison environment, the safer the inmates 
will be from the threat of physical assault.135 But guarding inmates 
requires constant interaction in a tense atmosphere with people who 
are bored, frustrated, resentful, and possibly dangerous.136 To protect 
inmates from harm and to ensure their own personal safety, 
correctional officers require training, experience, good judgment, and 
presence of mind. But when such officers are overworked and 
undertrained, or work in prisons that are understaffed, they are at a 
disadvantage in such a volatile environment and will thus be less 
effective at maintaining safe and secure prison conditions. Money-
saving strategies that include “hiring fewer staff members, paying 
 
when the same person contracts for the food, clothing, labor, and sanitary department 
of the convicts [the system is] equally injurious to the convict . . . because the 
contractor, who sees nothing but a money affair in such a bargain, speculates upon 
the victuals as he does on the labor. If he loses upon the clothing, he indemnifies 
himself upon the food, and if the labor is less productive than he calculated upon, he 
tries to balance his loss by spending less for the support of the convicts, with which he 
is equally charged. . . . The extent of his privileges, moreover, gives him an 
importance in the prison, which he ought not to have . . . . 
BEAUMONT & TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 33, at 68. From this, the authors concluded that “it is 
therefore advisable to separate [the contractor] as much as possible from the penitentiary, and 
to counteract his influence, if it cannot be neutralized entirely.” Id. 
 134. Dunham, supra note 4, at 1498 n.158 (quoting Director of Jail Operations Richard 
Ford, Nat’l Sheriffs’ Ass’n); see id. (placing the proportion of a prison’s budget that goes into 
staffing and training at 80–90 percent); see also SHICHOR, supra note 4, at 149 (“[B]etween 60% 
to 80% of the correctional cost is labor-related.”); Kenna, supra note 89, at F1 (reporting that 
labor costs are “about 75 per cent of prison budgets”); Tatge, supra note 87, at 18A (“Staffing 
costs typically make up 60 percent to 70 percent of a prison’s operating costs.”). 
 135. The same is true of sexual assault, which is an ongoing threat in correctional facilities 
across the country. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NO ESCAPE: MALE RAPE IN U.S. 
PRISONS (2001) (surveying the problem and making some policy recommendations); WOMEN’S 
RIGHTS PROJECT, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ALL TOO FAMILIAR: SEXUAL ABUSE OF WOMEN 
IN U.S. STATE PRISONS (1996) (same). 
 136. See SHICHOR, supra note 4, at 194–97 (“The high turnover rate also may be a result of 
the pressures of the everyday work with a generally hostile and manipulative ‘clientele’ and 
monotonous routines that usually lead to a high staff burnout rate.”). 
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lower wages, and reducing staff training”137 thus increase the threat to 
inmates of physical assault, a further hallmark of inhumane 
punishment.138 
The foregoing account is likely to meet with two objections. First, 
some may object that it overlooks the potential of contractors to find 
innovative ways to reduce the cost of labor and other necessities so as 
to allow a comfortable profit margin without putting prisoners at 
risk.139 However, the existence of alternative avenues for profit 
making does not mean that contractors would not also seek to 
increase profit further in the ways predicted, were they able to do so 
without detection or penalty.140 There is, moreover, little evidence of 
cost-saving innovation in private-sector prisons.141 Nor, given the 
nature of prison administration, is there much scope for such 
innovation in this arena consistent with the humanity principle.142 
 
 137. Dunham, supra note 4, at 1498. But cf. Belkin, supra note 5 (quoting industry officials 
attributing savings to their freedom from government rules, for example those governing 
procurement); Fox Butterfield, For Privately Run Prisons, New Evidence of Success, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 19, 1995, at A7 (quoting industry officials attributing savings to “reducing labor 
costs by making prisons a better place in which to work”). 
 138. As White puts it, 
[m]uch of the supposed competitive advantage of private prisons derives from their 
ability to sidestep the civil service wages required with public prison guards. This 
dynamic encourages not only the employment of under-trained and disinterested 
employees but aggregate reductions in staffing—practices which in turn account in 
part for elevated levels of abuse, inmate-on-inmate violence, and so forth. 
White, supra note 2, at 143. 
 139. According to Logan, for example, “CCA reports that it achieves savings in the key area 
of security personnel through efficient scheduling and facility design, and through strategic use 
of electronic surveillance systems. These management and capital investments have enabled 
CCA to reduce labor costs to about 60 percent of operating costs.” LOGAN, supra note 4, at 81. 
 140. Not all contractors, it might be argued, will value profit over satisfying the demands of 
the humanity principle. But given the incentive structure, it must be assumed that many will. For 
further discussion of this point, see infra note 159. 
 141. See GERALD G. GAES ET AL., U.S. BUREAU OF PRISONS, THE PERFORMANCE OF 
PRIVATELY OPERATED PRISONS: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH, in MCDONALD ET AL., supra note 
81, app. 1 at 1, 35 (“[D]espite the claims about cost savings and increased value, in reality there 
have been no empirical studies documenting innovations in the private sector in the use of labor 
or the purchasing of goods and services. . . . The private sector does not appear to argue that 
they run prisons in a dramatically different way based on different philosophies of managing 
inmates.”). 
 142. See, e.g., DiIulio, supra note 46, at 155, 171–72 (arguing that the belief that private 
prisons will be more innovative is flawed because “it is grounded in abject ignorance of the 
existing range of intersystem, intrasystem, and historical variations in correctional philosophies” 
and because it rests on questionable “theoretical assumptions about the relationship between 
given organizational conditions and organizational innovations”). 
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Unlike Adam Smith’s butcher, brewer, or baker,143 private prison 
administrators are not dealing with inert materials.144 They are instead 
dealing in an extended and intimate way with human beings, whose 
treatment, if it is to be humane, requires constant attention and the 
careful exercise of discretion.145 Running a prison is thus necessarily 
labor intensive and affords little scope for more than marginal cost-
saving innovation consistent with the humanity principle.146 
Second, some may object that the above account misunderstands 
the process of government contracting. Privately managed prisons, 
after all, exist only at the behest of the state. If the state wants to 
ensure a certain level of service provision, it need only specify its 
demands in the contract and hold the provider accountable.147 To 
 
 143. ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 15 (Edwin Cannan ed., Modern Library 
2000) (1776). 
 144. It is this quality of the task of running a prison that distinguishes this pursuit from the 
business of those worthies—the butcher, the brewer, and the baker—referred to in Smith’s oft-
cited explanation of self-interest as the engine of the market economy. See id. Smith noted that, 
in seeking our dinner, “[w]e address ourselves, not to the[] humanity [of these market providers] 
but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages.” Id. 
Given the vulnerability and dependence of prisoners on prison officials, however, if the 
conditions of confinement in prisons are to be humane, the strategy suggested by Smith in this 
passage will not do. 
 145. See Elaine M. Crawley, Emotion and Performance: Prison Officers and the Presentation 
of Self in Prisons, 6 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 411, 414 (2004) (explaining that relations between 
inmates and prison guards “are also emotionally charged because the degree of intimacy 
involved in working with prisoners is great”); id. at 415 (describing the prison as a quasi-
domestic sphere). 
 146. As Donahue puts it, “in general, incarcerating people is an enterprise with relatively 
little scope for resource-sparing technical progress. . . . Prisoners must be sheltered, fed, cared 
for when sick, protected from each other, and prevented from escaping. These do not appear to 
be tasks that allow for radical innovation in technique.” DONAHUE, supra note 129, at 162–63. 
Where truly radical innovation suggests itself, it is certain to be more costly than current 
approaches, and thus would be inconsistent with the goal of cost savings. See, e.g., Elaine 
Genders, Privatisation and Innovation—Rhetoric and Reality: The Development of a Therapeutic 
Community Prison, 42 HOWARD J. CRIM. JUST. 137, 154 (2003) (“The fiscal dimension of the 
value-for-money ideology seriously impedes the realisation of the opportunities for innovation 
[in prison management].”). 
 147. See Jody Freeman, The Contracting State, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 155, 170–71 (2000) 
(“To some extent, objections to contracting out might be ameliorated by careful attention to 
contract design. Contracts could specify tasks more clearly, detail procedures more thoroughly, 
and clarify responsibilities.”). But see id. at 171 (acknowledging the “limit to technocratic 
solutions”). Even assuming such contractual completeness is possible, it could also work to the 
states’ disadvantage. For instance, states could conceivably stipulate a minimum investment in 
the training and remuneration of the prison labor force. Doing so, however, would increase the 
cost of the contracts considerably, something cost-conscious state officials would wish to avoid. 
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achieve humane conditions of confinement, in other words, the 
contractual terms need only specify as much. 
To some extent this is true. Where the standard of service to be 
provided can be specified in detail in advance, careful drafting can 
provide some protection from abuses.148 But with respect to many key 
features of prison life that are crucial from the humanity 
perspective—the use of force, health care provision, inmate 
classification, discipline, and inmate safety, among others—it can be 
difficult to specify in advance precisely how they are to be provided.149 
To a significant extent, that is, private prison contracts are necessarily 
“incomplete,” meaning that the contractor’s obligations cannot be 
fully specified in the contract itself.150 
The inevitable incompleteness of private prison contracts raises 
two difficulties for efforts to rely on careful drafting alone to check 
contractor abuses. First, the necessarily vague character of incomplete 
contracts makes violations difficult to demonstrate and thus difficult 
to police.151 Second, because they are incomplete, prison contracts 
accord considerable discretion to contractors. This discretion comes 
in the form of what some economists call “residual control rights,” 
which carry “the authority to approve changes in procedure or 
innovations in uncontracted-for contingencies.”152 From the 
standpoint of prison administration, this allocation makes sense. 
Consider, for example the use of force. Plainly, it is not possible to 
spell out in advance every contingency within a prison that will 
 
 148. With respect to food service, for example, the American Correctional Association 
(ACA) “specifies the number of meals that must be served, caloric intake, time between meals, 
conditions for preparation and keeping of food, as well as palatability. It also refers to the 
standards of the American Dietetic Association on food quality.” Oliver Hart et al., The Proper 
Scope of Government Theory and an Application to Prisons, 112 Q. J. ECON. 1127, 1149 (1997). 
For more on ACA standards, see infra Part III.D.2. 
 149. See Freeman, supra note 147, at 171 (“No matter how careful the drafter, some tasks 
are difficult to specify in contractual terms (for example, delivering quality health care or 
providing a safe environment for prisoners).”). 
 150. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal 
Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729, 730 (1992) (“Legal scholars use the term ‘incomplete 
contracting’ to refer to the contracts in which the obligations are not fully specified.”) cited in 
Russell Korobkin, The Efficiency of Managed Care “Patient Protection” Laws: Incomplete 
Contracts, Bounded Rationality, and Market Failure, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 29 (1999); Hart et 
al., supra note 148, at 1128 (defining incomplete contracts as contracts in which “the quality of 
service the government wants often cannot be fully specified”). 
 151. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 147, at 171 (“[Contractual] vagueness may impede 
meaningful monitoring.”). 
 152. Hart et al., supra note 148, at 1132. 
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require the use of force by correctional officers. Prison employees 
thus need discretion to use force when they think it warranted, for it 
is they who face an unpredictable environment and must make the 
hard judgments when potentially dangerous situations arise. Still, the 
extensive discretion necessarily lent by incomplete prison contracts to 
both line officers and prison administrators opens up space for these 
parties to use force against inmates in ways at odds with the demands 
of the humanity principle while still formally fulfilling the contract’s 
terms.153 Thus, even carefully drafted contracts cannot prevent many 
decisions by private contractors that might yield inhumane conditions 
of confinement. 
There is, moreover, a further problem with relying on contract 
drafting alone to guard against possible contractor abuses. Even 
assuming the possibility of specifying contractual standards consistent 
with the humanity principle, the “hidden delivery” of prison 
services154 means that contractual violations may well go undetected. 
Imagine, for example, a contractual provision capping the number of 
assaults on inmates that may occur annually in the facility.155 To 
determine compliance with this provision, it is necessary for the state 
to have access to reliable data on such assaults. Yet private prison 
administrators are the ones who control access to this information, 
and they have a strong financial incentive to downplay the number of 
 
 153. See id. at 1128. Or consider the provision of prisoners’ medical care. As Russell 
Korobkin has shown in the context of managed healthcare, it is impossible to specify in advance 
the precise nature of a health plan’s obligations to the consumer. See Korobkin, supra note 150, 
at 29 (explaining that doing so would be both impractical, because the “number of 
permutations” that might possibly arise and call for some medical treatment could not 
“reasonably” be itemized in advance, and “theoretically impossible because the fast pace of 
change in medical technology and knowledge” makes it hard to predict what treatment would 
be appropriate when the symptoms arise). In terms of the treatment to be provided, often the 
most that can be specified in advance is that the healthcare provider will provide all “medically 
necessary” or “reasonable and necessary” treatment. Id. at 30. Effective checks are therefore 
needed to ensure that contractors do not exercise their residual control rights in a way that saves 
money at the expense of providing necessary treatment for patients. See, e.g., id. at 74–84 
(exploring judicial and legislative mechanisms for addressing this problem in the managed-care 
context in general). In the prison context, the hidden delivery of prison services, combined with 
the “low moral status of the prison population,” Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public 
Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 631 (2000), means that prisoners are especially vulnerable 
to abuses of contractor discretion in the health care context. See infra text accompanying notes 
294–97 (describing abuses of discretion on the part of Correctional Medical Services, a for-profit 
health care provider that presently holds contracts with prisons in over thirty states). 
 154. Gentry, supra note 4, at 356–57. 
 155. Such a provision might provide for financial penalties to be borne by the contractor for 
every assault in excess of the specified number. 
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assaults that actually occur, particularly if this number exceeds 
contractual specifications.156 Thus, even assuming a contract that 
carefully delineated the maximum number of assaults, contractor 
control over the information necessary to effectively implement these 
contractual provisions could defeat this effort at regulation through 
contract.157 
D. Available Accountability Mechanisms and Their Limits 
The claim so far is this: absent effective checks, the desire for 
profit will lead private prison contractors to cut costs in ways that will 
create or exacerbate gratuitously inhumane conditions of 
confinement. This claim is not a radical one. To the contrary, it 
reflects a basic assumption at the heart of the private prisons 
literature, one made by advocates and opponents alike, that without 
effective accountability mechanisms, privatization will lead to 
considerable reductions in the quality of prison conditions.158 The only 
difference here is that I have explicitly emphasized the costs of 
inadequate regulation in terms of the potentially inhumane treatment 
of inmates.159 
 
 156. Possible motivations for downplaying the number of assaults also exist in the public 
system, a fact that reinforces the need for effective monitoring and oversight mechanisms in the 
public sphere as well as the private. 
 157. The state’s relationship to private prison employees reflects a basic problem of agency 
theory, which arises when “(a) the desires or goals of the principles and agent conflict, and (b) it 
is difficult or expensive for the principal to verify what the agent is actually doing.” See 
Eisenhardt, supra note 132, at 58. 
 158. See, e.g., Harding, supra note 63, at 340 (noting that private prisons “pose some serious 
political and humanitarian risks”); Pozen, supra note 4, at 282 (identifying riots and abuse of 
inmates as “indicative of the risks of contracting,” because “with for-profit operators, a prison 
can quickly degenerate when its management is determined to save money by cutting corners 
and the government does not intervene,” and arguing that the “greater risks” posed by private 
prisons “place an added onus on regulators”); Robbins 1988, supra note 4, at 796 (arguing that if 
privatization of prisons is to succeed “in the long run, it must be accomplished with total 
accountability”). 
 159. One need not assume here that no private contractor has a conscience. In no business 
context are the consciences of providers exclusively relied on to ensure quality. Instead, the 
assumption is that incentives are required to get the results customers want and to deter 
contractors of any sort from acting solely in their own interests. See DONAHUE, supra note 129, 
at 170 (“[In the prison context,] if incarceration contracts are awarded on the basis of cost, and 
if it is possible to cut costs by lowering standards, then quality control becomes an urgent 
issue. . . . And without robust measures to guarantee the conditions of confinement, the 
businesspeople least constrained by scruples are likely to enjoy a competitive advantage in the 
imprisonment industry.”). 
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Properly channeled, the profit-seeking motive of private 
contractors may well allow states to achieve desired goals in terms of 
prison conditions without also creating the danger of contractor 
abuses. But to achieve such desirable results, effective regulation is 
indispensable. In what follows, I consider the four regulatory 
mechanisms most commonly introduced as evidence that effective 
checks on private prisons exist—the courts, accreditation, monitoring, 
and competition—and in each case explain why, under current and 
foreseeable circumstances, they are inadequate to the task. 
1. The Courts.  Arguably, any dangers private prison inmates 
face could be neutralized through lawsuits brought by them or on 
their behalf. Not only might abused inmates thereby get a remedy,160 
 
 160. State prisoners seeking to recover for violations of their constitutional rights must 
proceed in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a remedy for citizens who suffer 
“deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” at 
the hands of any public official acting “under color” of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). This 
statutory provision is the primary vehicle through which the civil rights claims of prisoners held 
in state facilities get into federal court. Analogous claims against federal officials must be 
brought under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 
388 (1971); see also FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 484 (1994) (holding that Bivens actions can be 
brought only against federal officials and not against federal agencies). In neither case, however, 
may prisoners sue the states directly. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 
(1989) (holding that states are not “persons” for § 1983 purposes and therefore cannot be sued 
under that statute). 
In 2001, the Supreme Court held that a federal inmate could not bring a Bivens suit 
against the prison contractor managing the facility in which he was held. Corr. Servs. Corp. v. 
Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 66 n.2 (2001). The Court has not yet addressed the question whether 
federal inmates may sue private prison officials in their individual capacity under Bivens, but in 
Malesko, the Court, per Chief Justice Rehnquist, made much of the fact that alternative 
remedies existed under which Malesko could have sought redress. See id. at 72 (“It was 
conceded at oral argument that alternative remedies are at least as great, and in many respects 
greater, than anything that could be had under Bivens.”). This emphasis, along with Malesko’s 
pointed cautions against extending the Bivens right of action to any new contexts, suggests that 
Bivens is unlikely to be extended any time soon to federal prisoners suing private prison officials 
in their individual capacity. See id. at 74 (“The caution toward extending Bivens remedies into 
any new context, a caution consistently and repeatedly recognized for three decades, forecloses 
such an extension here.”). Only one federal appeals court—the Tenth Circuit—has addressed 
this issue since Malesko. Taking its cue from the cautionary tone of the majority opinion, the 
court held that there is no private right of action for damages under Bivens against employees of 
a private prison for alleged constitutional deprivations when alternative state or federal causes 
of action for damages are available to the plaintiff. See Peoples v. CCA Det. Ctrs., 422 F.3d 
1090, 1108 (10th Cir. 2005). But see Sarro v. Cornell Corr., 248 F. Supp. 2d 52, 64 (D.R.I. 2003) 
(holding that federal inmates held in privately run prisons may bring a Bivens action against 
individual guards employed by the private prison operator); Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1108–13 (Ebel, 
J., dissenting) (arguing persuasively that all of the following factors support the view that Bivens 
does create a cause of action against individual private prison guards: (1) Supreme Court 
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but the threat of lawsuits and the accompanying possibility of major 
financial liability could provide incentives for private prison providers 
not to cut corners in ways likely to harm inmates.161 However, given 
the current state of the relevant law, the courts are not likely to 
provide a meaningful check on abuses in private prisons, 
notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s ruling denying private prison 
guards qualified immunity from Section 1983 actions.162 
Apart from a brief period in the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
judicial attitudes toward challenges to prison conditions have been 
marked by considerable deference to the judgment of prison 
officials.163 As a consequence, the constitutional rights of inmates have 
been interpreted extremely narrowly.164 For this reason, even 
instances of serious physical harm to inmates may not qualify for legal 
relief. Moreover, the mechanisms through which private prison 
providers might seek to save money could combine with the 
deferential standard of review under the Eighth Amendment to make 
it even less likely that private prison inmates could make out a 
successful constitutional claim. 
Consider, for example, the use of force by prison officials against 
prisoners. For an inmate to have a viable Eighth Amendment claim 
against a prison official for use of excessive force, the inmate must 
show that the prison official acted “maliciously and sadistically,” with 
the intention to cause harm.165 So long as the prison official can make 
 
precedent, (2) the imperative of ensuring parallel remedies where possible for federal and state 
prisoners and for prisoners in public and private facilities, (3) the imperative of ensuring 
uniform rules to govern conduct toward all prisoners equally, and (4) the interest in deterring 
constitutional violations on the part of individual prison guards). 
 161. Private prison companies are required by statute to have insurance to cover the 
individual employees who are held liable for constitutional violations. See LOGAN, supra note 4, 
at 190–91 (detailing the high costs of insuring private prisons). Like any other purchaser of 
insurance, however, such companies have an interest in keeping the cost of premiums as low as 
possible and would thus seek to minimize any legal claims for which they are responsible. 
 162. Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 401 (1997). 
 163. See David N. Wecht, Breaking the Code of Deference: Judicial Review of Private Prisons, 96 
YALE L.J. 815, 818–20 (1987) (explaining that “in areas profoundly affecting the Fourteenth 
Amendment liberty interests and process rights of prison inmates, the courts have continued to 
accord broad deference to the judgment of prison personnel”); Weidman, supra note 8, at 1509–24 
(examining the extent of the deference historically accorded prison officials in the federal courts). 
 164. See, e.g., Wecht, supra note 163, at 820 (explaining that judicial deference to the 
judgment of prison officials has led the Supreme Court to hold that “staff members may isolate 
inmates, restrict their incoming mail, determine how many beds a cell will hold, prohibit contact 
visits, and limit eligibility for rehabilitation programs” (footnotes omitted)). 
 165. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6–7 (1992). 
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a showing that “the use of force could plausibly have been thought 
necessary,” the prisoner’s claim will fail.166 For example, even 
assuming that the corrections officers at a privately run jail in 
Brazoria, Texas, who “forc[ed] prisoners to crawl, kicking them and 
encouraging dogs to bite them,”167 engaged in this abusive treatment 
because they were insufficiently trained in less-abusive inmate control 
techniques, the prisoners themselves could have no constitutional 
recourse so long as the guards could plausibly claim to have thought 
their actions necessary to “preserve internal order and discipline.”168 
Under these standards, private prison inmates suffering harm 
traceable to contractors’ inadequate investment in labor are even less 
likely to recover than public prison inmates: guards who are 
insufficiently trained may well resort to force more readily than 
guards with adequate training and experience, motivated in doing so 
not by a “malicious and sadistic” desire to cause harm, but by their 
own ignorance and fear.169 
 
 166. Id. at 7 (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321 (1986)). 
 167. Prison Privatization Is No Panacea, supra note 89, at C2. 
 168. Hudson, 503 U.S at 6–7. 
 169. In Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the Supreme Court 
held that municipalities may be liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their employees when 
the constitutional violation is attributable to a municipal policy or custom. Id. at 690–91. One 
might thus seek to argue by analogy that where the use of force against prisoners by correctional 
officers is attributable to private prison administrators’ policy or custom of underinvesting in 
staff training, the prisoner ought in that case to recover. But the issue in Monell was that of 
when a municipality may be held liable under § 1983 for conduct itself adjudged to be 
unconstitutional. And the doctrinal problem sketched here is precisely that when prison guards 
believe—even mistakenly—that such force is necessary, there is no constitutional violation for 
which the prison contractor may be held liable. The subjective component of the Eighth 
Amendment standard for cases involving the use of force—that such force must be shown to 
have been applied not as a “good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline,” but rather 
“maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm,” Whitley, 475 U.S at 320–
21—means that the fact of the violation itself turns on the state of mind of the prison official. 
The question of why the conduct occurred, which motivates the Court’s holding in Monell, thus 
has no relevance here. 
True, there is some language in both Hudson and Whitley suggesting that prisoners 
subject to the poor judgment of badly trained guards could rebut the presumption that the 
judgment of corrections officials as to when force is necessary is always reasonable. For 
example, the Court states that: 
[i]n determining whether the use of force was wanton and unnecessary, it may also be 
proper to evaluate the need for application of force, the relationship between that 
need and the amount of force used, the threat “reasonably perceived by the 
responsible officials,” and “any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful 
response.” 
Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7 (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321). A prisoner in the Brazoria facility 
might thus try to argue that the force used was far in excess of what was needed, and that 
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Or consider the Eighth Amendment standard for prisoners 
alleging inadequate medical care. In Estelle v. Gamble,170 the Supreme 
Court held that for medical neglect of prisoners to rise to the level of 
an Eighth Amendment violation, prison officials must be shown to 
have acted with “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.”171 
To satisfy this standard, prisoners must show that prison officials 
actually knew of the health risk and failed to take reasonable steps to 
address the problem.172 It is not enough for the inmate to have told an 
official of pain or other physical distress; he or she must also show 
that the official actually “dr[e]w the inference” from these facts of “an 
excessive risk to inmate health or safety.”173 Even under ordinary 
circumstances, it can be difficult for prisoners to make this showing. 
Add the profit motive to the picture, and the possibility of making out 
a claim of Eighth Amendment medical neglect becomes even more 
difficult. Prison operators wishing to save money on medical care 
might, for example, create a deliberately unwieldy process for 
prisoners wishing medical attention, as has apparently been the 
strategy of Correctional Medical Services (CMS), a for-profit prison 
medical services company operating in prisons and jails in twenty-
seven states.174 They might also hire medical staff of questionable 
competence, increasing the likelihood that conditions will go 
undiagnosed.175 Or they might institute treatment protocols of 
 
adequately trained correctional officers would not reasonably have perceived a threat 
demanding the level of force used. But even assuming that the facts would support such an 
argument, it would likely be to no avail. For the Court in Hudson also reaffirmed that prison 
officials “should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies 
and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to 
maintain institutional security.” Id. at 6 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 
321–22); see also Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320 (underscoring that courts should be “hesitan[t] to 
critique in hindsight decisions necessarily made in haste, under pressure, and frequently without 
the luxury of a second chance”). 
 170. 429 U.S. 97 (1976). 
 171. Id. at 106. 
 172. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 844–45 (1994). 
 173. Id. at 837. 
 174. See Hylton, supra note 8, at 48–49 (detailing the lengthy procedure CMS requires its 
doctors to complete prior to providing services to inmates); see also Correctional Medical 
Services, http://www.cmsstl.com/aboutus/overview.asp (last visited Dec. 13, 2005); infra text 
accompanying notes 294–97. 
 175. See, e.g., Andrew Skolnick, Prison Deaths Spotlight How Boards Handle Impaired, 
Disciplined Physicians, 280 JAMA 1387, 1387 (1998) (detailing CMS’s hiring practices, which 
include hiring medical personnel whose licenses have been suspended or revoked by state 
medical boards, and explaining that some states allow the reinstatement of medical licenses 
restricting the holder to “practice in [a] penal institution[]”). 
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questionable efficacy that cost less than medically indicated methods. 
This last approach in particular might allow a defense that 
“reasonable” steps were taken even if they were ultimately 
ineffective. 
Even assuming prisoners could demonstrate an Eighth 
Amendment violation, they must first get a hearing. Although no 
jurisdiction has ever warmly welcomed prisoner suits, the federal 
courts have traditionally been somewhat more receptive to prisoner 
claims than have state courts.176 However, the passage of the Prison 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA),177 intended by Congress 
“primarily to curtail claims brought by prisoners” under Section 
1983,178 places severe limits on inmates’ access to the federal courts. In 
many cases, these burdens effectively prevent inmates’ constitutional 
claims from being heard in this forum at all.179 Not only does the 
PLRA explicitly limit the possible role federal courts might play in 
enforcing acceptable standards in penal facilities, but it also sends a 
strong message from Congress to the courts that they are to continue 
to give strong deference to prison administrators. These procedural 
hurdles, of course, also restrict court access for prisoners in publicly 
run facilities. But if the profit motive is a source of further potential 
abuse of prisoners in private facilities, these hurdles are that much 
 
 176. See, e.g., Joseph T. Lukens, The Prison Litigation Reform Act: Three Strikes and You’re 
Out of Court—It May Be Effective, But Is It Constitutional?, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 471, 512 (1997) 
(explaining that Congress originally created § 1983 “to ensure that victims of civil rights 
violations by persons acting under color of state law would have a federal forum to seek redress 
against those violations” and noting that “there still are significant reasons why some civil rights 
litigants are better served in federal court,” including the fact that “[m]any state judges are 
elected and therefore do not enjoy the general freedom from political pressures as do federal 
judges”); Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1500 (2003) 
(noting the historical importance of federal courts in improving conditions in public prisons). 
 177. Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134 §§ 801–810, 110 Stat. 1321-
66 to 1321-77 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 11, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.). 
 178. Santana v. United States, 98 F.3d 752, 755 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 179. Among other provisions, the PLRA requires that prisoners exhaust all administrative 
remedies before filing § 1983 actions in the courts, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2000), a requirement not 
imposed on nonprisoner § 1983 suits, Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 516 (1982). This 
requirement can tie up even valid claims for extended periods. The PLRA also pares back on in 
forma pauperis protections for prisoners, requiring inmates—most of whom are indigent—to 
pay “the full amount of the filing fee” for any lawsuit they file, on a fee schedule specified in the 
statute. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b) (2000). And it creates a “three-strikes-and-you’re-out” rule that 
forever bars prisoners from filing § 1983 actions in federal court once they have filed three 
claims found by the courts to be “frivolous, malicious, or fail[ing] to state a claim upon which 
relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.” 
28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (2000). 
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more troubling when they prevent private prison inmates from 
gaining a hearing. 
Private prison inmates do enjoy one doctrinal advantage over 
their counterparts in public prisons, an advantage that should, in 
theory at least, increase the likelihood that prisoners’ claims against 
private prison officials will succeed when like claims against public 
prison officials would fail. Under Richardson v. McKnight,180 private 
prison inmates filing Section 1983 actions need not overcome prison 
officials’ claims of qualified immunity.181 As a result, should private 
prison inmates be able to make a showing of unconstitutional 
treatment, private prison guards will be unable to escape liability on 
the grounds that the right they violated was not “clearly established” 
at the time of the violation.182 
Richardson, however, is unlikely to make much difference to 
private prison inmates. These inmates only have a true doctrinal 
advantage over inmates in public prisons when the right they are 
asserting has not previously been “clearly established.”183 If, however, 
prisoners are to succeed in vindicating constitutional rights not 
already clearly established, judges must add to the set of prisoners’ 
rights already recognized. And at present, there is little reason to 
expect federal judges to do so. Only during the late 1960s and 1970s 
did the Supreme Court seem willing to extend prisoners’ 
constitutional protections.184 And even during this period, the extent 
of this willingness was limited. The decades since, moreover, have 
seen a reinstatement of the “hands-off” attitude that predated that 
 
 180. 521 U.S. 399 (1997). 
 181. See id. at 412 (denying qualified immunity to private prison guards). The defense of 
qualified immunity affords state officials immunity from individual liability in § 1983 suits if they 
can show that their conduct did not violate “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights 
of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 
(1982). Federal officials can claim the same defense against Bivens suits. 
 182. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. 
 183. Id. Only in such cases could prison guards plausibly claim qualified immunity, and thus 
only in such cases would the Richardson Court’s refusal to recognize this defense for private 
prison guards substantively change the result. If prisoners can demonstrate the violation of a 
right that was clearly established at the time of the violation, public prison officials’ claims to 
qualified immunity would fail, making Richardson’s benefits to the prisoners superfluous. And if 
the prisoners bringing suit cannot demonstrate any violation of their rights, they cannot prevail 
in a § 1983 action regardless of Richardson. 
 184. See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 579–80 (1974) (requiring procedural due 
process in prison disciplinary hearings); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 421–22 (1974) 
(protecting inmates’ basic First Amendment rights); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 489–90 
(1969) (providing protections for prisoners’ right of access to the courts). 
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brief period of expansion. This recent retrenchment has been marked 
by a series of decisions paring back the rights articulated during the 
period of reform185 and creating new and substantial hurdles to the 
success of prisoners’ constitutional claims.186 And these conditions are 
unlikely to change while public attitudes to incarcerated offenders 
remain as they are. Thus, the denial to private prison guards of the 
defense of qualified immunity is unlikely to benefit sufficient 
numbers of inmate plaintiffs to act as a meaningful check on the 
excesses of private contractors.187 
It might still be objected that, while courts are deferential to 
government officials, this deference is unlikely to extend to 
employees of for-profit prison-management companies. Private 
prison administrators and employees might thus not benefit from the 
culture of judicial deference to prison officials. This objection, 
however, misunderstands the role that judicial deference plays in 
prisoners’ rights cases. Recovery is difficult for prisoners, not because 
courts routinely show deference to the individual prison officials 
 
 185. See, e.g., Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 363 (1996) (narrowing the scope of prisoners’ 
right of access to the courts); O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 353 (1987) (narrowing 
the scope of prisoners’ First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion); Turner v. Safley, 
482 U.S. 78, 99–100 (1987) (narrowing the scope of prisoners’ First Amendment right of 
expression). 
 186. Most notable in this regard is Turner, which denies prisoners recovery for violation of 
their constitutional rights when the state can show that the policy or practice in question “is 
reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” 482 U.S. at 89. In practice, this is an 
extremely deferential standard. For example, the first of the four factors that the Court 
identifies as going to the reasonableness of the regulation is the showing of a “valid, rational 
connection” between the policy and the “legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify 
it.” Id. To challenge a regulation on this basis, the plaintiffs must show that the “logical 
connection between the regulation and the asserted goal is so remote as to render the policy 
arbitrary or irrational.” Id. at 89–90. The remaining three factors are equally deferential to the 
government. See id. at 89–91 (“[C]ourts should be particularly conscious of the ‘measure of 
judicial deference owed to corrections officials.’” (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 828 
(1974)). 
 187. It is of course possible that the courts’ current hostility to prisoners’ rights could lead 
judges to reinterpret existing rights narrowly. Such a move might increase the chance that a 
court would find it not to have been clearly established that the challenged treatment was 
included in the existing right—as, for example, the Eleventh Circuit did in Hope v. Pelzer. See 
240 F.3d 975, 977, 981–82 (11th Cir. 2002) (finding no clearly established precedent that 
defendants’ conduct violated the Eighth Amendment, when correctional officers had 
handcuffed prisoner Larry Hope to a hitching post for seven hours in the hot sun without a shirt, 
little water, and no bathroom breaks), rev’d, 536 U.S. 730, 745–46 (2002). But even should some 
courts be motivated by such hostility, this disposition is unlikely to lead to favorable results in 
enough private prison inmates’ cases to make a significant difference in how private prisons 
allocate resources. 
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against whom suit is brought, but because, in the crafting of 
applicable constitutional standards, courts defer to the position and 
expertise of prison officials in general.188 Because the scope of 
prisoners’ rights under prevailing constitutional doctrine will be the 
same whether prisoners are housed in public or private facilities, 
private prison employees defending prisoner suits will enjoy the 
benefits of judicial deference to prison officials, whatever individual 
judges in specific cases may feel about the for-profit character of 
private prisons.189 
2. Accreditation.  It is a standard requirement of state enabling 
statutes that private prison operators achieve and maintain official 
accreditation from the American Correctional Association (ACA),190 
 
 188. See, e.g., Turner, 482 U.S. at 89 (establishing a deferential standard for review of prison 
regulations that “impinge[] on inmates’ constitutional rights,” because, in the Court’s view, 
“such a standard is necessary ‘if prison administrators . . . , and not the courts, [are] to make the 
difficult judgments concerning institutional operations’” (quoting Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor 
Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 128 (1977))). 
 189. Assuming a private prison inmate overcomes all existing substantive and procedural 
hurdles and demonstrates a constitutional violation, he or she would at that point face a jury, 
which would decide on the extent of the recovery for the violation. The suggestion has been 
made that juries in such cases might be less sympathetic to defendants employed by private 
prison companies and would thus be more likely to award inmate plaintiffs a greater recovery 
than otherwise, an effect that would mean greater accountability in the private sector than the 
public sector. Developments in the Law—The Law of Prisons: A Tale of Two Systems: Cost, 
Quality, and Accountability in Private Prisons, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1880 (2002). However, 
even assuming the existence of such hostility, the possibility of disproportionately greater jury 
awards for plaintiffs who overcome the many hurdles that stand between them and a recovery is 
too speculative to have much regulative effect. Certainly, the example offered to support this 
proposition—the $1.65 million settlement between CCA and the Youngstown prisoners who 
brought a class action against the company in the wake of a series of stabbings and other serious 
security breaches in the facility—is unpersuasive as evidence of this likely effect. See supra Part 
I.C (discussing the Youngstown affair in more detail). In the wake of the Youngstown affair, the 
citizens of the city felt deep outrage and bitterness toward CCA over the way it handled its 
Youngstown operations and its dealings with the city itself. See Kenna, supra note 89, at F1 
(“[CCA] will be sorry that they . . . did this to Youngstown . . . .” (quoting Youngstown Mayor 
George McKelvey)); id. (“Youngstown feels it is a city deceived.”); 60 Minutes: Private Prisons 
Break Rules to Make a Profit, supra note 83 (“I wouldn’t recommend CCA to any 
community. . . . I think they’ve failed miserably at doing the job that they claim they do best. 
The job that they do best is to make money, period.” (quoting State Senator Bob Hagen, who 
represents Youngstown, Ohio)). The size of the settlement, even if formed “in the shadow of 
expected recovery,” A Tale of Two Systems, supra, at 1880, may be best understood as an 
indication that CCA recognized the ill will the company itself had sown in the community and 
the bad faith it was widely believed to have demonstrated, and not, as has been asserted, “the 
well-known tendency of juries, rightly or wrongly, to be less sympathetic to large corporate 
defendants,” id. 
 190. Harding, supra note 63, at 315. 
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an independent “organization of correctional professionals dating to 
1870.”191 The ACA sets standards governing every aspect of penal 
life192 and, on request, certifies the facilities that meet these standards 
to a satisfactory degree.193 The requirement that private prisons 
receive ACA accreditation is certainly desirable; indeed, in this 
regard, the private sector, having been forced to satisfy ACA 
standards, is ahead of many public-sector facilities, 20 percent of 
which did not have such accreditation in 2001.194 
Still, it would overestimate the effect of ACA accreditation to 
assume that this requirement sufficiently checks private-sector 
abuses. For one thing, ACA visits are highly structured, so that 
“certification [indicates] compliance with standards for only a brief 
period.”195 Moreover, the standards are largely procedural in 
character, generally satisfied by a showing as to “what the written 
procedures of the institution lay down as operational processes, 
rather than observing whether those processes in fact are followed.”196 
Arguably, these problems could be resolved by an overhaul in the 
accreditation process, and such an overhaul would certainly be 
welcome. In its current form, however, the ACA is unlikely to 
undertake sufficient reform to ensure adequate protection against 
inmate abuses. For one thing, ACA officials are generally chosen 
from the ranks of experienced corrections officials.197 As a result, 
 
 191. Freeman, supra note 153, at 628. 
 192. See id. at 628 n.351 (“The [ACA] provides standards for ‘security and control, food 
service, sanitation and hygiene, medical and health care, inmate rights, work programs, 
educational programs, recreational activities, library services, records and personnel issues.’” 
(quoting MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE 
MODERN STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA’S PRISONS 163 (1998))). 
 193. Harding, supra note 63, at 316. 
 194. See id. at 317 (arguing that universal private sector compliance with ACA standards 
“marks a distinct step forward, at least symbolically, in the commitment of state agencies to 
improved standards”). 
 195. Keating, supra note 69, at 147. 
 196. Harding, supra note 63, at 316. As McDonald and colleagues put it, 
For the most part, the prevailing professional standards [of the ACA] prescribe 
neither the goals that ought to be achieved nor the indicators that would let officials 
know if they are making progress toward those goals over time. Two facilities could 
conform equally to an ACA standard by having a written policy on a particular issue, 
yet they could have diametrically opposite practices and outcomes on that issue. 
MCDONALD ET AL., supra note 81, at 49. 
 197. As the ACA itself explains: 
The average [ACA] auditor has worked in corrections for more than 18 years and has 
experience operating and evaluating the type of programs being audited. . . . In order 
to be considered for a position as an ACA auditor, [an applicant] must have five years 
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personal and professional relationships between ACA overseers and 
prison management are not uncommon, creating a common sympathy 
and sense of purpose that tells against both more meaningful 
standards and more rigorous enforcement.198 Moreover, the 
institutions being inspected “ha[ve] to pay for the whole procedure,” 
providing income on which the ACA is dependent for its survival.199 
For this reason, “a degree of capture is likely.”200 
One could imagine a system of ACA accreditation that would 
serve as a meaningful check on declining prison conditions. Emphasis 
could be placed on ensuring conditions consistent with the humanity 
principle, prioritizing physical safety and the meeting of basic human 
needs.201 To be successful, however, any such reform would need the 
backing of ACA membership and state officials alike. Moreover, 
more frequent and effective monitoring would be required, which is 
both expensive and itself susceptible to the problems of capture. 
These problems are not insurmountable ones. However, where the 
state’s aim in privatization is to save money, little progress may be 
expected toward effective ACA standards that satisfy the humanity 
principle. 
3. Monitoring.  As John Donahue has observed, “full, effective 
monitoring [of private prisons] is a tall order.”202 Why is this so? In the 
prison context, the hidden delivery of the contracted-for services 
means that the contract is fulfilled away from the scrutiny of the 
buyers—in this case, the state.203 Prisons are often large, sprawling 
 
of experience in corrections, three of which must be at the supervisory level, be a 
current ACA member, and be recommended by the director/CEO of [his or her] 
agency. 
American Correctional Association: Standards and Accreditation, http://www.aca.org/ 
standards/becomeauditor.asp (last visited Nov. 16, 2005). 
 198. See Lilly & Knepper, supra note 76, at 161 (“Reliance on ACA standards by 
government agencies and private contractors promotes a close working relationship between 
the ACA, government agencies, and private companies.”). 
 199. Harding, supra note 63, at 316. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Such standards might also reflect other societal concerns that go beyond the demands 
of the humanity principle, like rehabilitation or the reduction of recidivism. 
 202. DONAHUE, supra note 129, at 171. 
 203. Gentry, supra note 4, at 356–57. Of course, the state is in turn contracting on behalf of 
the public. However, as Freeman points out: 
The ultimate beneficiaries of the incarceration function, whether taxpayers, prisoners, 
or both, face considerable obstacles to meaningful oversight. The typical taxpayer 
encounters few opportunities or incentives to monitor conditions in prisons . . . [and] 
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institutions, housing anywhere from several hundred to several 
thousand inmates. At any time in a given facility, therefore, scores 
and perhaps hundreds of employees are operating in a volatile 
environment, shielded from public view. 
The call for monitoring is the usual response when concern is 
expressed regarding the possibility of abuses by private prison 
contractors. Yet, available data reveal good reason to doubt the 
efficacy of the monitoring regimes in place to oversee contractual 
compliance. The most comprehensive survey on the question was 
conducted in December 1997.204 This survey found that, of the twenty-
eight state and federal government agencies then in the midst of 
“active contracts with privately operated [penal] facilities . . . twenty 
reported using monitors in addition to contract administrators,” 
suggesting that fully eight agencies used no monitoring at all.205 The 
twenty agencies that reported using on-site monitoring provided 
survey information for ninety-one separate contracts. Of these, forty-
six—slightly over half—reported having monitors on-site on a daily 
basis.206 The remainder had monitors on-site weekly (five), monthly 
(sixteen), quarterly (ten), “on an ‘as needed’ basis or on an annual or 
semi-annual basis” (nine), with three contracts conducting all their 
monitoring off-site.207 
What should be made of this data? Given the enormity of the 
task of overseeing contractual performance under circumstances of 
“hidden delivery”208 in crowded and bustling institutions,209 it seems 
 
the relative invisibility and low moral status of the prison population makes prisoners 
especially vulnerable . . . . 
Freeman, supra note 153, at 631–32. As a result, the state must protect the interests of both 
taxpayers and prisoners. 
 204. MCDONALD ET AL., supra note 81, at 50. More recent data would be welcome, but to 
my knowledge none exist. In any case, nothing in the literature indicates that monitoring 
regimes have changed significantly since the collection of the data discussed here. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. at 51 tbl.4.1. 
 207. Id. These numbers cover eighty-nine contracts, suggesting an absence of usable 
information regarding the remaining two. For our purposes, though, this minor discrepancy is of 
no moment, because the main point is the apparent inadequacy of all the monitoring systems 
reported. 
 208. Gentry, supra note 4, at 356. 
 209. It would be impossible for state monitors to oversee all activity everywhere in a given 
prison. But an effective oversight system would allow state monitors full access to all parts of 
the facility, in numbers sufficient to ensure an accurate picture of contractual performance as a 
whole. Certainly, any such system must be designed with care, so as not to disrupt the 
functioning of the prison or compromise the ability of prison officials to maintain safe and 
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plain that systems under which monitors make only occasional on-site 
visits are inadequate to the task—even assuming, as the data suggest, 
multiple monitors per visit.210 As the authors of the study themselves 
note, “[w]here monitoring is so limited, it is unlikely that contracting 
agencies are able to provide more than a cursory assessment of the 
contractor’s performance.”211 Certainly, those contracts that provide 
for full-time on-site monitors are an improvement over those that 
allow for only occasional visits: the average permanent on-site 
monitor spends an average of 7.25 hours per day, working five days a 
week, in the monitored facility.212 But still, given the scope of prison 
contracts and the range and extent of the interactions and activities 
within any given prison, it seems unlikely that comprehensive and 
meaningful oversight can be achieved by a single monitor spending an 
average of thirty-six hours a week on-site. 
It is theoretically possible that a comprehensive system of 
contractual oversight could check the temptation of contractors to cut 
costs in ways likely to harm inmates, if the contractors actually 
believed that the decisions made by their employees would be 
observed and recorded by monitors committed to enforcing the terms 
of the contract. But this possibility provides little comfort if—as the 
data suggest—no such comprehensive system actually exists. 
Why are existing monitoring systems so inadequate? The answer 
is at least in part financial. Monitoring is necessarily labor intensive 
and therefore expensive, requiring an investment that states—which 
turned to privatization to save money—are not eager to make.213 
 
orderly conditions. At the same time, monitoring cannot be so minimal and restrained that its 
deterrent and enforcement effects are lost. The task, moreover, is made more difficult by the 
ongoing nature of a prison contract, which means that monitoring is never finished. Instead, it is 
a process, requiring constant attention and vigilance. Effective oversight of a prison is thus 
necessarily a labor-intensive endeavor. 
 210. For example, the sixteen contracts reporting monthly visits reported an average of 
nineteen hours per visit and a “total monitoring time . . . per contract” of 18.6 percent. 
MCDONALD ET AL., supra note 81, at 51 tbl.4.1. These data suggest monthly visits conducted by 
teams of three. 
 211. Id. at 56. 
 212. See id. at 51 tbl.4.1 (explaining that the time reported by full-time monitors assumed a 
forty-hour work week). 
 213. It might be thought that states achieving a measure of cost savings through 
privatization would be willing to invest some portion of that savings in monitoring, because by 
doing so they would still come out ahead. But this notion overlooks the fact that states seeking 
to reduce the cost of running their prisons are doing so to have funds available for other 
budgetary items and would thus be unenthusiastic about spending any savings on the prisons 
themselves. Moreover, the use of private prisons does not always yield the promised cost 
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States may try to pass the cost of monitoring onto the contractor, but 
such efforts are ill-advised. Unless the contract specifies the amount 
contractors must spend in this regard, contractors’ interest in cutting 
costs—not to mention their interest in reducing the effectiveness of 
monitors in exposing contractual violations—will likely lead to an 
investment too small to serve the purpose.214 And were the contract to 
stipulate the expenditure of an amount sufficient to ensure effective 
monitoring, it could well erase the possibility of any profit margin for 
the contractor. Private prison providers already operate on extremely 
narrow profit margins,215 so if the state is to have any contracting 
partner at all, imposing such stipulations would also necessarily drive 
up the contract price for the state. There is no way around it: if 
monitoring is to be effective, the state must bear the cost. 
Even assuming adequate financial investment on the part of the 
state, however, there remains a further obstacle to the effective 
monitoring of private prisons: the risk of “agency capture.”216 Agency 
capture occurs when “regulators come to be more concerned to serve 
the interests of the industry with which they are in regular contact 
 
savings. See MCDONALD ET AL., 1998, supra note 81, at iv–v (describing the mixed results on 
studies of cost savings). Further, any investment in monitoring must be made up front, before 
any possible savings would be realized. Because private prison contracts allow for a set rate per 
inmate per day, the state cannot say in advance how much it will pay on a given contract; this 
amount depends on the number of offenders that ultimately come through the system. It is true 
that, given a contract price below what the state would otherwise spend, state officials could 
assume that, however many inmates the private prison turns out to house, the state will end up 
saving money. But with the contract price a shifting target, officials are even less likely to want 
to commit money up front for monitoring, given that at the outset they cannot even say with any 
certainty what their ultimate expenditure on incarceration will be. State officials negotiating the 
contracts would thus perceive the cost of monitoring, not in terms of possible future savings, but 
as among the expenses of privatization, and cost-conscious officials in this position would be 
loath to invest more in monitoring than the bare minimum, whether or not the designated 
amount were sufficient to ensure an effective system of oversight. 
 214. Of course, given the inadequacy of the mechanisms currently in place for enforcing 
contractual performance by prison contractors, this result could equally be true even were the 
contracts to specify a minimum required investment in monitoring. 
 215. See HALLINAN, supra note 61, at 177–78 (“The [private] prison business is intensely 
competitive. Winning bids for prison contracts are often separated by pennies per day. Those 
pennies mean the difference between a profitable prison and a money-loser.”); Sam Howe 
Verhovek, Operators Are Not Worried by Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 1997, at B10 (“Even a 
small increase in their costs could be enough to eliminate the price advantage that many 
companies can now offer . . . , which is almost uniformly the factor that leads governments to 
privatize.”). 
 216. See HARDING, supra note 3, at 33–34 (citing MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING 
BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION (1955)). 
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than the more remote and abstract public interest.”217 The worry here 
is that monitors will become too closely aligned with the facility being 
monitored, leading them to overlook or miss altogether evidence of 
abuse. 
Although relations between state-employed monitors and private 
prison management are likely to be closest when monitoring is carried 
out by a full-time on-site inspector, opportunities will exist for a 
rapport to develop between inspectors and contractors, whether the 
monitor is permanent or makes only periodic inspections. These 
actors, generally drawn from the same pool of corrections 
professionals,218 all share a common interest, knowledge base, 
professional community, and perhaps most importantly, a sense of the 
difficult challenges involved in running a prison and a concomitant 
sympathy with the perspective of prison administrators. Such a 
rapport can orient the monitor toward the interests of the contractor, 
making it less likely that contractual performance will be challenged. 
Equally significantly, the “revolving door” between state agencies 
and private providers219 can “create [a] subtle conflict of interest,” as 
monitors who might at some point seek to move from public to 
private employment try to avoid alienating potential future employers 
in the course of performing their current responsibilities.220 
Effective monitoring thus appears to have two key requirements: 
sufficient financial investment, and a commitment to overcoming the 
risk of agency capture. Even still, the scope of activity within the 
prison and the hidden delivery of prison services may limit the likely 
 
 217. Id. at 33 (quoting P. GRABOSKY & J. BRAITHWAITE, OF MANNERS GENTLE: 
ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIES OF AUSTRALIA BUSINESS REGULATORY AGENCIES 198 (1986) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 218. According to Dennis Cunningham of the Oklahoma Department of Corrections, the 
qualifications of private prison monitors “include but are not limited to”: 
A. Broad base of experience in corrections 
B. Operated at a high level administrative position prior to assignment 
C. College degree or equivalent 
D. Oklahoma private prison monitors average 19 years of experience each. Prior 
experience ranges from Warden to Unit Manager. 
Dennis Cunningham, Okla. Dep’t of Corr., Cross Continental Cross Cultural Cooperation, at 9, 
http://www.doc.state.ok.us/Private%20Prisons/Cross%20Continental%20Cross%20Cultural%2
0Cooperation%208-13-03.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2006). 
 219. LOGAN, supra note 4, at 219. 
 220. Gentry, supra note 4, at 360 n.38. The risk of capture appears present whatever the 
particular monitoring regime. Richard Harding studied monitoring in a range of jurisdictions 
pursuing a variety of approaches, and found evidence of capture in all of them. HARDING, supra 
note 3, at 38–47. 
042706 01__DOLOVICH.DOC 5/23/2006  8:43 AM 
2005] PRIVATE PRISONS 495 
effectiveness of any monitoring scheme. Notice, moreover, that there 
is a tension between these requirements, in that the more time 
monitors spend on-site, the greater the risk of agency capture. 
Although this tension need not undermine the possibility of effective 
monitoring, it does further indicate the limits of monitoring as a 
possible check on contractor excesses. 
4. Competition and the Threat of Replacement.  Even assuming a 
contract could be drafted with sufficient specificity to reflect the 
desired results and even if an effective system of monitoring were in 
place, prison contractors need not fear exposure of noncompliance 
absent a credible threat of replacement. Plainly, the states need to 
house their prisoners somewhere. Contractors know this, and know 
too that states face great obstacles to finding suitable alternative 
accommodations for their prisoners. They will therefore understand 
that, notwithstanding threats to this effect, contractual noncompliance 
need not necessarily mean a loss of the contract.221 
As Donahue points out, “[p]erfect competition—many 
alternative suppliers, ease of entry and exit, full information, and so 
on—is out of the question here.”222 But is the field of competition 
good enough to ensure a meaningful threat of replacement in the 
event of nonperformance? At least three characteristics of the private 
prison “market” raise questions as to the likely efficacy of such a 
threat in ensuring ongoing quality of service.223 First, as Justice Scalia 
points out in his dissent in Richardson v. McKnight, the only buyers in 
this market are public officials, spending “other people’s money.”224 
Consequently, factors other than quality of service are liable to 
 
 221. Even under such circumstances, the contracts might still impose monetary sanctions for 
violations, which private prison operators would wish to avoid and which could thus be expected 
to have some disciplinary effects. But if the state is dependent on the private prison provider to 
house its prisoners, the contractor will have considerable leverage that could be used to keep 
any such sanctions to a minimum. As Gentry puts it, “If the state cannot return to a competitive 
market to rebid the contract, sanctions for misfeasance will be inadequate to halt these abuses, 
even if the abuses are detected. The state will be constrained not to penalize the firm heavily 
enough to drive it from business.” Gentry, supra note 4, at 358 (footnotes omitted). 
 222. DONAHUE, supra note 129, at 165. 
 223. This argument regarding market failures in the private prison context draws on that 
offered in my case comment on Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399 (1997). See Case 
Comment, Qualified Immunity—Privatized Governmental Functions: Richardson v. McKnight, 
117 S. Ct. 2100 (1997), 111 HARV. L. REV. 390, 396–98 (1997) (discussing market failures in the 
private prison industry). 
 224. Richardson, 521 U.S. at 418–19 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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influence the judgment of whether to cancel or renew a contract—for 
example, politicians’ need to secure future campaign contributions or 
the business or personal connections between politicians, corrections 
officials, and firm management.225 Second, there is a relatively small 
number of viable industry participants with the experience, resources, 
and infrastructure necessary to make a bid. For this reason, although 
a number of smaller companies have sought to break into the market, 
the industry continues to be dominated by a very few major players.226 
The limited pool of competitors can undermine the force of 
threatened replacement even in the event of inadequate performance 
on the part of the contractor.227 Third, the dependence of the 
government on the initial provider is compounded by the obstacles to 
the state’s resuming the operation of a privatized facility: it would 
face high start-up costs,228 especially if the current facility were owned 
by the contractor,229 and possible litigation arising out of the 
termination of the contract. In rescinding a private prison contract, 
the state is therefore likely to wind up spending more on corrections 
than it had before privatizing. It may thus “be cheaper for the state to 
 
 225. As Steven Donziger explains, because private prisons are “funded entirely by 
government, firms like CCA need to ally themselves with politicians to sustain their growth.” 
Steven Donziger, The Prison-Industrial Complex: What’s Really Driving the Rush to Lock ‘Em Up, 
WASH. POST, Mar. 17, 1996, at C3. In Tennessee, for example, an investigation into the Nashville-
based CCA following the announcement of a bill to privatize all twenty-one of the state’s 
prisons revealed “a small but impressive network of political contacts, a history of generous 
campaign contributions by CCA executives, and business ties among [CCA owner Tom] 
Beasley and top state officials.” Richard Locker, Personal, Political, Business Ties Bind CCA, 
State, MEMPHIS COM. APPEAL, May 25, 1997, at B3. Richard Locker reports that “[a]t least five 
state officials” are business partners with CCA owner Beasley in an unrelated business 
venture.” Id.; see also Simon, supra note 89, at 25 (providing examples of state officials being 
“intertwined” with CCA). 
 226. Together, CCA and Wackenhut control 70 percent of the American market. PHILIP 
MATTERA ET AL., CORRECTIONS CORPORATION OF AMERICA: A CRITICAL LOOK AT ITS 
FIRST TWENTY YEARS 2 (Grassroots Leadership 2003); Your World with Neil Cavuto (Fox 
News television broadcast May 10, 2004) (reporting that CCA runs sixty-five facilities and has 
custody of 62,000 inmates). 
 227. See SHICHOR, supra note 4, at 126. Clifford Rosky, among others, has argued that this 
particular problem could be resolved by making the private prison market more competitive. 
See Rosky, supra note 2, at 960–61. But even assuming such a change could be orchestrated, 
states will still be reluctant to bear the cost of replacement in the event of nonperformance. 
 228. For example, Nevada expected to incur some $12 million in additional operating costs 
in the first two years following decisions in 2003 and 2004 by state legislators to return to public 
control two private facilities that had been operating in the state. See discussion infra note 245. 
 229. See Gentry, supra note 4, at 357. As Gentry notes, “[T]he firm’s market power can 
drive the state from the marketplace just as it can private competitors.” Id. at 358 n.28. 
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accept some contractor abuses than to remedy them by resuming 
state operation.”230 
Available evidence confirms that, absent both political pressure 
to replace abusive or otherwise ill-performing contractors and a 
willingness to bear the financial cost of such replacement, the state is 
unlikely to act on the threat of rescission. It is not that state agencies 
never replace contractors in the event of noncompliance;231 states 
experimenting with privatization have rescinded a number of private 
prison contracts after contractor abuses came to light.232 But what 
seems to be required for such cancellation are conditions sufficiently 
objectionable to trigger a public outcry, an effect that generally 
occurs under limited circumstances: either the inmates experiencing 
abusive conditions are housed by private prisons out of state, or the 
exposed conditions are extremely egregious. 
As to the former, at least six states have cancelled contracts 
“involving the shipment of [their own] prisoners to private prisons in 
another state”233 following allegations of “vendor violations.”234 
 
 230. Id. That states’ dependence on private contractors deepens the longer state 
correctional facilities have been in private hands may explain the fear among skeptics of prison 
privatization that contractors will engage in “low-balling.” The term refers to the practice of 
deliberately bidding low for a contract, and then raising the prices charged to the captive 
purchaser later on. Michael Janus, Bars on the Iron Triangle: Public Policy Issues in the 
Privatization of Corrections, in PRIVATIZING CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS, supra note 4, at 
75, 78. 
 231. Indeed, on comparing the private prisons landscape in the United States with that in 
Australia and the United Kingdom, Richard Harding found that “United States authorities have 
been more willing than their peers in other countries to cancel contracts.” Harding, supra note 
63, at 323. 
 232. See id.; see also MCDONALD ET AL., supra note 81, at 53. States have also cancelled 
contracts when their prison populations dropped sufficiently to allow all inmates to be housed in 
state facilities. Peter Slevin, Prison Firms Seek Inmates and Profits, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 2001, 
at A3. Here, however, what is of interest is only those cancellations made as a result of 
contractor noncompliance. 
 233. Harding, supra note 63, at 323. 
 234. See MCDONALD ET AL., supra note 81, at 53 (listing states that have terminated 
contracts with out-of-state private prison providers on the basis of “vendor violations,” 
including Colorado, Montana, North Carolina, Oklahoma and Utah); see also Scott Charton, 
Missouri Suit Says Jail Abuse Covered Up, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, Aug. 26, 1997, at 
B3 (noting that the Brazoria facility and two other Texas jails from which Missouri withdrew its 
inmates “were managed by . . . Capital Correctional Resources, Inc.”); Matthew Schofield, 
Fortune Takes a Downward Turn: Inmate Exit Threatens a Town’s Livelihood, KAN. CITY STAR, 
Aug. 24, 1997, at A1. It bears noting that each one of the out-of-state contract terminations 
described by McDonald and colleagues, as well as Missouri’s termination of its out-of-state 
private prison contracts following the Brazoria incident, involved private facilities located in 
Texas. See MCDONALD ET AL., supra note 81, at 53; Schofield, supra. 
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Among them was Missouri, which pulled eight hundred of its 
prisoners from three Texas jails managed by Capital Correctional 
Resources, Inc. (CCR), after a leaked videotape showed Missouri 
inmates in CCR’s Brazoria facility “forced to crawl on the floor, 
shocked with electric prods, [and] bitten by police dogs.”235 
As to the latter, in 1995, for example, the INS cancelled its 
contract with Esmor Correctional Services for the operation of its 
Elizabeth, New Jersey, facility after it came to light that Esmor’s 
practices included the “cutting [of] financial corners” on food, so that 
at some Esmor facilities “there were often only 30 meals to feed 100 
inmates, because Esmor did not want to pay for more.”236 Detainees 
were also denied such essentials as clean underwear and sanitary 
napkins, and Esmor even charged them “for lost eating utensils, 
clothing and drinking cups.”237 Investigations into the New Jersey 
facility also revealed that guards who were ill-trained, overworked, 
and outnumbered had routinely abused inmates physically, “shackled 
them during visits [and] placed them in punishment cells for little 
documented reason . . . [as] part of a systematic methodology 
designed by some Esmor guards as a means to control the general 
detainee population.”238 
To take one further example, in 2004, in the wake of extensive 
reports of abuse, the state of Louisiana closed its Tallulah 
Correctional Center for Youth. Tallulah had been operated by Trans-
American Corporation, a company run by a local businessman whose 
father was “an influential state senator.”239 At the Tallulah facility, 
inmates had “regularly appear[ed] at the infirmary with black eyes, 
 
The greater number of cancelled contracts with out-of-state contractors has several 
possible explanations. For one thing, in such cases, the regulatory power of the host state is at a 
minimum. (Harding calls this situation one of “regulatory impotence.” Harding, supra note 63, 
at 280.) There also appears to be greater political will to protect “home” inmates when the 
provider is an outsider, and out-of-state contractors may also have fewer political contacts that 
they might work to their advantage when allegations of abuse surface. 
 235. Schofield, supra note 234, at A1; see also Charton, supra note 234, at B3. 
 236. John Sullivan & Matthew Purdy, Parlaying the Detentions Business into Profit, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 23, 1995, at A1 (“Whoever got there first got the food.” (quoting Richard Moore, a 
“former operations manager for Esmor’s two halfway houses in New York”)). 
 237. Id. (“Money, money, money. That’s all that was important to them.” (quoting Carl 
Frick, “a veteran jail warden who was the first administrator [of the] Elizabeth, [New Jersey, 
facility]”)). 
 238. Id. (quoting the investigators’ report). 
 239. Fox Butterfield, Profits at a Juvenile Prison Come with a Chilling Cost, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 19, 1995, at A1. 
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broken noses or jaws or perforated eardrums from beating by the 
poorly paid, poorly trained guards or from fights with other boys.”240 
One inmate suffered regular beatings from guards, and after fifteen 
months, a judge ordered that he be released so he could receive 
medical attention. By this time “his eardrum had been perforated in a 
beating by a guard, he had large scars on his arms, legs and face, and 
his nose had been broken so badly that he [spoke] in a wheeze.”241 
Trans-American “scrimped on money for education and mental 
health treatment . . . to earn a profit,” and meals at the facility were 
“so meager that many boys los[t] weight [and c]lothing [was] so scarce 
that boys [fought] over shirts and shoes.”242 
The willingness of state agencies to cancel contracts under these 
limited circumstances suggests that the threat of replacement may 
serve to check at least some contractor excesses, particularly when the 
private prison is located in another state. But taken as a whole, the 
evidence suggests not a readiness to rescind contracts when there is 
evidence of widespread abuse but reluctance on the part of states to 
do so even in the face of long-term concerns with prison conditions. 
Wisconsin, for example, waited five years after allegations first 
surfaced of physical and sexual abuse of Wisconsin prisoners in a 
CCA-run prison in Tennessee before announcing its intention to 
cancel its contract and bring its prisoners home, although the 
allegations had been confirmed by a team of Wisconsin state 
investigators shortly after being raised.243 And Louisiana’s Tallulah 
Correctional Center for Youth, which the state finally closed in 2004, 
had by that time seen allegations of severe abuse of prisoners for a 
full decade.244 
To make the threat of replacement meaningful, legislators must 
commit to bearing the cost when the evidence of abuse suggests the 
need to do so.245 Yet, where the state’s priority is saving money, this 
 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Richard P. Jones, State to Probe Alleged Abuse of Inmates in Tennessee, MILWAUKEE J. 
SENTINEL, Oct. 3, 1998, at 1; Patrick Marley, State Cutting Ranks of Inmates Held Elsewhere, 
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Mar. 30, 2004, at 3B. 
 244. See Butterfield, supra note 239, at A1 (reporting on the brutal conditions at Tallulah as 
recounted by prison officials and inmates). 
 245. For instance, in Nevada, the legislature voted to take over the CCA-run Southern 
Nevada Women’s Correctional Facility in North Las Vegas after legislators visiting the prison 
saw evidence of inadequate programming and below-standard medical care. Prior to these visits, 
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willingness is unlikely to be forthcoming absent extreme 
circumstances and a public outcry. As a consequence, the threat of 
replacement cannot be expected to deter any but the most extreme 
abuses. 
E. Private Prisons: Problems and Prospects 
The foregoing survey suggests that, although existing oversight 
and accountability mechanisms are not wholly ineffectual, they fall far 
short of providing adequate safeguards against prisoner abuse. 
Ideally, private prisons would allow states to harness “[the] 
willingness and ability [of the private sector] to innovate in pursuit of 
profits”246 within a regulatory structure that effectively checked any 
efforts by contractors to save money in ways likely to put inmates at 
risk. But this is not the regime currently in place. 
Instead, absent the restraining power of effective regulatory and 
oversight mechanisms, private prison contractors have acted largely 
as earlier predicted.247 That is, they have sought to increase their 
margins by considerably reducing their labor costs, systematically 
cutting salaries and benefits to employees, and underinvesting in 
training.248 They have done so, moreover, without fear of either 
contravening statutory civil service protections or meeting collective 
 
nearly half the inmates had signed a petition complaining of “poor food and medical care, 
staffers who aren’t properly trained, inadequate grievance procedures and missing personal 
items” and used the petition to pressure the state to take over running the facility. Female 
Nevada Inmates Petition for State Takeover of Prison, Associated Press Newswires, Apr. 12, 
2004, available at Westlaw, 4/12/04 APWIRES 19:20:05; see Ed Vogel, Board OKs State’s 
Takeover of Prison, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., June 17, 2004, at B4. The decision of the Nevada 
legislature to take over the women’s prison came just a year after it decided to do the same with 
a privately run juvenile facility when allegations of abuse led to the withdrawal of the 
contractor. This dual takeover was expected to cost the state an extra $1 million a year for the 
women’s prison and up to $10 million over the first two years for the youth facility. See id.; 
Legislative Panel Votes for State to Operate Youth Prison, Associated Press Newswires, May 9, 
2003, available at Westlaw, 5/9/03 APWIRES 15:24:00. 
 246. Pozen, supra note 4, at 283. 
 247. See supra Part III.C. 
 248.  
Private prison companies lure state-employed guards by offering short term bonuses 
and pay raises. They do not dwell on the fact that, unlike the unionized state prison 
guards—whose union, AFSCME, has negotiated a generous, and guaranteed, pension 
package over the years—private guards receive a benefits package that in the long 
run is virtually worthless. For a few thousand dollars in ready cash, the newly hired 
private guards give up the possibility of a lifelong guaranteed retirement income. 
Sasha Abramsky, Incarceration, Inc.: Private Prisons Thrive on Cheap Labor and the Hunger of 
Job-Starved Towns, THE NATION, July 19, 2004, at 22. 
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resistance from their workers. Not only are the employees of private 
prisons not state employees, a fact that allows their employers to set 
contract terms with minimal restrictions,249 but private prison 
employees are also not generally union members. As employees of 
private companies, guards in private facilities are not eligible for 
membership in the American Federation of State, County, and 
Municipal Employees (AFSCME), which has so effectively 
represented publicly employed correctional officers nationwide.250 
Nor have private prison guards tended to form their own unions, as 
“private correctional companies make every effort not to employ 
unionized workers and not to let their workforce join any union.”251 
Nor have predicted innovations in prison management through 
privatization come to pass.252 Instead, the private prisons of today 
function very much like public prisons, only with a cheaper labor 
force.253 Private prisons thus generally exhibit all the particularized 
characteristics that make public prisons dangerous places: the 
considerable discretion and power conferred on guards;254 the fear on 
all sides; the simultaneous monotony and high pressure of the prison 
environment;255 inmates’ possible proclivity to violence; and the 
 
 249. See Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 411 (1997) (noting that privatization “frees 
the private prison-management firm from many civil service law restraints” and that such firms 
“can operate like other private firms; [they] need not operate like a typical government 
department”). 
 250. The other powerful correctional officers’ union is the California Correctional and 
Peace Officers’ Association (CCPOA). CCPOA, however, represents only correctional officers 
in California, which as of now has no private prisons. And given the strong opposition of the 
organization to prison privatization, it is unclear whether it would open its ranks to private 
prison guards should the state ever privatize some of its prisons. See Daniel B. Wood, Private 
Prisons, Public Doubts, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, July 21, 1998, at 1 (explaining that 
private prisons are “vehemently opposed by [CCPOA]”). 
 251. SHICHOR, supra note 4, at 198. 
 252. For discussion as to why not, see supra notes 140–46 and accompanying text. 
 253. As McDonald and colleagues found in their comprehensive survey of private prisons, 
when contracting agencies have privatized penal facilities, “the contract procurement and 
monitoring procedures appear to be designed to obtain a facility that is a close equivalent to the 
public facility, differing mainly in the legal status of the operator (i.e., private rather than 
government).” MCDONALD ET AL., supra note 81, at 56. And, they conclude, “with some 
notable exceptions, . . . the agencies are getting what they ask for.” Id. 
 254. See Gentry, supra note 4, at 354 n.7 (suggesting that “the greatest unwarranted burden on 
prisoners may be the arbitrary implementation of rules and exercise of authority by guards”). 
 255. See Crawley, supra note 145, at 417–18 (“Anxiety [on the part of prison officers] arises 
from the unpredictability of prison life; although much of prison life is mundane and routine, 
the officer is always conscious that a prisoner may assault him, that a prisoner may try to escape, 
that a prisoner may try to take him hostage, etc.”). 
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relative social and economic disempowerment of prison guards, who 
do a difficult job in a tense and dangerous environment and for whom 
power over prisoners constitutes both a rare perquisite and an outlet 
for frustration.256 But in addition, private prison employees are likely 
to be less qualified (because less well remunerated) and less well 
trained than their public-sector counterparts.257 
Given this situation, it seems likely that private prisons as 
currently constituted would turn out to be more violent places than 
their state-run counterparts. And in fact, although much of the 
available data is inconclusive regarding the overall quality of 
conditions in private prisons as compared with public facilities,258 
meaningful data do exist showing elevated levels of physical violence 
in private prisons.259 
For example, in 1997, researchers at the U.S. Department of 
Justice Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) surveyed private prison 
operators and received responses pertaining to sixty-five of the eighty 
private correctional facilities then in operation in the country.260 They 
then compared this information to comprehensive data on public 
prisons nationwide. Comparing the number of “major incidents,” 
including “assaults, riots, fires and other disturbances” in the public 
prisons over twelve months with those occurring in private facilities 
 
 256. See, e.g., Ted Conover, Guarding Sing Sing, NEW YORKER, Apr. 3, 2000, at 55, 58; 
Bruce Porter, Terror on an Eight-Hour Shift, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 26, 1995, at 42. 
 257. This is not to say that public prison guards are always well trained. Hallinan, for 
example, reports that “[b]y 1994, Texas guards received only 120 hours of classroom instruction 
before entering a prison[,] . . . one of the shortest training periods in the nation.” In 1994, 
moreover, “one-third of the guards in Texas had less than a year’s experience.” HALLINAN, 
supra note 61, at 89. 
 258. See MCDONALD ET AL., supra note 81, at 55 (“[A]ll of the existing evaluations are 
flawed in fundamental ways, and there is little information that is widely applicable to various 
commitment settings. Accordingly . . . it is not possible to make any general statements about 
the ability of private contractors to ensure quality correctional services in comparison to public 
prison management.” (summarizing the findings of GAES ET AL., supra note 141)). 
 259. Some may take the drawing of this comparison to be inconsistent with my earlier 
eschewal of the comparative efficiency approach. But the argument against comparative 
efficiency is not an argument against any and all comparison between public and private. It is an 
argument against premature comparison derailing efforts to understand how private prisons 
actually work, and against the exclusive focus on efficiency at the expense of the arguably more 
urgent legitimacy concerns. The comparison of violence levels offered here avoids both these 
pitfalls, having come after a detailed analysis of the actual structure and functioning of private 
prisons themselves, and placing the relative humanity of conditions of confinement, and not 
their relative efficiency, at center stage. 
 260. See JAMES AUSTIN & GARY COVENTRY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EMERGING ISSUES 
ON PRIVATIZED PRISONS 39–40 (2001); see also Austin & Coventry, supra note 67, at 190. 
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over the same period,261 the survey found a greater number of such 
incidents per one thousand inmates in the private prisons: 45.3 per 
1,000 inmates in public prisons, as compared with 50.5 in private 
facilities.262 When inmate assaults were taken alone, the disparity was 
even more marked: 25.4 per 1,000 inmates in publicly run facilities, as 
compared with 35.1 in private prisons.263 
These data, moreover, do not account for the greater proportion 
of maximum-security inmates in publicly run facilities—19.8 percent 
as compared with only 4.6 percent in private facilities.264 Maximum-
security prisoners are so classified because they are considered a 
much greater security risk and are thus likely to be more violent than 
prisoners with lower security classifications.265 One should thus expect 
public prisons, which house a higher proportion of maximum-security 
inmates, to be more violent than private ones. That private prisons 
are more violent than public ones despite the lower security 
classification of private prison inmates suggests that particular 
violence-fostering forces are at work in private prisons that are not 
present in public prisons, or at least not present to the same degree. 
This hypothesis is reinforced by the picture that emerges once the 
data are adjusted to compare only “the medium and minimum 
security public facilities with the same type of private facilities.”266 
Here, the difference is even more pronounced, with 29.6 “major 
incidents” per 1,000 inmates at public prisons, as compared with 48.0 
 
 261. See Austin & Coventry, supra note 67, at 190, 196. 
 262. See id. at 196 tbl.9. 
 263. See id. 
 264. See id. at 191 tbl.5. 
 265. In Montana, for example, inmates labeled “predatory” are automatically classified as 
maximum security. The prison disciplinary infractions that earn an inmate the label “predatory” 
include “homicide; assault; inciting a riot/rioting; hostage taking; setting a fire; . . . sexual assault; 
assault with intent to transmit a communicable disease; threats of bodily harm; and fighting.” 
PATRICIA L. HARDYMAN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REVALIDATING EXTERNAL PRISON 
CLASSIFICATION SYSTEMS 10–11 (2002), available at http://www.nicic.org/pubs/2002/017382.pdf. 
In Virginia, prisoners classified as Level 6, the highest available security classification, are those 
prisoners who satisfy this description: “[d]isruptive, assaultive, severe behavior problems, 
predatory-type behavior, and/or escape risk.” Id. at 65 (Exhibit A.4). And in Delaware, 
prisoners who earn seventeen points or more according to Department of Corrections 
guidelines are automatically placed in maximum-security facilities, see id. at 88–89 (Exhibit 
A.14); on this scale, among other allocations, prisoners receive seven points for a “[p]redatory/ 
assaultive institutional misconduct report,” as well as seven points for a conviction of the 
“highest severity,” id. These parameters are representative of those used across the country. See 
id. at 59–107 (detailing the classification schemes of ten states). 
 266. Austin & Coventry, supra note 67, at 197. 
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in the private facilities.267 For inmate assaults taken alone, with the 
adjustment for security classification, public prisons had 20.2 assaults 
per 1,000 inmates, as compared with 33.5 in private facilities.268 
The data on staff assaults likewise changed notably once the 
classification levels were taken into account. Private prisons did 
slightly better than public prisons on this measure when the full 
complement of publicly held maximum-security inmates was 
included: per 1,000 inmates, there were 12.7 assaults on staff in 
private prisons as compared with 13.8 in public prisons during the 
twelve-month period studied.269 However, when the data were 
recalculated to include only medium- and minimum-security inmates, 
researchers found 8.2 such assaults per 1,000 inmates in public 
facilities, as compared with 12.2 in private prisons.270 
Other studies have also found elevated violence levels in private 
prisons as compared with public ones. For example, according to 
Judith Greene, a New York-based expert on private prisons, a 
comparative study of “serious incidents” in public and private 
facilities in Oklahoma over a three-year period found that “private 
prisons recorded more than twice as many incidents as public ones.”271 
Similar findings were also made in an earlier study commissioned by 
the Tennessee Department of Corrections (TDOC).272 The TDOC 
study compared two public prisons and one prison run by CCA. 
Although the study authors claimed to have found no significant 
differences among the prisons in terms of quality,273 the empirical data 
on which this conclusion was based tell a different story. In particular, 
over the fifteen months studied, “the private prison reported 
significantly more (214) injuries to prisoners and staff, compared to 
21 and 51 for the two state prisons respectively,” and “[t]he private 
prisons also reported 30 incidents of the use of force [against inmates 
by guards], compared with 4 and 6 respectively for the state 
prisons.”274 As with the BJA study above, inmate characteristics were 
 
 267. See id. at 196 tbl.9. 
 268. See id. 
 269. See id. 
 270. See id. 
 271. Slevin, supra note 232. 
 272. See GAES ET AL., supra note 141, at 9. 
 273. Id. 
 274. Hart et al., supra note 148, at 1151 (quoting Tennessee Department of Corrections 
report). It is unclear how the three Tennessee prisons that were the focus of this study 
compared in terms of population size. But the three facilities selected for the study were chosen 
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not consistent across the three Tennessee facilities, with each facility 
housing “quite different types of inmates in terms of the socio-
demographic characteristics reported, age and race, criminal history 
and custody classification.”275 That this is so, however, only 
strengthens the point, for prisoners assigned to the care of private 
prison providers tend to be the “cream of the crop,” those thought to 
be less inclined to violence or other forms of troublemaking.276 One 
should thus have expected fewer incidents of injuries and use of force 
in Tennessee’s private prison, rather than the other way around. 
Certainly, nothing in the foregoing discussion goes to show that 
the state’s use of private prisons could never satisfy the humanity 
principle. What it does show is that, when the state looks to 
privatization to save money on the cost of corrections, there is reason 
to expect conditions of confinement to fall below even that level of 
quality and safety that can be reasonably expected of those charged 
with the difficult task of running the prisons. When the state’s aim is 
saving money, it will be unwilling to undertake measures that will 
substantially raise the cost of privatization, even when doing so could 
arguably ensure more meaningful protections for vulnerable inmates. 
So the state will invest minimally in monitoring contractual 
compliance, placing perhaps one full-time monitor at each site, 
despite the arguable need for a full-time team of monitors if the effort 
is to be at all effective. When money is the state’s primary concern, it 
will hesitate to rescind contracts even when evidence of abuse is 
considerable, fearing the costs such a move would entail. It will also 
forbear from specifying contractual terms requiring private 
contractors to provide minimum levels of staffing and training for 
private prison guards and stipulating the salaries and benefits to be 
paid to them. Doing so would only increase the cost of contracting to 
the state and would, moreover, greatly tie the hands of contractors, 
for whom cutting labor costs is the central available means to keep 
expenses down. 
It is possible that the hazards private prisons pose under these 
circumstances might be mitigated considerably were society 
 
for purposes of direct comparison between public and private prison management, and they 
“were all based on the same general architectural design.” GAES ET AL., supra note 141, at 7. 
These factors suggest that the populations of the three facilities were at least roughly 
comparable in size. 
 275. GAES ET AL., supra note 141, at 9. 
 276. DiIulio, supra note 46, at 166–67. 
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committed to satisfying the demands of the humanity principle and 
willing to pay the cost of effective regulatory tools. Still, even 
assuming such a commitment, obstacles would remain to eliminating 
gratuitously inhumane treatment in private prisons. Contracts would 
still be incomplete and would continue to accord residual control 
rights to private prison administrators and guards, thus allowing scope 
for abuses.277 Even assuming a public commitment to adequate 
oversight, many aspects of prison life would inevitably still go 
unobserved. And though one might contemplate a change in the 
public sentiment regarding the cost of corrections, contractors 
themselves will still be motivated by the desire for profit. This means 
that even under the altered circumstances contemplated, the 
contractors’ interests would remain at odds with those of the 
humanity principle, continuing to place a burden of particularly 
rigorous oversight on the state.278 
F. Public Prisons: A Satisfactory Alternative? 
To judge private prisons from the perspective of the humanity 
principle, it is not enough to consider merely the idea of private 
prisons. Instead, it is necessary to examine prison contracting as a 
practice, within the regulatory context in which private prisons 
actually operate. Conducting this contextual analysis has made plain 
that, at least as currently structured, private prisons pose an 
appreciable danger to the possibility of legitimate punishment. 
Yet public prisons, too, will invariably fall short when measured 
against the ideal the humanity principle represents.279 Given 
conditions in publicly run prisons and jails, it would be absurd to 
suggest otherwise. The question then becomes, of what relevance is 
the sorry state of many public prisons to the present discussion? 
Were comparative efficiency the operative framework here, 
drawing attention to existing conditions in public prisons would serve 
as a rejoinder: yes, conditions in private prisons are at odds with the 
demands of the humanity principle, but so are conditions in public 
prisons—the implication being that, given the shortcomings of public 
 
 277. Indeed, it is this reason alone that leads economists Hart, Schleifer, and Vishny to 
caution against the use of private prisons. Hart et al., supra note 148, at 1150–52. 
 278. See, e.g., Pozen, supra note 4, at 282 (suggesting that the profit motive of private 
contractors creates risks that “place an added onus on regulators”). 
 279. See supra note 8 (noting the various dangers faced by prisoners as a result of conditions 
in public prisons). 
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prisons, private prisons may still be preferable. But liberal legitimacy 
rejects the “either/or” approach of comparative efficiency. It aims not 
to champion the least bad alternative, but instead to understand how 
and why existing prisons and jails, public and private, fall so far short 
of the ideal. For liberal legitimacy, therefore, the current state of 
public prisons represents not a rejoinder to the foregoing critique of 
private prisons, but rather an occasion for asking whether the insights 
gleaned from that critique help also to explain failings in the public 
system. 
That there is much to learn about public prisons from a study of 
private prisons only makes sense. Although the privatization of 
corrections is generally treated in the private prisons literature as a 
radical departure from prevailing penal practices, prison privatization 
represents neither an isolated nor an aberrant approach to 
punishment. It is instead the logical extension of practices that are 
standard fare in the prison system as a whole. Of these practices, two 
in particular bear emphasizing: (1) the widespread use of private 
contractors to provide key prison services at a cheaper cost than the 
state would otherwise pay, and (2) the delegation to correctional 
officers of considerable discretion—and thus, considerable power—
over vulnerable and dependent prisoners absent mechanisms 
adequate to check possible abuses. 
The foregoing discussion suggests that the risk that private 
prisons will be unsafe and inhumane stems directly from these two 
practices. Yet both of these practices are also standard components of 
state-run prisons across the country. As to the first, virtually every 
corrections facility in the country contracts out to for-profit providers 
for at least some necessary services, including everything from food 
services to medical, dental, and psychiatric treatment to rehabilitative 
and educational programming, garbage collection, and even inmate 
classification.280 The state’s primary motivation for such contracting is 
its potential to cut the cost of corrections to the state; for the majority 
of contractors, as in the case of private prison providers, the aim is to 
 
 280. See Joel, supra note 63, at 51, 51. All prisons—public as well as private—contract out a 
range of necessary services to private for-profit contractors to save money on the cost of 
corrections. The alternative to private prisons is thus not wholly “public” prisons, but rather 
prisons in which state-employed prison administrators contract out discrete services to for-profit 
providers who, in their spheres, are subject to the same pressures and temptations as private 
prison providers. 
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make as large a profit as possible.281 And although perhaps some 
services—say, garbage collection—can be carried out without having 
an impact on prison conditions, most others directly affect the well-
being of prisoners.282 
And as to the second, in terms of correctional officers’ discretion 
in dealing with prisoners, there is little if anything to distinguish 
public from private. Prison officials in public and private prisons alike 
have direct control over all aspects of prisoners’ day-to-day lives,283 
the circumstances of which are well hidden from public view. 
Furthermore, the mechanisms in place to check potential abuse in the 
public prisons are either identical to those that apply in the private 
context, or else, despite differences, are just as likely to be 
inadequate. 
With respect to the courts, aside from the narrow Richardson 
exception,284 the legal standards previously canvassed, both 
substantive and procedural,285 apply equally to public and private 
prisons.286 The same holds for the certification standards of the ACA, 
which does not distinguish between public and private prisons when 
assessing facilities for accreditation purposes, and thus judges each on 
 
 281. Unlike the private prison context itself, in the context of contracting out for discrete 
services, some of the players are nonprofits, who seek not economic rewards but to fulfill some 
other aim. The precise interests of nonprofit prison contractors vary depending on the nature of 
the contractor. For example, Prison Fellowship Ministries operates a program called the 
InnerChange Freedom Initiative (IFI), which runs “Biblically-based, Christ-centered 24-hour a 
day” prison residential programs in Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, and Texas. IFI - About - IFI 
Program, http://www.ifiprison.org/channelroot/home/aboutprogram.htm (last visited Dec. 13, 
2005); IFI - States, http://www.ifiprison.org/channelroot/home/states.htm (last visited Dec. 13, 
2005). Prisoners who participate in IFI programs live together in a separate area of the prison, 
and their days are orchestrated exclusively by InnerChange. See IFI - About - IFI Program, 
http://www.ifiprison.org/channelroot/home/aboutprogram.htm (last visited Dec. 13, 2005) (“The 
state continues to provide food, clothing, shelter and security to the inmates while IFI staff 
provides the intensive program.”). According to the program’s website, its mission “is to create 
and maintain a prison environment that fosters respect for God’s law and rights of others, and 
to encourage the spiritual and moral regeneration of prisoners.” Id. 
 282. Arguably, of course, even garbage collection can directly affect the quality of 
conditions of confinement if it is not carried out regularly enough or under sufficiently sanitary 
conditions. 
 283. See supra note 133 and accompanying text. 
 284. See Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399 (1997) (holding that privately employed 
prison guards are not entitled to qualified immunity in § 1983 actions). But see supra notes 183–
87 and accompanying text for an argument that the denial of qualified immunity to private 
prison guards is unlikely to yield much tangible benefit to prisoners held in private facilities. 
 285. The PLRA, which restricts prisoners’ access to the courts, applies to all inmates, 
whether they are held in public or private facilities. 
 286. See supra Part III.D.1. 
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the same basis. As for the threat of service-provider replacement in 
cases of poor performance and ongoing monitoring of internal prison 
affairs, although the structuring regimes differ in each case, these 
mechanisms appear no more effective at constraining abuses in the 
public sphere than in the private. 
With regard to competition and the threat of replacement, 
because the state has a monopoly over prison administration, there is 
no possibility that a dysfunctional public prison will be taken over or 
replaced by an alternate provider. And as to monitoring, although 
many states provide by statute or administrative regulation for 
regular inspection and oversight of corrections facilities, the 
stipulated requirements tend to be minimal. In California, for 
example, the Office of the Inspector General (CA OIG) is required 
by statute to audit each prison within a year of a new warden’s 
appointment, and all facilities once every four years.287 Although 
available reports suggest that the CA OIG does a thorough job and 
provides detailed and useful findings,288 the infrequency of the audits 
suggests that this oversight scheme can have only limited effect. At 
the same time, even where monitoring requirements seem on paper 
to be relatively stringent, they do not necessarily translate in practice 
into effective means for identifying and checking possible abuses. In 
Tennessee, for example, the Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner 
of Corrections is required to visit each state prison once a month “to 
determine whether the laws, rules and regulations are duly 
 
 287. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 6126 (a)(2) (West 2005). This provision went into effect on 
July 1, 2005, and its requirements are to be “fully met” by July 1, 2009. Id. Prior to the 
amendment, the CA OIG was under no specific obligation to conduct regular investigations or 
audits of any facilities; instead, the CA OIG was simply given the discretion to “initiate an 
investigation or an audit on his or her own accord.” Id. (text of section operative until July 1, 
2005). 
 288. For example, the CA OIG’s 2003 audit of conditions in California State Prison Solano 
in Vacaville, California, identified problems that included “deficiencies in tracking inmate 
tuberculosis status, improper assignment of sentence reduction credits, ineffective monitoring of 
the length of time inmates spend in administrative segregation, unsafe modification to 
administrative segregation unit buildings, and inappropriate housing for inmates taking 
psychotropic and anticonvulsant medications.” CAL. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, 
MANAGEMENT REVIEW AUDIT, CALIFORNIA STATE PRISON, SOLANO at 3 (2003), available at 
http://www.oig.ca.gov/reports/pdf/csps0303.pdf. In addition, the audit “revealed several issues 
outside the direct control of the warden that require the attention of the Department of 
Corrections. Those issues include[d] budgetary restrictions that conflict with departmental 
mandates relating to inmate dental care and deficiencies in procedures for conducting inmate 
death reviews.” Id. 
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observed . . . and the convicts properly governed.”289 Yet my efforts to 
turn up records confirming these monthly inspections were 
unavailing, and the commissioner’s own annual review suggests that 
inspections are conducted not monthly but annually.290 And even 
these annual inspections seem unlikely to affect the quality of 
conditions of confinement, given the emphasis the commissioner 
places on the “cost efficient” character of this monitoring scheme;291 
as has already been seen, an emphasis on cost savings in the context 
of monitoring tends to detract from, rather than enhance, the success 
of the effort.292 
Thus, public prisons, too, contract with for-profit providers for 
the provision of essential prison services as a cost-saving measure. 
And in public prisons, too, correctional officers enjoy considerable 
power over prisoners absent effective oversight mechanisms. It 
should thus be unsurprising that, in terms of day-to-day structure and 
functioning, private prisons operate pretty much like public prisons—
and that the conditions in each are far from safe or humane.293 
What lessons, if any, does the foregoing analysis of private 
prisons offer for those wishing to increase the humanity of prison 
conditions generally? For one thing, it suggests that prison officials 
should be wary of contracting out prison services, even on a smaller 
scale, to any entities that promise to reduce the cost of providing 
essential prison services in exchange for the chance to make a profit 
for themselves. This caution extends not just to contracts for running 
 
 289. TENN. CODE ANN. § 41-1-1-6 (2005). 
 290. TENN. DEP’T OF CORR., FISCAL YEAR 2003–2004, ANNUAL REPORT, at 19 (2004) 
(section entitled “Annual Inspections”). 
 291. Id. This particular emphasis, together with the fact that, collectively, the Tennessee 
prisons were reportedly 95 percent “in compliance with policy mandates for FY2003-04” 
suggests an inspection regime of relatively limited efficacy in terms of identifying problems and 
constraining abuses. Id. at 20. 
 292. See supra Part III.D.3. 
 293. This fact may help to resolve a puzzle presented by the emergence of private prisons—
why a policy innovation that struck so many outsiders as inappropriate and even deeply 
disturbing was so readily adopted as a good idea by corrections professionals across the country. 
The explanation may be that once prison officials came to view as appropriate the contracting 
out to for-profit parties of key prison services in order to save money on the cost of corrections, 
and came to see nothing problematic about according broad discretion over inmates to prison 
guards notwithstanding the questionable efficacy of existing accountability mechanisms, private 
prisons themselves did not seem so dramatic a move. At that point, it may have seemed 
perfectly reasonable to delegate responsibility for whole inmate populations to for-profit 
contractors and to rely on the regulatory mechanisms canvassed in this Article to check 
potential abuses 
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whole prisons, but also to the contracting out of discrete prison 
services like food service, medical, dental and psychiatric care, 
rehabilitative programming, and inmate classification. As has just 
been seen, absent effective checks, one can expect for-profit 
contractors to cut costs even at the expense of inmates. Creating 
disincentives to this behavior is therefore crucial. But ensuring 
meaningful oversight and accountability costs money, and any time 
the states contract out to reduce their prison budgets, state officials 
are going to be reluctant to spend what it takes to ensure prisoners’ 
ongoing security and well-being. This set of dynamics means that 
contracting out even discrete prison services to for-profit contractors 
when the state’s goal is cost cutting is a recipe for seriously 
compromised conditions of confinement. 
Experiences with prison health-management companies bear out 
this caution. To take just one example, in 2003 alone, CMS took in 
over $500 million contracting with prisons in thirty states to provide 
medical care for inmates. Although the company is extremely 
secretive,294 investigations into company practices have revealed a 
litany of stories of inmates who died or suffered serious long-term 
disability because of treatment delayed or denied,295 of staff—doctors 
and nurses—being hired despite their having been suspended from 
the practice of medicine or otherwise disciplined by the medical 
boards issuing their licenses,296 and of policies deliberately designed to 
minimize the amount of medical care ultimately provided to prisoners 
in need of treatment.297 
 
 294. See Hylton, supra note 8, at 43. 
 295. See, e.g., William Allen & Kim Bell, Death, Neglect, and the Bottom Line, ST. LOUIS 
POST-DISPATCH, Sept. 27, 1998, at G1 (giving examples of numerous inmates who died or 
became seriously ill as a result of inadequate medical care provided by CMS). 
 296. See Skolnick, supra note 175, at 1387 (detailing CMS’s employment practices, which 
include hiring medical personnel whose licenses have been suspended or revoked by state 
medical boards, and explaining that some states allow the reinstatement of medical licenses 
restricting the holder to “practice in a penal institution”). 
 297. One former CMS employee, who worked for CMS for five years as a supervising nurse, 
recounted a host of such policies, including those made to reduce the number of doctors’ visits: 
Appointments were made for weeks or months down the road, knowing that the 
inmate would not be there anymore. Or we would make appointments for days that 
we knew the inmate was going to be in court. They don’t keep the trial dates in the 
medical file, but you just call the booking desk up front and ask them when the trial 
date is. Then you make their next appointment for that date. We were told to tell 
them, there was a canned phrase, “Don’t worry, you have an appointment. We just 
can’t tell you when it is because of security reasons.” So you would be consoling 
someone, knowing full well that they weren’t going to get to see anybody. You just 
put them right back at the bottom of the list again. 
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And contracting out is not the only practice that bears scrutiny 
for the reasons just explored. It is also necessary to scrutinize 
carefully any independent efforts on the part of state officials to make 
publicly run prisons financially self-sustaining or to run them at a 
profit.298 Meeting inmates’ needs and ensuring their safety is 
expensive and requires a certain minimum investment. Yet state 
corrections officials, too, face pressures to reduce the cost of running 
the prisons. Depending on the approach adopted to achieve this end, 
these efforts could well pose a risk of serious harm to inmates.299 
The foregoing analysis of private prisons also indicates that 
dangers may exist whenever individuals with their own motives and 
interests are given wide discretion over the lives of inmates. Given the 
power wielded by all correctional officers, public or private, all 
prisons could benefit from more intense efforts to monitor 
meaningfully and to enforce standards of confinement consistent with 
 
Hylton, supra note 8, at 53. 
 298. But cf. JAMES ET AL., supra note 4, at 154 (“[W]hilst it might be argued that there is an 
important distinction between the pursuit of profit and the pursuit of economy, any difference 
in the impact of the cash nexus in terms of [prison] regime management is . . . difficult to 
discern.”). 
 299. Consider, for example, the landmark case of Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978), in 
which the Supreme Court affirmed the characterization of the Arkansas prison system “as ‘a 
dark and evil world completely alien to the free world,’” id. at 681 (citation omitted). 
[At] Cummins Farm, the institution at the center of [the] litigation, [inmates were 
required] to work in the fields 10 hours a day, six days a week, . . . in all sorts of 
weather, so long as the temperature was above freezing, sometimes in unsuitably light 
clothing and without shoes. [They] slept together in large, 100-man barracks, . . . 
[allowing] “creepers[]” . . . [to] stalk[] their sleeping enemies. In one 18-month period, 
there were 17 stabbings, all but 1 occurring in the barracks. Homosexual rape was so 
common and uncontrolled that some potential victims dared not sleep . . . . 
[Disciplinary infractions brought c]onfinement in punitive isolation . . . for an 
indeterminate period of time. An average of 4, and sometimes as many as 10 or 11, 
prisoners were crowded into windowless 8'x10' cells containing no furniture other 
than a source of water and a toilet that could only be flushed from outside the cell. 
Id. at 681 n.3, 682 (citations omitted). In this case, the Court found that Arkansas’ prison 
administrators “evidently tried to operate their prisons at a profit.” Id. at 681 n.3. The Arkansas 
Corrections Commissioner at the time the case was brought was T. Don Hutto, who 
subsequently joined CCA as an executive vice president. Lilly & Knepper, supra note 76, at 159. 
Or consider the effects of efforts by the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) in 
1994 to keep spending down by serving inmates “Vitapro[, a] powdered soybean substitute for 
meat.” HALLINAN, supra note 61, at 175. Vitapro came “in two flavors, chicken and beef, and 
was supposed to be cheaper than both.” Id. The TDCJ contracted with the manufacturer of 
Vitapro to buy its product on the understanding that it could sell any extra to other state prison 
systems, an arrangement that promised the TDCJ four million dollars a year and led Andy 
Collins, then TDCJ director, to “order[] the prison’s food supervisor to water down” the powder 
so as to preserve a large amount for resale, leading to a “food” that was “barely tolerable.” Id. 
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the demands of the humanity principle.300 All prisons, for example, 
ought to be required to secure ACA accreditation,301 although ideally 
these standards would be made more rigorous than they currently 
are. There ought to be benchmark standards of quality and humanity 
that apply to all prisons, set by state departments of corrections 
themselves—or if this arrangement would create too great a conflict 
of interest, then by an independent body.302 This body could also be 
charged with monitoring compliance in a regular and ongoing way. In 
the public sector, too, such an arrangement would carry a risk of 
agency capture, but absent the lure of a high-paying job with the 
entity being monitored, monitors overseeing the performance of 
state-run prisons might at least be somewhat less vulnerable in this 
regard.303 And efforts should be made to render the courts a more 
 
 300. Publicly employed prison guards, who enjoy civil service protections and are far more 
likely to be unionized, receive higher salaries, better benefits, and more training, and are less 
likely to be short staffed than private prison guards. They are thus better equipped to maintain a 
prison environment in which inmates are less susceptible to violence than the prisoners are in 
private prisons. But if for this reason conditions in public prisons may be somewhat less at odds 
with the demands of the humanity principle, they nonetheless continue to fall well short of fully 
satisfying those demands, notwithstanding that conditions in private prisons may be still worse. 
 301. As of 2001, fewer than 80 percent of public prisons met this requirement, whereas 100 
percent of private prisons had or would soon have ACA accreditation. Harding, supra note 63, 
at 316–17. 
 302. Charles Logan has gone further than anyone in developing systematic standards for 
measuring the quality of prison conditions. See Charles H. Logan, Well Kept: Comparing 
Quality of Confinement in Private and Public Prisons, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 577, 581 
(1992) (introducing criteria with which to measure prison quality). His framework measures 
“eight dimensions of prison quality—security, safety, order, care, activity, justice, conditions, 
and management.” Id. These dimensions are consistent with the “mission of a prison . . . to keep 
prisoners—to keep them in, keep them safe, keep them in line, keep them healthy, and keep 
them busy—and to do it with fairness, without undue suffering and as efficiently as possible.” Id. 
at 580 (citing CHARLES H. LOGAN, WELL KEPT: COMPARING QUALITY OF CONFINEMENT IN A 
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PRISON 5–11 (Nat’l Inst. of Justice 1991)). 
 303. Possible strategies for addressing the risk of agency capture might include salary 
increases for monitors to counter any temptation to curry favor with the monitored entity in the 
hope of securing a higher paying job; frequent rotations by state-employed monitors through 
the various facilities to prevent the possibility of a shift in loyalty; and the establishment of 
independent oversight bodies, perhaps along the lines of Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Prisons 
(HM Inspectorate) in the United Kingdom. HM Inspectorate is an independent oversight 
agency “which reports on conditions for and treatment of those in prison, young offender 
institutions and immigration removal centres.” HM Inspectorate of Prisons, 
http://inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmiprisons/about-us/ (last visited Dec. 13, 2005). The 
chief inspector “is appointed by the Home Secretary, from outside the Prison Service, for a term 
of five years,” and “reports directly to the Home Secretary.” Id. The auditors include 
“healthcare inspectors, drugs inspectors,” and other professionals otherwise unconnected to the 
Prison Service. HM Inspectorate of Prisons - Frequently Asked Questions, 
http://inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmiprisons/about-us/faqs/ (last visited Dec. 13, 2005). 
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meaningful channel for ensuring the accountability of prison 
administrators. Such efforts might include clarifying (and even 
strengthening) via statutory enactments the particular duty of care 
that state officials owe inmates, providing inmates seeking to enforce 
these standards with more meaningful rights of access to the courts, 
and establishing liability rules more likely than prevailing Eighth 
Amendment standards to yield humane conditions of confinement. 
Such changes to prevailing legal standards would benefit inmates in 
any prison, public as well as private. 
As these proposals indicate, viewed from the liberal perspective, 
there is a great benefit in shifting the focus of the private prison 
debate from efficiency to the humanity of conditions of confinement. 
Doing so allows us to transcend the inadequate baseline of current 
prison conditions and to consider how the system as a whole, public 
prisons as well as private, might better measure up against society’s 
obligations to those it incarcerates. 
These proposals do leave unaddressed one accountability 
mechanism favored by private prison advocates, that of competition 
and the threat of replacement. The absence of these forces in the 
public context, a product of the state’s monopolistic status as the sole 
prison provider, is one reason some advocates of private prisons offer 
for their preference for privatization. On this view, the fear of losing 
one’s contract to a competitor is supposed to exert a disciplining force 
not available in the public context. Yet the foregoing discussion 
suggests that this threat is far less effective at curbing abuses than is 
often believed. It also suggests the danger of relying on this threat to 
ensure adequate conditions of confinement; even if a given prison 
contractor is replaced, there is no guarantee that the replacement will 
do the job any better. Indeed, there is reason to think they will not do 
so, given that the same regulatory structure that failed to constrain 
the previous provider will still govern. Moreover, having replaced a 
provider once, the state will not be eager to do so again. The lesson 
here applies equally to public prisons as to private ones. If the penal 
system is failing, changing the logo on the letterhead or the 
nameplates on the doors will not solve existing problems. When the 
system is failing, the system itself requires serious reconsideration. 
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IV.  PRIVATE PRISONS AND THE PARSIMONY PRINCIPLE 
A. Understanding the Parsimony Principle 
As conceived of here, the parsimony principle speaks not to 
conditions of confinement, but to the length of prison sentences. This 
principle obliges the state to avoid imposing sentences that are 
gratuitously long. I have argued elsewhere that this constraint 
requires that punishments be no more severe than necessary to 
appreciably deter offenses causing harm of equal or greater 
severity.304 But one need not accept this particular interpretation of 
the parsimony principle to agree with the more general point that to 
be legitimate, punishment can be of no greater severity than can be 
justified to all under fair deliberative conditions.305 
This more general version of the principle is all that is required 
to motivate the analysis of private prisons from the parsimony 
perspective. Whatever one’s view of the justification for punishment 
that would be accepted under fair deliberative conditions, any view 
satisfying this requirement would recognize the burden that 
punishment places on the urgent interests of the targets306 and would 
thus authorize the state to punish convicted offenders only when 
interests of equal or greater urgency would thereby be served.307 I 
therefore take it as uncontroversial that, whatever one’s particular 
view as to the justification for punishment that would be accepted 
under fair deliberative conditions, all would reject the idea that 
 
 304. The basis for this position is that when a punishment of incarceration would worsen the 
conditions of the target vis-à-vis his or her most urgent interests without effecting a like benefit 
for anyone else, that punishment would be viewed from behind the veil of ignorance as merely 
gratuitous and thus illegitimate. See Dolovich, supra note 8, at 385–403 (analyzing the principles 
of punishment that parties would adopt under “conditions of partial compliance”). 
 305. I have in mind here the conditions modeled by Rawls’s idea of the original position 
with its veil of ignorance, suitably modified for conditions of partial compliance. See Dolovich, 
supra note 8, at 350–78 (applying the principles of partial compliance to the Rawlsian 
framework); see also supra Part II.B. 
 306. This assumption stems from the impartiality constraints imposed on deliberating 
parties. Parties uncertain whether they will wind up targets of punishment once the veil is lifted 
would consider the issue as if they themselves might suffer punishment; they would thus 
necessarily be aware of the burdens such punishments would impose. For a response to the 
objection that the parties behind the veil would not be uncertain on this point, see supra note 
110. 
 307. See supra Part II.B (discussing the deliberative process of the parties behind the veil, 
which for purposes of determining the principles of punishment would be guided by leximin). 
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punishments of incarceration might be imposed on some members of 
society in order that others might benefit financially.308 
From the parsimony perspective, any such punishments would be 
considered gratuitous, and therefore illegitimate. Yet the 
privatization of prisons seems to raise this very concern—that the 
delegation of responsibility for prison administration to private, for-
profit contractors could result in punishments imposed so that some 
members of society might increase their net worth. To this extent, the 
state’s use of private prisons would violate the parsimony principle. 
Efforts to ensure that prison sentences satisfy the parsimony 
principle face obstacles not present in the humanity context. With 
very few exceptions, violations of the humanity principle can be 
verified against existing prison conditions.309 People may disagree as 
to whether particular conditions are inhumane, but the ultimate 
judgment will turn on the nature of the conditions themselves. To 
identify violations of the parsimony principle, in contrast, it is not 
enough to look to the sentences themselves, for there are no 
qualitative differences between legitimate punishments and 
gratuitous ones. All are measured by incarceration for a term of 
years, and what for one offender will constitute gratuitous 
punishment will be legitimate when applied to another. In the 
parsimony context, it is the reason why a particular sentence was 
authorized that matters. The determination as to whether a particular 
punishment is illegitimate is thus necessarily far more speculative in 
the parsimony context than in the humanity context. Moreover, it is 
the process of fixing sentences rather than the particular sentences 
themselves that is the primary focus of scrutiny. 
The parsimony principle requires at the very least that 
punishments not be imposed on some members of society in order 
that others might benefit financially. It is thus crucial that the process 
of shaping sentencing policy and fixing particular sentences be 
 
 308. Or at least this is so where the financial benefit is unconnected to the protection of 
anyone’s most urgent interest in their security and integrity, or to any interests as urgent as 
those of the punished burdened by the punishment itself. See supra note 107. 
 309. The exceptions would arise in those rare circumstances under which inhumane 
punishment was not automatically ruled out as illegitimate; in those cases, one would require 
more information before judging conditions gratuitously inhumane. See supra notes 121–23 and 
accompanying text (noting that inhumane punishment may not always be incompatible with the 
demands of liberal legitimacy in a partially compliant society, but that the circumstances under 
which such punishment might be legitimate are highly circumscribed). 
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untainted by illegitimate influences.310 In practice, of course, this 
process will inevitably fall short of this ideal. As a consequence, even 
legislators committed to realizing the parsimony principle cannot be 
confident that either the sentencing policies they authorize or the 
punishments imposed pursuant to those policies will satisfy this 
standard. Such legislators thus have an added burden. Not only are 
they obliged to do all they can to ensure the conditions necessary if 
criminal punishment is to be legitimate, but they must also avoid 
taking steps likely to corrupt these conditions. This “integrity 
condition” is designed to ensure that the process of crafting 
sentencing policies is as isolated as possible from any illegitimate 
influences.311 When this condition remains unsatisfied, the criminal 
justice system itself may come to lack integrity, a circumstance that 
could lead to the imposition of illegitimate punishments. It could also, 
moreover, lead to citizens’ mistrust of the judgments and actions of 
government institutions. Citizens may be expected to respect the 
authority of the state only when they trust that state power is 
exercised for legitimate reasons justifiable to all. When the process of 
setting criminal penalties is perceived to lack integrity, citizens would 
reasonably lack confidence that punishments imposed on convicted 
offenders were consistent with such reasons. Satisfying the integrity 
condition in the parsimony context is thus important for two reasons: 
it increases the likelihood of legitimate punishment, and it secures 
public trust in the process. 
In what follows, I consider the possible parsimony concerns 
raised by the state’s use of private prisons. In contrast to Part III, the 
present discussion introduces considerations that have not previously 
been addressed in any systematic way in the private prisons literature. 
It is thus necessarily more speculative and suggestive than Part III. As 
with the discussion in Part III, consideration of the state’s use of 
private prisons from the perspective of the parsimony principle 
suggests a critique, not only of the state’s use of private prisons, but of 
 
 310. It is for this reason that parties deliberating at the legislative stage as to the shape of 
sentencing policy ought to approach the task as if from behind a “modified veil,” which screens 
out any knowledge of the parties’ personal particulars. See supra note 117. 
 311. The integrity condition may thus be understood as prophylaxis, preventing actions that 
might risk the imposition of illegitimate punishment. In so doing, it also helps to preserve the 
public trust, which would be compromised by any widespread skepticism as to the legitimacy of 
punishment. The integrity condition arguably also applies in the humanity context. But for the 
reasons noted here, it is particularly salient in the context of the parsimony principle. See also 
supra discussion accompanying note 118. 
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the penal system as a whole. In this case, however, it is not merely 
particular practices, but the whole process of policymaking in the 
criminal justice context that the analysis of private prisons calls into 
question. 
B. Influencing Time Served from the Inside: “I’m the Supreme 
Court”312 
The length of the sentence a convicted offender officially 
receives is established by the sentencing judge within the terms set by 
the legislature. However, in those jurisdictions that have retained 
parole and indeterminate sentencing,313 the precise amount of time a 
convicted offender actually serves is determined by judgments 
regarding the inmate’s behavior made by prison officials over the 
course of his or her confinement. Such judgments in turn influence 
decisions regarding the classification, discipline, and ultimate release 
date of the inmate. For this reason, those prison officials with direct 
day-to-day contact with inmates are in a position of considerable 
power over the length of the sentence individual inmates will 
ultimately serve. 
In private prisons, it is the employees who exercise this power. 
From the perspective of the parsimony principle, the concern with 
this arrangement arises from the possibility that private prison 
operators, whose profitability depends on maintaining a high 
occupancy rate, could encourage their employees in subtle and not-
so-subtle ways to make judgments regarding individual inmates’ 
behavior so as to prolong the amount of prison time that inmates 
serve, regardless of whether such extensions are consistent with the 
demands of legitimate punishment.314 True, at least in some states, 
 
 312. Robbins 1987, supra note 4, at 816 (quoting Martin Tolchin, Jails Run by Private 
Company Force It to Face Question of Accountability, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1985, at A15 
(statement of CCA employee John S. Robinson)). 
 313. As of 2002, eighteen states had abolished parole. This number does not include 
Colorado or Connecticut, each of which, having abolished parole, have since reinstated it. See 
ASS’N OF PAROLING AUTHS. INT’L, PAROLE BOARD SURVEY 2002, available at 
http://www.apaintl.org/Pub-ParoleBoardSurvey2002.html (last visited Dec. 6, 2004) (surveying 
parole policies of U.S. states). 
 314. Some anecdotal evidence suggests that private prison administrators already encourage 
decisionmaking on the part of employees that inures to the financial advantage of the prison-
management company. Guards at CCA’s Youngstown facility, for example, were given a 
“rundown [by their employer,] ‘saying two slices of bread . . . costs this much. If you can cut 
corners here, it would mean a possible raise for us.’” Tatge, supra note 87, at 18A (quoting 
former CCA employee Robert Oliver). 
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legislators have sought to mitigate the danger of such manipulation by 
reserving to state officials the final authority over determinations 
bearing on length of sentence, including changes to inmate 
classification and any decisions relating to inmate release dates, 
parole decisions, work release, and reduction of good-time credit.315 
However, even under such arrangements, private prison employees 
still wield considerable influence over the administrative proceedings 
that affect individual inmates’ length of confinement: as one CCA 
employee, charged with reviewing disciplinary cases, put it, “I’m the 
Supreme Court.”316 The formal reservation of these powers to the 
state may thus be insufficient to counteract the dangers such influence 
represents for the legitimacy of criminal punishment in terms of 
parsimony. 
Take, for example, the disciplinary context. Discipline in prisons 
is kept by guards, who have authority to “write up”—that is, to issue 
disciplinary tickets (D-tickets) to—inmates caught violating prison 
regulations. Following the receipt of a D-ticket, the inmate will be 
called to a hearing (D-hearing), at which time evidence may be 
entered and testimony heard and after which the hearing officer will 
issue the verdict and pronounce sentence.317 Depending on the 
infraction, penalties may include revocation of good-time credits318 
and thus the extension of the inmate’s term of incarceration.319 
 
 315. See, e.g., Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 411–12 (1997) (noting Tennessee’s 
reservation to the state of “important discretionary tasks—those related to prison discipline, to 
parole, and to good time” (citing TENN. CODE ANN. § 41-24-110 (1990))). According to Ratliff, 
“[e]leven states . . . bar private operators from ‘[g]ranting, denying or revoking inmates’ good-
time credits, . . . eleven states prohibit private contractors from calculating prisoners’ release 
dates[, and] . . . nine states bar contractors from making furlough decisions.’” Ratliff, supra note 
25, at 412 (citation omitted). “[H]owever, only six states currently prohibit private contractors 
from making parole recommendations[, and] . . . only seven states have enacted any restraints 
on private contractors’ ability to make disciplinary judgments.” Id. at 413, 415–16. 
 316. Robbins 1987, supra note 4, at 816 (quoting Martin Tolchin, Jails Run by Private 
Company Force It to Face Question of Accountability, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1985, at A15 
(statement of CCA employee John S. Robinson)). 
 317. See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 548 n.8 (1974) (quoting in full the 
regulations describing the disciplinary process in the Nebraska prison system, as established in 
the Nebraska Treatment and Corrections Act, as amended, NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1,107 (Cum. 
Supp. 1972)). 
 318. In jurisdictions with “truth in sentencing” statutes, which require convicted inmates to 
serve some specified component of their sentence (usually 85 percent) before the possibility of 
release, the amount of good-time credit an inmate can earn is statutorily capped. PAUL M. 
DITTON & DORIS JAMES WILSON, TRUTH IN SENTENCING IN STATE PRISONS: STATE 
SENTENCING LAW CHANGES LINKED TO INCREASING TIME SERVED IN STATE PRISONS (1999), 
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Because inmates have no right of counsel at D-hearings,320 it is 
generally their word against that of the guard who wrote up the 
infraction. Under such circumstances, even in the public sector, the 
inmate is at a considerable disadvantage: given the solidarity among 
corrections officers, which can frequently devolve into a mentality of 
“us” against “them,”321 the hearing officer’s sympathies tend to lie 
with the disciplining officer. When the facility is run by a private, for-
profit corporation, the worry is that the process will be skewed even 
more strongly against the inmate. The guard writing up the infraction, 
and in many cases the hearing officer as well, will be employed by a 
corporation with a direct financial stake—indeed, a paramount 
interest—in maintaining a high occupancy rate.322 This arrangement 
raises the concern that official testimony and judgments rendered at 
D-hearings will not reflect the treatment that the inmates deserve or 
that is consistent with the state’s interest in imposing only legitimate 
punishments, but will instead reflect the financial interests of the 
company running the prison.323 
The same can be said for parole decisions. In the decision of any 
parole board, the inmate’s disciplinary record while in prison carries 
great weight. Indeed, in many cases, prison officials are “called upon 
to provide parole boards with testimony [and] parole 
 
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/press/tssp.pr (last visited Dec. 6, 2004). By the end 
of 1998, forty states had adopted such statutes. Id. 
 319. Other possible sentences range from denial of privileges to time in solitary confinement 
(“the hole”). LYNN S. BRANHAM & MICHAEL S. HAMDEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE 
LAW OF SENTENCING & CORRECTIONS 583 (7th ed. 2005). 
 320. However, inmates are entitled to some limited procedural due process rights at such 
hearings. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 558. 
 321. See, e.g., Conover, supra note 256, passim (illustrating the oppositional interplay 
between guards and inmates); Crawley, supra note 145, at 420 (explaining that most prison 
guards feel the need to be “emotionally detached” from prisoners). 
 322. See Ratliff, supra note 25, at 373, 393 (“Private prison contractors . . . have a financial 
interest in maximizing their inmate populations, because their compensation is directly tied to 
the number of prisoners they house each day. . . . Because each prisoner release entails a 
revenue loss, private operators have a financial bias toward minimizing releases and maximizing 
sentences.”). 
 323. Although this possibility might be constrained to some degree in cases in which the 
hearing officer is required by statute to be a state employee, the animating worry remains. Even 
in such cases, the same tendency of prison officials to be sympathetic to one another’s reports 
will likely incline the state-employed hearing officer to take the side of the private prison 
employee over the inmate. From the perspective of the parsimony principle, therefore, 
notwithstanding the participation in the process of a state-employed corrections official, the 
situation still creates the possibility of illegitimate influence and thus remains troubling. 
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recommendations.”324 Again, the worry is that private contractors’ 
financial interest in the outcome of parole proceedings “may impair 
private officials’ objectivity” in a way that yields parole denials for 
otherwise qualified inmates.325 
Little study has been made of this aspect of private prison life, 
and as a result little definitive proof exists of widespread abuses of 
discretion of the type just postulated.326 Given the demands of the 
integrity condition, however, to raise a salient parsimony concern it is 
not necessary to have definitive empirical proof that the feared 
abuses have in fact taken place. It is enough that the policies in 
question create an appreciable risk that illegitimate interests will 
affect the nature and scope of punishments imposed by the state. 
Here, the Supreme Court’s due process jurisprudence provides 
an apt analogy.327 The Court has held that it violates due process to 
subject the “liberty or property [of any defendant] to the judgment of 
a court the judge of which has a direct, personal, substantial, 
pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against him in his case.”328 
In Connally v. Georgia,329 for example, the Court held that the 
issuance of a search warrant by a justice of the peace violated due 
process when the justice was paid a fee of five dollars only when he 
issued the warrant sought, and received no compensation if the 
warrant request was denied.330 Such a situation, the Court found, 
“offers ‘a possible temptation to the average man as a judge . . . [that] 
might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true between 
the State and the accused.’”331 Indeed, the Court has gone still further 
and required “that judges avoid even the appearance of financial 
 
 324. Dunham, supra note 4, at 1489. 
 325. Id. at 1490. 
 326. One study does exist which bears out the hypothesis that, in the private prison context, 
the financial interests of the company running the prison will influence judgments made in the 
context of prison discipline and classification. See Paul Moyle, Separating the Allocation of 
Punishment from Its Administration: Theoretical and Empirical Observations, 11 CURRENT 
ISSUES CRIM. JUST. 153, 166–170 (1999) (offering evidence from a CCA-run prison in 
Queensland, Australia, which suggests that “the commercial interest of CCA influenced a 
decision to [discipline] an inmate” and affected “classification” decisions). This study, however, 
is a very small one, and although the findings are suggestive, they are hardly conclusive. 
 327. I am grateful to Robert Goldstein for suggesting this analogy. 
 328. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927) (quoted in Ratliff, supra note 25, at 385). 
 329. 429 U.S. 245 (1977) 
 330. Id. at 246, 251. In this way, the Court found that the “financial welfare [of the justice 
was] enhanced by positive action and [was] not enhanced by negative action.” Id. at 250. 
 331. Id. at 250 (quoting Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60 (1972)). 
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bias.”332 As the Court explained, “to perform its high function in the 
best way, ‘justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.’”333 These 
cases are plainly concerned with the substantive fairness of the 
outcome, the worry being that the decisionmaker will not be truly 
impartial and will thus reach a questionable result. But they are also 
concerned with the integrity of the system itself, and with ensuring 
that those subject to punishments can trust in the impartiality of the 
decisionmaker and thus in the legitimacy of the verdict. For where the 
judge is known to have a vested interest in the outcome, the subjects 
of punishment are unlikely to trust and respect the judgment issued. 
This same set of concerns applies to the private prison context. 
True, private prison guards’ financial incentive to maintain high 
occupancy rates is not as stark as the justice of the peace’s financial 
incentive in Connally, because private prison employees, unlike the 
justice of the peace, receive a salary regardless of any role they might 
play in disciplinary or parole hearings. But the interest of their 
employers in this regard is still substantial; depending on the contract 
price, a single parole denial or revocation of good-time credit could 
be worth as much as $10,000 to $20,000 or more per year,334 a notable 
sum in an industry where contractors work on extremely narrow 
profit margins.335 The guards, who are hired to work in the interest of 
their employers and whose job security is dependent on the financial 
success of the operation, surely know that this is so.336 Under such 
circumstances, it would come as no surprise if illegitimate decisions 
were in fact rendered by private prison employees, or if prison 
inmates, along with their families, friends, and communities, were 
 
 332. Ratliff, supra note 25, at 386 (emphasis added). 
 333. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 825 (1986) (quoting In re Murchison, 349 
U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (internal citation omitted)). 
 334. Cf. Ratliff, supra note 25, at 414 (arguing that “due process would not tolerate a system 
in which public officials received twenty-thousand dollar bonuses each time they denied an 
inmate’s parole or reduced an inmate’s good-time credits”). 
 335. See supra note 215. 
 336. The incentives facing private prison guards are arguably like those faced by the 
defendant mayor in Ward v. Village of Monroeville, who, although having no personal financial 
stake in the outcome of cases before him, had an interest in maintaining the income of the city 
of which he was mayor, “[a] major part of [which was] derived from the fines, forfeitures, costs, 
and fees imposed by him in his mayor’s court.” 409 U.S. at 58. In Ward, such conditions were 
enough for the Court to find any judgment rendered by the mayor to be suspect when it resulted 
in fines accruing to the municipal treasury. Id. at 60–62. The point was not that the fine could be 
known conclusively to be illegitimate, imposed solely for the pecuniary benefit of the city, but 
that the temptation that existed to impose illegitimate fines was enough to make the integrity of 
any such judgment suspect. Id. at 60. 
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skeptical of the impartiality of the decisionmakers and thus unable to 
trust the legitimacy of judgments affecting the length of their 
incarceration.337 
In public prisons, too, the impartiality of corrections officials can 
be infected by illegitimate motives, by a distaste for particular 
inmates, or by sheer delight in exercising power. All such motives 
could—and likely do—lead public correctional officers to issue D-
tickets, to revoke good-time credits, or to testify at parole hearings in 
ways at odds with the parsimony principle, even absent the financial 
interest of private prison providers. However, this likelihood does not 
vindicate private prisons. Rather, recognizing the particular danger 
the profit motive creates in the context of private prison discipline 
and parole prompts consideration of other, less obvious ways that 
dispositions in prison disciplinary and parole hearings may be 
illegitimately skewed. 
C. Influencing Incarceration Rates from the Outside: “The Most 
Powerful Lobby You’ve Never Heard Of”338 
The private prison industry, to increase the demand for its 
services, exerts whatever pressure it can to encourage state legislators 
to privatize state prisons.339 This effort does not necessarily suggest a 
parsimony concern, for the fact of privatization alone need not affect 
 
 337. Logan suggests that the economic interest of private prison operators in being widely 
known as trustworthy would “restrain an ideological interest and . . . force [the contractor] to 
focus more on the concerns of the general public.” LOGAN, supra note 4, at 153. This notion, 
however, assumes that there are sufficient mechanisms in place to identify any questionable 
decisions by private prison employees and to translate any concern with overreaching into 
economic costs for the contractor. As I have shown, however, the limited efficacy of existing 
oversight and accountability mechanisms makes it unlikely that economic incentives will 
operate on private prison contractors in ways likely to constrain the sorts of abuses anticipated. 
See supra Part III.D. 
 338. Nick Penniman, Outing ALEC: The Most Powerful Lobby You’ve Never Heard Of, 
AM. PROSPECT, July 1, 2002, at 12. 
 339. Strategies to influence penal policy in the direction of privatization have included both 
aggressive lobbying, McDonald 1994, supra note 4, at 43, and the targeting of campaign 
donations to key legislative players, see BRIGITTE SARABI & ERWIN BENDER, THE PRISON 
PAYOFF: THE ROLE OF POLITICS AND PRIVATE PRISONS IN THE INCARCERATION BOOM 8 
(2000). In 1998, for example, the private prison industry collectively contributed more than 
$540,000 to political campaigns in twenty-five states, just $44,000 shy of the total contribution 
given to state campaigns by the National Rifle Association. See id. “[W]hile the figure [of 
$540,000] appears small relative to federal elections,” Sarabi and Bender explain that “[i]n 
states, when campaign budgets still average $5000 for state representatives and $20,000 for state 
senators, contributions of $250, $500, and $1000 are still meaningful.” Id. 
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the number of individuals who are actually incarcerated or the length 
of prison sentences.340 But what if the private prison industry were 
exerting political pressure on state legislators not only to encourage a 
shift to privatization, but also to generate harsher sentencing 
regimes? This would create the possibility that the state’s sentencing 
policies, and thus the sentences imposed pursuant to them, are 
inconsistent with the priority of the most urgent interests and instead 
serve the financial interests of the private prison industry and the 
politicians who accept campaign contributions from industry 
members.341 By creating an industry capable of, and with an interest 
in, corrupting the legislative conditions for legitimate punishment, the 
state’s use of private prisons would be directly at odds with the 
demands of the parsimony principle. 
Given the financial interest of private prison providers in 
increased incarceration rates, it would not be unexpected if the 
industry did seek to influence legislation in this direction. 
Interestingly, however, although the industry is adept at lobbying 
legislators and targeting campaign contributions to promote its 
privatization agenda, there is little evidence of any such efforts in 
support of harsher criminal sentencing schemes. Some commentators, 
noting this fact, have argued that the private prison industry has no 
need to push for stiffer sentences. They suggest that by the time the 
industry emerged in the mid-to-late 1980s, the prisons were filling up 
so quickly as a result of other, unrelated forces that prison contractors 
 
 340. There is, however, one sense in which the privatization of prisons might well have this 
effect. The work of Malcolm Feeley suggests that resources made available for the imposition of 
punishment tend to get used, and thus that penal innovations that expand the state’s capacity to 
incarcerate will tend to mean the imposition of more punishment regardless of legitimate need. 
See Malcolm M. Feeley, The Privatization of Punishment in Historical Perspective, in 
PRIVATIZATION AND ITS ALTERNATIVES 199, 203–05 (William T. Gormley, Jr. ed., 1991) 
(“[T]he most significant consequence of privatization historically has been the generation of 
new and expanded sanctions and forms of control.”). This effect in turn suggests the possibility 
that, to the extent that privatizing prisons expands the number of prison cells available for 
occupancy by convicted offenders, the incarceration rate will expand accordingly to fill these 
cells, regardless of whether filling them is consistent with the demands of legitimate punishment. 
If Feeley is right in this regard, it might be argued that, to the extent that private prisons expand 
the possible scope of incarceration beyond the demand for legitimate punishment, their use, for 
this reason alone, is at odds with the parsimony principle. See, e.g., Richard Sparks, Can Prisons 
Be Legitimate? Penal Politics, Privatization, and the Timeliness of an Old Idea, 34 BRIT. J. 
CRIMINOLOGY 14, 25 (1994) (asserting that the state’s use of private prisons is “extremely 
unlikely, for reasons of economic and political logic, to reduce the overall dimensions of [the 
criminal justice] system”). 
 341. On the campaign contributions of private prison providers to state legislators, see supra 
note 339. 
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have not needed to undertake any deliberate efforts to ensure 
continued demand for their services.342 
However, even if demand for prison space is currently sufficient 
to ensure the financial position of private prison operators, there is no 
guarantee that the same will be true in the future. Here, the analogy 
of the U.S. defense industry, suggested by J. Robert Lilly and 
Matthew Deflem, may be instructive.343 After the Cold War, military 
contractors in the United States suffered a decline in the demand for 
their services. In response, explain Lilly and Deflem, members of this 
group “successfully lobbied for governmental concessions and 
support in the form of changes in the guidelines for selling arms to 
foreign customers.”344 Previously, military contractors only received 
U.S. government approval for foreign arms sales when the sales were 
found by state officials to “support[] American foreign policy goals 
and strengthen[] regional alliances.”345 However, after successful 
lobbying by the industry hoping to expand its markets in a period of 
declining American investment in defense, the guidelines for such 
sales were amended, and they now “require that the U.S. government 
also consider their benefits to the nation’s military contractors.”346 
In other words, it was not until economic opportunities for 
defense contractors began to shrink that the industry began 
pressuring legislators to generate policies consistent with its corporate 
interests. This experience suggests that even if private prison 
providers have had no need as yet to pressure state legislators to 
shape sentencing policies consistent with their financial interests,347 
these conditions are subject to change. Ultimately, the worry is that, 
as in the case of the defense industry, the power, wealth, and political 
connections of the corrections industry may mean that “concerns for 
 
 342. See, e.g., HARDING, supra note 3, at 94 (“In the USA there have been exponential 
increases in imprisonment rates and numbers for the last 15 years. Yet it is really only since the 
mid-to-late 1980s that privatization has become a visible aspect of the adult imprisonment 
scene.”); McDonald 1994, supra note 4, at 43 (“There is no evidence that private firms have had 
any influence over the key decisions that have created the booming prisoner populations.”). 
 343. J. Robert Lilly & Matthew Deflem, Profit and Penality: An Analysis of the Corrections-
Commercial Complex, 42 CRIME & DELINQ. 3, 12 (1996); see also Lilly & Knepper, supra note 
76, at 151 (arguing that “corrections policy is fashioned within a corrections-commercial complex 
akin to the military-industrial complex that operates in the defense industry”). 
 344. Lilly & Deflem, supra note 343, at 12. 
 345. Id. 
 346. Id. 
 347. This would not mean that they have not in fact done so. For reason to think that at least 
some industry players have done just this, see infra discussion accompanying notes 358–63. 
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profit, efficiency, competition, and money may radically alter the . . . 
normative goals [of the corrections domain].”348 
The defense industry analogy suggests that a lack of evidence as 
to present efforts to unduly influence sentencing policy does not 
necessarily mean that the parsimony concern is misplaced in the 
context of private prisons. It is, moreover, not so clear that the private 
prison industry has not yet taken steps to promote the adoption of 
statutes likely to increase the size of the prison population. Although 
industry members have taken little overt action in this direction, at 
least two private prison firms—industry leaders CCA and 
Wackenhut—have for some time been “private sector members” of a 
little-known organization called the American Legislative Exchange 
Council (ALEC). ALEC is an unusual organization. It takes no 
public credit for its legislative successes, instead preferring to 
maintain a low profile.349 Its main function is the drafting of model 
legislation, which its legislator-members take back to their home 
jurisdictions and do their best to turn into law. In 2000 alone, over 
3,100 bills based on ALEC’s model legislation were introduced into 
legislatures by its members, with 450 such bills signed into law.350 This 
success is a function of the sheer number of legislators from around 
the country who are members of ALEC—2,400, almost a third of all 
state and federal legislators nationwide.351 
 
 348. See id. at 14 (“As the economic system intrudes even further into matters of law, 
justice, and punishment, the picture that may emerge may be one of the ‘business of law and 
order’ being run by ‘merchants in justice and punishment’ whose only interest lies in the law of 
the free market (profit).”). When they speak of the corrections-commercial complex, Lilly and 
Deflem are not talking solely of private prisons, but of the entire range of players whose 
ongoing financial health depends on continued expansion of the prison system, including those 
businesses that supply corrections agencies with the goods and services they need to run the 
prisons. See infra note 373 and accompanying text. If these predictions are right, they suggest 
that one should be troubled by the full range of ways that private interests stand to profit from 
increased incarceration—and the possibility that the combined effort of these businesses will 
place an upward pressure on criminal sentencing in ways that violate the parsimony principle. 
 349. See Alan Greenblatt, What Makes ALEC Smart?, GOVERNING MAG., Oct. 2003, at 30, 
30 (“You don’t hear too much about this right-leaning state pressure group. Maybe that’s why it 
wins so often.”); Penniman, supra note 338, at 12 (“Never heard of the American Legislative 
Exchange Council? That’s just the way ALEC likes it.”). 
 350. Karen Olsson, Ghostwriting the Law: A Little-Known Corporate Lobby Is Drafting 
Business-Friendly Bills for State Legislators Across the Country, MOTHER JONES, Sept.–Oct. 
2002, at 17, 17. 
 351. Greenblatt, supra note 349, at 30; AM. LEGISLATIVE EXCH. COUNCIL, 2002 ANNUAL 
REPORT 3 (2003). A large number of these members, moreover, wield considerable power at the 
state level: among its members, ALEC counts 125 floor leaders, thirty-two Speakers of the 
House, twenty-two Senate presidents or presidents pro tempore, and eight sitting governors. 
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With minimum annual dues of $5,000, corporations and trade 
associations can also become ALEC members.352 Upon further 
payment of “applicable Task Force Dues” (ranging from $1,500 to 
$5,000 annually), private-sector members can join the task force of 
their choice353 and participate in drafting the model legislation that 
public-sector members will introduce to their respective legislatures. 
According to ALEC itself, the criminal justice task force has 
been among the organization’s most successful working groups.354 Its 
successes have included the passage in forty states of ALEC-
sponsored “truth in sentencing” statutes, mandating that convicted 
offenders serve at least 85 percent of their sentences before being 
eligible for parole,355 and the passage in at least eleven states of three-
strikes laws, which impose mandatory minimum sentences of 
anywhere from twenty-five years to life for offenders convicted of a 
third serious offense.356 Although ALEC takes care to obscure the 
 
ALEC’s alumni list is also extremely impressive, featuring more than eighty members of 
Congress, including Speaker of the House J. Dennis Hastert (R-IL), former House Majority 
Leader Tom DeLay (R-TX), and Assistant Senate Majority Leader Don Nickles (R-OK), 
Penniman, supra note 338, at 12, as well as former Wisconsin Governor and former Health and 
Human Services Secretary Tommy Thompson (awarded ALEC’s Thomas Jefferson Freedom 
Award in 1991) and White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card, AM. LEGISLATIVE EXCH. 
COUNCIL, supra, at 10, 18. 
 352. DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE & NAT’L RES. DEF. COUNCIL, CORPORATE AMERICA’S 
TROJAN HORSE IN THE STATES: THE UNTOLD STORY BEHIND THE AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE 
EXCHANGE COUNCIL 20–21 (2002), available at http://alecwatch.org/11223344.pdf. Each public-
sector member of ALEC pays $50 for a two-year membership. Id. at 5. The bulk of ALEC’s $6 
million annual budget, Penniman, supra note 338, at 12, which “pays for 30 staffers in prime 
Washington office space,” id., comes from “private sector members,” the corporations and trade 
associations that pay between $5,000 (“Membership”) and $50,000 (“Jefferson Club”) annually 
to be affiliated with ALEC, DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE & NAT’L RES. DEF. COUNCIL, supra, at 
20–21. 
 353. DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE & NAT’L RES. DEF. COUNCIL, supra note 352, at 20–21. 
ALEC has twelve such task forces, covering a range of issues from natural resources to tax and 
fiscal policy to education. ALEC National Task Forces, http://www.alec.org/task-forces (last 
visited Nov. 12, 2005). 
 354. See Weekend Edition: American Legislative Exchange Council (NPR broadcast Apr. 13, 
2002), available at LEXIS, News Library, National Public Radio File (“By ALEC’s own 
admission in its 1995 model legislation scorecard, [ALEC’s criminal justice task force was] very 
successful.” (quoting Edwin Bender of the National Institute on Money in State Politics)). 
 355. Olsson, supra note 350, at 18. By foreclosing the possibility of parole until the inmate 
has served 85 percent of the sentence imposed, truth-in-sentencing creates mandatory minimum 
sentences, thereby extending the amount of time offenders ultimately serve. Joanna M. 
Shepard, Police, Prosecutors, Criminals, and Determinate Sentencing: The Truth About Truth-in-
Sentencing Laws, 45 J.L. & ECON. 509, 509 (2002). 
 356. ALEC’s three-strikes push postdated passage of the first such legislation, passed in 
Washington state in 1993, and in California in 1994. See SARABI & BENDER, supra note 339, at 
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pressure on incarceration rates. Moreover, it reveals that, should 
these leading members of the private prison industry see a financial 
benefit to themselves in promoting harsher sentencing regimes, there 
are channels through which they might effectively further these 
interests—channels that are conveniently out of public view. Given 
the distaste with which the public might well react to the notion of 
private prison contractors lobbying for stiffer criminal penalties—a 
move that would suggest a cynical willingness to lock more people up 
for longer periods so that CCA and its fellow industry members might 
profit financially—their involvement in ALEC may signal, not a lack 
of interest in promoting such legislation, but a recognition that such 
efforts might best be undertaken behind closed doors. 
The link between CCA, Wackenhut, and ALEC’s criminal 
justice initiatives provides no concrete evidence of undue influence 
over sentencing policy on the part of private prison providers. It 
nonetheless effectively illustrates the tension between the state’s use 
of private prisons and the demands of the parsimony principle’s 
integrity condition. At the heart of this condition is the imperative 
that the state do all it can to secure the conditions of legitimate 
punishment and to avoid taking steps likely to corrode these 
conditions. Yet the state, through the use of private prisons, not only 
allows but facilitates the growth of an industry with a “direct, 
personal, substantial, pecuniary interest” in increased incarceration 
rates regardless of the demands of legitimate punishment,362 with no 
particular commitment to ensuring legitimate punishment, and with 
direct access to powerful legislators through both public and back 
channels. Viewed in this light, it is hard not to see the state’s support 
of the private prison industry as inviting the possibility that this 
constituency will exercise undue influence on sentencing policies. 
Under these circumstances, especially given the extent of the 
campaign donations given by the private prison industry to key 
legislative players, citizens may well wonder about the legitimacy of 
sentencing policies and the punishments imposed pursuant to them.363 
 
 362. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927). 
 363. An editorial cartoon by artist Matt Wuerker suggests that this suspicion already exists. 
It shows a prison in the form of a cash register, bearing the legend “Private Prisons Inc ‘Time is 
Money!’” In the background, dump trucks full of prisoners drop their loads onto a conveyer belt 
leading into the prison. In the foreground, Uncle Sam hands over bags of money to men who 
are wearing suits and big smiles, and carrying a briefcase marked with a dollar sign. News Art, 
Prisons and Sentencing, http://www.newsart.com/zz/zz16.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2005). A 
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And this suspicion is likely to be strongest in communities most 
vulnerable to state punishment of any sort—those communities that 
themselves enjoy little political access or influence. 
D. CCA & CCPOA: “Protecting the Public Interest”?364 
There is thus a tension between the existence of a successful and 
influential private prisons industry and the demands of the parsimony 
principle. But private prisons are by no means unique in the threat 
they pose to the legitimacy of particular punishments and to citizens’ 
trust in the institutions of the criminal justice system. This threat 
exists whenever sentencing policy is influenced by interest groups 
with a strong financial interest in increased incarceration and longer 
prison sentences. And were private prison providers to seek to wield 
such influence themselves, they would enter a politicized arena in 
which several other interest groups already work to shape criminal 
justice policies in ways consistent with the financial interests of their 
members.365 
Perhaps the most notable example in this regard is the California 
Correctional and Peace Officers’ Association (CCPOA). This 
organization, one of the most powerful lobby groups in California,366 
represents all of California’s correctional officers and consistently 
supports state legislation providing for enhanced sentencing, 
seemingly regardless of the legitimacy of the punishments thereby 
 
slightly different version of this cartoon graces the cover of THE CELLING OF AMERICA: AN 
INSIDE LOOK AT THE U.S. PRISON INDUSTRY (Daniel Burton-Rose et al. eds., 1998). 
 364. LOGAN, supra note 4, at 159. 
 365. See id. at 152–59 (“The private sector will not bring politics and lobbies to a field where 
none now exists. Corrections is already a political arena.”). 
 366. See Dan Morain & Jenifer Warren, Battle Looms over Prison Spending in State Budget, 
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2003, at A1 (“The 26,000-member prison guards union . . . . is among the 
biggest campaign donors in California, giving $3.4 million to [California Governor Gray] Davis 
directly and indirectly since his first run for governor in 1998, including more than $1 million last 
year alone.”); see also JOE DOMANICK, CRUEL JUSTICE: THREE STRIKES AND THE POLITICS OF 
CRIME IN AMERICA’S GOLDEN STATE 113 (2004) (“[By 1990, c]andidates for governor were 
stumbling all over themselves to get Novey’s endorsement and some serious campaign money. 
They had come to understand that a nod from him could mean the difference between victory 
and defeat.”). One reporter wrote that “when [Don] Novey[, the president of CCPOA,] calls, 
California governors and lawmakers carve out time in their schedules. When he fights 
legislation, odds are it’s dead. When he blesses a politician with campaign cash, others invest in 
the candidate too.” Jenifer Warren, When He Speaks, They Listen, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2000, at 
A1 (quoted in Kerri Strunk, Majoritarianism Unchecked 14 (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on 
file with the author)). 
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imposed.367 The existence of CCPOA and other criminal-justice 
interest groups, however, does not vindicate the state’s use of private 
prisons, as some commentators appear to believe.368 Any time 
criminal justice policy is influenced by parties hoping to further their 
financial interests through increased incarceration regardless of the 
demands of legitimate punishment, it is cause for concern. The fact 
that the private prison industry is not the only group motivated in this 
direction suggests not that there is no problem with private prisons, 
 
 367. Among CCPOA’s notable successes was the 1994 passage of California’s three-strikes 
provision. CCPOA donated a total of $101,000 to the three-strikes ballot initiative campaign, an 
amount eclipsed only by the NRA’s contribution of $130,000. DOMANICK, supra note 366, at 
115, 130. As Joe Domanick puts it in recounting the story of the measure’s passage, with its 
donation, CCPOA became one of the campaign’s “financial angels early on, when it counted 
most.” Id. at 115. The three-strikes law was a key victory for CCPOA because the enhanced 
sentences for which it provides assured increased job security for CCPOA’s members. These 
enhanced sentences include among others a twenty-five-year mandatory minimum sentence for 
a third “strike” (i.e., felony conviction), no matter how minor. See, e.g., Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 
U.S. 63 (2003) (upholding a mandatory sentence of fifty years to life imposed pursuant to the 
California three-strikes law for two third-strike counts of petty theft with a prior, imposed when 
the defendant stole a total of nine videotapes from K-Mart stores ); Ewing v. California, 538 
U.S. 11 (2003) (upholding a mandatory sentence of twenty-five years to life for a third-strike 
grand theft conviction, imposed when the defendant stole three golf clubs from a pro shop). Yet, 
the punishments this law authorizes seem in many cases impossible to square with the 
parsimony principle, which requires that punishment not be imposed beyond the point 
necessary to protect the security and integrity of the least well-off citizens judged on this 
measure. 
CCPOA has had other such victories. For example, in 1999, the California legislature 
approved a bill to establish a $1 million pilot program that would provide alternative sentencing 
for some nonviolent parole offenders. Judith Tannenbaum, Prisons a Growth Industry, S.F. 
CHRON., Sept. 27, 1999, at A25. Because the state spends so much to reincarcerate members of 
this group, the bill would have meant significant savings—an estimated $600 million per year—
for state taxpayers. Id. CCPOA, however, opposed it. The union presumably expressed this 
opposition to Governor Gray Davis, for despite the widespread bipartisan support the measure 
enjoyed, Governor Davis—who had received $2.3 million in contributions from CCPOA during 
his recent election campaign—vetoed it. Id.; see also Strunk, supra note 366, at 14. 
 368. See, e.g., PAUL GUPPY, WASH. POLICY CTR., PRIVATE PRISONS AND THE PUBLIC 
INTEREST: IMPROVING QUALITY AND REDUCING COST THROUGH COMPETITION 15 (2003), 
available at http://www.washingtonpolicy.org/ConOutPrivatization/PBGuppyPrisonsPublic 
Interest.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2005) (“Government programs are equally subject to undue 
influence from, for example, powerful public-sector unions that have a direct interest in 
preserving state monopolies.”); cf. Savas, supra note 4, at 898 (“Some opponents of 
privatization . . . claim that private prison firms will be inclined to lobby for more and longer 
prison sentences . . . . If this argument was sound, however, prison officials, guards, and their 
unions presumably would act in the same manner for the same reasons.”). 
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but that the problem is more widespread than previously 
recognized.369 
As private prison advocate Charles Logan sees it, introducing the 
private prisons industry into the political mix better serves “the public 
interest” by forcing competing interest groups—correctional officers’ 
unions, state agencies, etc.—to press their claims in the most 
vociferous way possible. This process, Logan claims, allows 
policymakers and citizens to “sort[] out the [public interest] from 
among competing definitions and claims.”370 My own view is 
somewhat different. To satisfy the parsimony principle, the state is 
obliged to avoid taking steps likely to corrupt the conditions of 
legitimate punishment. Yet the presence of any powerful interest 
group with a financial stake in increased incarceration creates the 
danger of such a corrupting influence. Granted, this sort of political 
pressure is routinely brought to bear by interest groups of all kinds 
hoping to influence all manner of legislation. But whatever one might 
think of this system more generally, it is out of place when the issue is 
criminal punishment. 
In the case of punishment, the state is taking the extraordinary 
step of heavily burdening the security and integrity of individual 
citizens. Imposing such a burden is not beyond the scope of the state’s 
legitimate power. But if the exercise of this power is to be legitimate, 
it must be consistent with the priority of the most urgent interests.371 
And if the criminal justice system is to earn citizens’ trust, the process 
for setting the terms of state punishment must be driven by a good-
faith effort by all parties to craft policies consistent with the demands 
of legitimate punishment. However, where it is known that the 
process and state officials themselves are open to the influence of 
parties standing to benefit financially from increased incarceration, 
not only may the punishments flowing from particular criminal justice 
policies prove illegitimate, but citizens are also likely—rightly—to 
view them as such. 
 
 369. Thus here too, applying the standards of liberal legitimacy to the case of private prisons 
reveals aspects of the criminal justice system more generally which are widely taken for granted 
but which may also be at odds with the principles of legitimate punishment. 
 370. LOGAN, supra note 4, at 159. 
 371. The fact that a particular role played by a private party in the legislative process may 
raise no constitutional objections is thus insufficient to justify that party’s involvement or render 
legitimate the resulting policy. On the view adopted here, any such involvement must also raise 
no parsimony concerns of the sort described. 
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The private prison industry and the correctional officers’ unions 
are not the only entities with a financial interest in increased 
incarceration rates. As Lilly and Knepper have shown, “there are 
many more companies profiting from the routine, low-profile world 
of providing prison services,” among them private companies who 
provide prisons with services including “food service design and 
management, consulting and personnel management, architecture 
and facilities design, vocational assessment, medical services, drug 
detection, and transportation. . . . And that is not all.”372 There are 
also those companies that supply prisons and jails with equipment, 
selling them, among other things, “protective vests for guards, closed-
circuit television systems, mechanical and electronic locks, perimeter 
security and motion detection systems, fencing, flame-retardant 
bedding, furniture, foot[wear], lighting, and linen along with shatter-
proof plastic panels, tamper-proof fasteners, and clog-proof waste 
disposal systems.”373 As this account suggests, prisons are big business. 
There is thus a wide range of private interests in a position to profit 
from an increase in the number of people incarcerated, and 
potentially a large number of interest groups with the desire, and 
perhaps the financial wherewithal, to seek to influence sentencing 
policies in ways consistent with their financial interests.374 
 
 372. Lilly & Knepper, supra note 76, at 154–55. For more on one such company, 
Correctional Medical Services, see supra notes 294–97 and accompanying text. 
 373. Lilly & Knepper, supra note 76, at 155. 
 374. It might be thought that taking the discussion in this direction extends the parsimony 
principle too broadly. The concern of the parsimony principle is that public officials not take 
steps likely to corrupt the conditions of legitimate punishment. With the use of private prisons, 
state officials themselves foster the growth of the industry, which increases in size and power the 
more prisons are privatized. As it grows, the industry may be expected to have greater influence 
over the shape of sentencing policies in the ways suggested above. Thus, it might be thought, 
state officials bear particular responsibility for the growth of private prisons as a powerful 
interest group, in contrast to prison guards’ unions or purveyors of necessary prison services, the 
growth and strength of which might be thought an inevitable by-product of incarceration rather 
than a direct effect of state action. This distinction may make sense as a practical matter—state 
officials could perhaps more easily limit their use of private prisons than they could constrain 
the power of prison guard unions. If, however, the concern is with state actors fostering a 
potentially corrupting influence on sentencing policy by parties with a financial stake in 
increased incarceration, it is hard to find grounds for distinguishing between the state’s use of 
private prisons and policies facilitating the growth of union power or decisions taken to contract 
out the provision of goods and services for public prisons. See Joel, supra note 63, at 51, 56 
(explaining that virtually every state department of corrections accepts bids for private contracts 
to provide at least some services to its prisons, including food services, medical, dental, and 
psychiatric treatment, rehabilitative programs, educational programs, garbage collection, inmate 
classification, and even data management). Regardless whether the concern is decisions of state 
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Widening the lens to include this range of parties with a financial 
interest in incarceration may seem to extend the parsimony concern 
too far, perhaps thereby negating its critical bite. Am I saying that no 
one in contemporary society should be able to make money from 
operating prisons? If so, what about correctional officers, who work 
for salaries and benefits? And how would prisons receive the goods 
and services that are incontestably necessary if they are to run at all? 
The point here is not that, for punishment to be legitimate, no one 
can benefit financially from corrections; as the questions just posed 
indicate, such a requirement would be a practical impossibility. That 
this is so, however, does not require averting one’s eyes from the 
potential dangers created when people or entities with a strong 
financial interest in increased incarceration are also positioned to 
influence the nature or extent of punishments imposed. Where such 
circumstances exist, it is essential to call attention to them and be 
explicit about the threat they represent. Society must also do all it can 
to protect the process of crafting sentencing policies from any undue 
influence. 
 
officials that affirmatively create and sustain a constituency that then comes to exert influence 
over the criminal justice process (as in the case of private prisons), or whether it is instead the 
state’s failure to curb an emerging interest group that comes to wield such power (as in the case 
of CCPOA), in either case the potential for compromising the conditions of legitimate 
punishment is traceable to official policies that in themselves are questionable from the 
perspective of the parsimony principle. 
The case of California and the CCPOA reveals the way in which the state’s failure to 
constrain the power of an interest group might come to influence the nature and extent of 
punishments in a way inconsistent with the demands of legitimate punishment. A commission 
struck by Governor Schwarzenegger to examine the state of California corrections found that 
many of the pathologies in the state’s prisons, including the intimidation of whistleblowers and 
excessive delays in internal investigation and discipline of corrections officers accused of abuse, 
are traceable in part to CCPOA’s power to protect its members from discipline. See CORR. 
INDEP. REVIEW PANEL, REFORMING CORRECTIONS 27–29 (2004), available at 
http://cpr.ca.gov/report/indrpt/corr/pdf/introto6.pdf (describing such problems with employee 
investigations and discipline). This power, the commission found, has contributed to an 
institutional culture in the prisons characterized by the routine cover-up of wrongdoing and 
prisoner abuse and harassment of whistleblowers. See id. at 19–20 (noting that the DOC is 
described as “one that punishes employees who try to do right and protecting those who do 
wrong”). In the wake of the commission’s report, Senate Bill 1731 was introduced in the 
legislature to try to constrain this power; had it passed, the bill would have “remov[ed] a major 
barrier to investigations of guard misconduct”: a clause in the labor contract that “requires 
investigators to turn over information about a probe—including the accuser’s name—before 
internal affairs interviews are conducted.” Jenifer Warren, Major Prison Reform Eludes 
Lawmakers, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2004, at B1. But this effort failed, thanks to strong lobbying 
efforts on the part of CCPOA itself. See id. (“Killing the bill was a top priority of the [CCPOA], 
which represents the guards.”). 
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Admittedly, short of generating an explicit and widespread 
commitment among legislators and their constituents to satisfying the 
conditions of legitimate punishment, a total abatement of the sort of 
undue influence over sentencing policy described here is unlikely. 
Absent that commitment, the interest-group model of politics that 
reigns in the criminal justice context will not likely be widely 
condemned or even questioned. Campaign finance reforms designed 
to constrain illegitimate influence would certainly be welcome,375 as 
would tighter conflict-of-interest rules, for example, those prohibiting 
legislators or their spouses from owning stock in companies that stand 
to gain significant economic benefits from increased incarceration.376 
But any such efforts are likely to be limited in their effects, for several 
reasons. First, even absent overt lobbying and obvious conflicts of 
interest, there is reason to expect a sympathy of perspective and 
priorities between policymakers and at least some private interests. 
This is particularly so in the private prison industry, where the 
“revolving door” between government and private corrections firms 
means that private prison executives will often have a considerable 
range of contacts in the government of the state whose prison 
markets they seek to access.377 Second, effective lobby groups will still 
be able to find mechanisms to promote their financial interests in 
ways less obvious—and thus less open to regulation and less 
susceptible to critique—than direct lobbying of legislators.378 And 
 
 375. See, e.g., GUPPY, supra note 368, at 14 (“The most obvious check [to the “corruption” 
of the legislative process by the prison industry] is campaign finance law, which requires public 
disclosure of donations that may influence policymaking.”); see also Rosky, supra note 2, at 955 
(“[T]he industrial influence argument is not an argument against the privatization of 
punishment . . . . If we curb the problem of corporate campaign finance, then we curb the 
problem of industrial influence.”). 
 376. See HALLINAN, supra note 61, at 168 (“Among the early investors in CCA was Honey 
Alexander, wife of Lamar Alexander, who was then governor of Tennessee. In 1984, Mrs. 
Alexander invested $8,900 in CCA. Five years later, she walked away with $142,000.”). 
 377. As Lilly and Knepper note, “[t]he heads of private prison firms are often former 
government officials or corrections administrators who have left public service for private 
interest.” Lilly & Knepper, supra note 76, at 158. Examples abound. Before his appointment as 
executive vice president of CCA, for example, T. Don Hutto was commissioner of corrections in 
Arkansas and Virginia. Id. at 159. (Hutto also became president of the ACA shortly after his 
appointment to CCA.) CCA vice president and former CEO J. Michael Quinlan was former 
head of the Federal Bureau of Prisons. Maurice Sigler, former chair of the Federal Parole 
Commission, held a seat on the CCA board of directors. Id. And the “list goes on.” Id. 
 378. The legislative strategy of CCPOA effectively illustrates this point. Perhaps recognizing 
that the sight of prison guards vociferously advocating for tougher sentences for criminal 
offenders might invite charges of cynical self-interest, former CCPOA president Don Novey 
invested heavily in supporting victims’ rights organizations, sponsoring the yearly Crime 
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third, these methods will do little or nothing to prevent the kind of 
access and influence enjoyed by private-sector members of 
organizations like ALEC. Yet even granting that campaign finance 
reform efforts are likely to fall short, society remains obligated to 
recognize the broader legitimacy problem posed by the possibility of 
private influence over the legislative process and to do what it can to 
ameliorate it. 
E. Prison Building as Economic Development: “Recession-Proof 
Jobs”379 
There is a further reason why the concerns raised by the 
parsimony principle cannot be fully addressed through initiatives 
targeted at constraining the undue influence of identifiable interest 
groups over the legislative process: the tendency to look to prisons—
and prisoners—as a revenue source is not restricted to interest groups 
like these. In addition to the groups already discussed, communities 
across the country, led by public officials at all levels, have come to 
view prison building as the means to bring in jobs and grow local 
economies. As a result, voters and their political representatives now 
regard incarceration as a means to promote their own financial 
interests. Thus these groups, too, may well have an incentive to 
support policies likely to increase the prison population regardless of 
the implications for legitimate punishment. 
Take, for example, the case of Wise County, Virginia. In the late 
1990s, with much fanfare, the state of Virginia opened two state-of-
 
Victims’ March on the Capitol and providing office space, lobbying staff, computers, and annual 
funding to at least two victims’ rights organizations in the state, Crime Victims United (CVU) 
and the Doris Tate Crime Victims Bureau (CVB). See DOMANICK, supra note 366, at 112; 
Strunk, supra note 366, at 16; see also CCPOA—About Us, http://www.ccpoanet.org/ 
mem_svcs/default.php?inc=mission (last visited Feb. 7, 2006) (“[The Member Services] division 
of Logistics works with responsible individuals coordinating special events, such as . . . the 
Annual Victims March on the Capitol.”). CVU in particular is supported almost entirely by 
CCPOA and is, some have alleged, “its creature.” DOMANICK, supra note 366, at 112. Both 
CVU and CVB are committed wholeheartedly to the goal of sentence enhancement. This goal is 
shared by CCPOA, which seeks job security for its members and a growing membership for 
itself. Yet by supporting CVU and CVB, CCPOA is able to further its own interests via an 
interest group that is much more palatable both to lawmakers and the public, allowing the union 
to “wrap[] [itself] in this flag of altruism and concern for public safety which masks their self 
interest.” Strunk, supra note 366, at 17 (quoting Vincent Schiraldi, executive director of the 
Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice, www.cjcj.org/cpp). 
 379. Tom Gibb, Private Prison Back on Track for Philipsberg, PITTSBURGH POST-
GAZETTE, Dec. 16, 2002, at A11 (quoting John Woznisk, Pennsylvania state senator (internal 
quotations omitted)). 
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the-art supermax prisons, Wallens Ridge and Red Onion, in Wise 
County.380 To do so was a serious investment; Wallens Ridge alone 
cost the state $77.5 million, an average of $110,085 per cell.381 
The supermax prison is a recent innovation in incarceration. As 
the term “supermax” suggests, the purpose of these prisons is 
generally to house what prison administrators refer to as “the worst 
of the worst”—those inmates who are too violent or unruly to be kept 
under control even in the relatively restrictive conditions of 
conventional maximum security.382 Originally, the intended purpose of 
Virginia’s new supermax facilities was to house this subset of 
prisoners. Although “never precisely defined,” the worst of the worst 
was understood by the state’s director of prisons to “include[] two 
categories of inmates: those who had been ‘disruptive’ at other 
prisons (those who had attacked other inmates or guards) and those 
who had been sentenced to terms of life or ‘near life’—typically, 
eighty years or more.”383 As it happened, however, between Wallens 
Ridge and Red Onion, the Virginia Department of Corrections 
(DOC) had more supermax cells than qualified prisoners.384 In 
response, the DOC “quietly expanded the eligibility” for supermax 
classification.385 By the time both prisons were opened, they were 
accepting inmates sentenced to as few as five years, who had harmed 
no one and had never been disruptive.386 
 
 380. HALLINAN, supra note 61, at 204–18. 
 381. Id. at 204. Supermax cells generally house one prisoner (and thus one bed) only. By 
way of comparison, the average capital investment for each maximum-security bed in Virginia is 
$66,400. THE 2002 CORRECTIONS YEARBOOK: ADULT CORRECTIONS 86 (Camille Graham 
Camp ed., 2003). 
 382. Weidman, supra note 8, at 1526 (quoting Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1155 
(N.D. Cal. 1995) (internal quotations omitted)). 
 383. HALLINAN, supra note 61, at 204–05. 
 384. See id. (“[T]here weren’t enough of these inmates to go around.”). 
 385. Id. 
 386. Id. As Hallinan explains it, 
[B]y the time Wallens Ridge opened, in April 1999, “the worst of the worst” had 
come to be a meaningless phrase. It included those who had been disruptive and 
those who had not, those who had committed horrible crimes and those who had 
harmed no one, those who would be loose in a few years and those who would never 
be free. 
Id. Human Rights Watch (HRW) has expressed concern about the Virginia DOC’s 
classification policy for its supermax prisons. As a press release issued by HRW put it: “No 
prisoners should be subjected to more restrictive conditions than is [sic] reasonably necessary 
for safe and secure confinement. Yet in Virginia, inmates who do not pose serious security or 
safety risks and who have not engaged in assaultive or dangerous behavior while incarcerated 
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Incarceration in supermax represents a qualitatively different 
and more severe punishment than even incarceration in a 
conventional maximum-security prison. Inmates housed in such 
prisons are severely restricted in their movements and actions. They 
are generally locked down in their cells twenty-three hours a day, 
with one hour given to (solitary) physical activity in an outdoor 
“concrete exercise ‘yard’ that is simply a larger version of their own 
cell, minus the toilet and roof.”387 There is neither programming nor 
inmate interaction, and possession of personal items is extremely 
limited.388 Why would the state of Virginia extend its control in this 
way over inmates whose behavior did not warrant it? The reason is 
economic development. In 1995, Wise County had seen the closing of 
the Westmoreland Coal Company, then the biggest employer in the 
area, and the building of the prisons was intended to bring business 
and jobs to the area. As Governor James Gilmore said at the opening 
of Wallens Ridge, the prison “is an economic boon for this town and 
this county and this region . . . [a] win-win for everyone.”389 A prison 
operating at less than full capacity, however, means less of an 
economic boon than otherwise possible: fewer jobs for local residents, 
fewer visitors to the area, less business for area merchants, and even 
fewer mouths to feed inside the prison walls. Hence the expanded 
supermax eligibility. 
Wise County is just one example of a community looking to 
prisons—and the imposition of punishment they represent—for 
 
are being assigned to supermax facilities.” Human Rights Watch, Red Onion: Virginia’s First 
Supermax Prison, http://www.hrw.org/about/initiatives/onion.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2005). 
The Supreme Court recently held, in a case out of Ohio, that prisoners have a protected 
liberty interest in avoiding transfer to supermax. See Wilkinson v. Austin, 125 S. Ct. 2384, 2394–
95 (2005) (finding that “assignment to OSP [Ohio’s supermax facility] imposes an atypical and 
significant hardship under any plausible baseline”). Prisoners are thus entitled to some 
procedural protections before they may be transferred from general population to supermax. 
See id. at 2390–91, 2395–97 (upholding Ohio’s “New Policy,” which among other procedures 
accords inmates forty-eight-hours’ notice, in writing, “summarizing the conduct or offense 
triggering the [classification] review,” and multiple layers of review of any decision to reassign 
the inmate to supermax). It is possible that such protections may prove to have some limiting 
effect on the circumstances under which Virginia transfers its prisoners to supermax. 
 387. HALLINAN, supra note 61, at 208. 
 388. See id. (noting that many inmates “live and eat alone” and are allowed just “a 
‘reasonable amount’ of personal effects”); see also Weidman, supra note 8, at 1525–28 (“[M]ost 
supermax prisons rely on solitary confinement. . . . [S]upermax inmates are rarely offered any 
educational, religious, or legal programming.”). 
 389. HALLINAN, supra note 61, at 206. 
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economic development purposes. But such examples abound.390 
Throughout the United States, communities in rural areas in 
particular have come to look to prison building as the way to boost 
their economies, provide jobs, and increase tax revenues,391 and even 
to increase the local population registered by the national census, 
thereby increasing the state and federal subsidies for which the 
community is eligible.392 In the 1990s, an estimated 245 prisons were 
built in “212 of the nation’s 2,290 rural counties, many in Great Plains 
towns of Colorado, Oklahoma and Texas that had been stripped of 
family farms and upended by the collapse of the 1980s oil boom.”393 
These communities see prison building as a safe, “clean” form of 
economic development,394 and they also see it as “recession-proof”;395 
as one city manager commented, “Nothing’s going to stop crime.”396 
State legislators appear to share this view, and routinely vie to locate 
 
 390. See, e.g., John Reid Blackwell, Lost Contract Guts Snack Suppliers, RICHMOND TIMES 
DISPATCH (Va.), July 19, 2003, at A1 (reporting that Virginia’s privatization of prison 
commissaries cost Wayne Sanders, a snack supplier to prison commissaries for twelve years, 90 
percent of his business when private, out-of-state companies were hired to manage them); 
Ronald Fraser, Prisons Have Become a Growth Industry in New York, BUFFALO NEWS, Nov. 
21, 2004, at H2 (reporting that in New York, “more towns [are] becom[ing] economically 
dependent on state prisons”); David Unze, Oak Ridge Corrections Facility, ST. CLOUD TIMES 
(Minn.), Nov. 17, 2004, at 1A (reporting that the Oak Ridge Corrections Facility was reopening 
under private management and that its 1999 closing had cost the local economy approximately 
$5 million annually and 100 jobs). 
 391. As one observer explained, “More than a Wal-Mart or a meat-packing plant, state, 
federal and private prisons, typically housing 1,000 inmates and providing 300 jobs, can put a 
town on a solid economic footing.” Peter T. Kilborn, Rural Towns Turn to Prisons to Reignite 
Their Economies, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2001, at A1 (citing Calvin L. Beale, senior demographer 
at the Economic Research Service of the United States Department of Agriculture). Moreover, 
“[a]s communities become more and more familiar with the benefits that prisons bring, they are 
also becoming increasingly adept at maximizing their windfall through collecting taxes and 
healthy public service fees.” Id. 
 392. See Robert Whiteside, Sprawling for Prisoners, HARPER’S MAG., Feb. 2002, at 88, 88. 
Among the municipalities adopting this technique is Florence, Arizona, which since 1982 “has 
repeatedly expanded its borders to include prisons being built beyond them, inflating its census 
count and thereby its state and federal funding.” Id. Meanwhile, “five new prisons have opened 
or expanded within town limits.” Id. There is a further benefit of increasing the official 
population in this way, that of “influence[ing] the drawing of congressional and state districts,” a 
move that usually benefits Republicans at the expense of Democrats because “most prisoners 
are minorities from urban, Democratic areas and reside in typically white, rural, Republican 
enclaves.” Id.; see also infra notes 402–03 and accompanying text. 
 393. Kilborn, supra note 391 (citing Calvin L. Beale, senior demographer at the Economic 
Research Service of the United States Department of Agriculture). 
 394. Abramsky, supra note 65, at 25. 
 395. Kilborn, supra note 391 (quoting Jack McKennon, city manager of Sayre, Oklahoma). 
 396. Id. 
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new prisons in their districts to provide an economic boon for 
constituents.397 
The phenomenon of what one observer has called “prison 
construction advocacy”398 does not necessarily mean that the 
punishments served in the prisons built under these circumstances are 
illegitimate. Viewed from the perspective of the parsimony principle, 
however, the worry is that maintaining a high incarceration rate will 
become fused in the minds of voters—and, even more troubling, in 
the minds of their political representatives—with the possibility of 
economic prosperity, potentially corrupting the process of 
determining appropriate criminal punishments with concerns that are 
plainly illegitimate. Interestingly, in many cases, prison building has 
not provided the economic security and employment opportunities 
for residents that communities often expect.399 But the federal and 
state financing a county receives is based on census data, which 
includes the inmate population of local prisons.400 Having a prison in 
 
 397. Fox Butterfield, Study Tracks Boom in Prison and Notes Impact on Counties, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 30, 2004, at A19. In some cases, desperate communities have teamed up with 
private prison-management companies to help them bring prisoners to local prisons. Abramsky, 
supra note 65, at 24. In 2003, for example, Wackenhut Corrections agreed to take over three 
prison facilities built on spec by the town of Pecos. Pecos, a “dying oil town . . . in the remote 
West Texas county of Reeves,” has since the late 1980s issued a total of $90 million in bonds to 
build three separate prisons, the most recent of which was completed in the spring of 2003. Id. 
The town has been servicing the debt at a rate of $500,000 per month. Although Pecos had 
successfully contracted with the federal Bureau of Prisons for inmates to fill two of its prisons, 
local officials were unable to fill the third prison. Enter Wackenhut, which “agreed to take over 
the three facilities on a ten-year contract, and to use its out-of-state contracts to bring in 
prisoners to fill the [third prison]” in exchange for a monthly fee of $330,000. Id. at 24–25. The 
county itself pays “the salaries of all the guards, the medical expenses of prisoners, all 
programming costs, food expenses and utilities.” Id. at 25. 
 398. Butterfield, supra note 397, at A19 (quoting Jeremy Travis, a senior fellow at the 
Urban Institute). 
 399. In Delano, California, for example, the building of North Kern State Prison was 
supposed to bring a “river of jobs, sales tax revenue and other economic goodies,” but in 2002, 
“a pall of economic gloom . . . still envelop[ed the] town.” Matthew Heller, Delano’s Grand 
Illusion, L.A. TIMES MAG., Sept. 1, 2002, at 8. And an Urban Institute report published in 2004 
found “no clear evidence that building prisons in poor rural areas had a significant economic 
impact.” Butterfield, supra note 397, at A19. The report cited one Sentencing Project study of 
“25 years of employment and per capita income data from rural counties in New York, which 
found ‘no significant difference or discernible patterns of economic trends’ between counties 
that were home to a prison and counties that did not have one.” Id. 
 400. See Eric Lotke & Peter Wagner, Prisoners of the Census: Electoral and Financial 
Consequences of Counting Prisoners Where They Go, Not Where They Come From, 24 PACE L. 
REV. 587, 601 (2004) (“Larger places typically have greater needs and receive a corresponding 
share of government resources. . . . One measure of size for determining resource distribution is 
the official U.S. census population.”); see also Editorial, Phantom Constituents in the Census, 
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the district can thus bring a community a considerable amount of 
extra money, whether or not the employment rate is positively 
affected.401 And even in cases where building a prison brings fewer 
economic benefits than might have been hoped, once the prison is 
built and filled, citizens still have a strong financial incentive to see 
incarceration levels maintained. 
Again, I know of no empirical evidence confirming that the 
allure of economic benefits directly inclines voters or their 
representatives to push for “tough-on-crime” initiatives. From the 
perspective of the parsimony principle, however, it is enough that the 
incentives to do so exist, promoted by the very legislators charged 
with the task of defining the terms of legitimate punishment for 
convicted offenders. Such incentives create the real possibility that 
illegitimate interests will affect the nature and extent of punishments 
ultimately imposed. They also give citizens—especially those citizens 
most likely to be subject to criminal punishment—reason to mistrust 
the process, grounding the suspicion that criminal punishments are 
imposed not for legitimate reasons but instead to sustain the 
economies of voters in rural communities and the reelection 
prospects of their political representatives. 
If this concern seems far fetched, consider the racial dynamics 
that arise from treating prisons as engines of rural economic 
development. The communities that have benefited from this strategy 
are overwhelmingly “white, rural, Republican enclaves.”402 The 
prisoners shipped in to populate the new prisons, in contrast, are 
overwhelmingly “minorities from urban, Democratic areas.”403 Many 
of these prisoners, moreover, are serving time for nonviolent 
 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2005, at A16 (“A longstanding quirk in census rules counts incarcerated 
people as ‘residents’ of the prisons where most are held for only a short time, instead of 
counting them in the towns and cities where they actually live.”). 
 401. For example, Ina, Illinois, population 455, is home to the Big Muddy River 
Correctional Center, inmate population 1,900. As a result, Ina receives federal and state tax 
revenues that would ordinarily be reserved for towns with four times its population. Big Muddy 
River thus provides a “permanent windfall for [the] town.” David Heinzmann, Towns Put 
Dreams in Prison: Rural Areas See the Potential for Economic Gains, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 20, 2001, 
at 1. The mayor of Ina, Andy Hutchins, has exulted over his situation. As he views it, “This little 
town of 450 people is getting the tax money of a town of 2,700. . . . And those people in that 
prison can’t vote me out of office.” Id. 
 402. Whiteside, supra note 392, at 88. 
 403. Id. 
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offenses.404 Under these circumstances, it is not unreasonable to think 
that, when prisoners are viewed by local whites as the key to 
prosperity, those same prisoners—not to mention their families, 
friends, and communities—would come to view their incarceration as 
more about jobs and revenue for rural communities than about 
satisfying the demands of legitimate punishment. 
F. Private Prisons as Miner’s Canary 
Considering the state’s use of private prisons through the lens of 
the parsimony principle reveals a possible threat to the legitimacy of 
punishment whenever parties with a financial interest in increased 
incarceration are in a position to exert influence over the nature and 
extent of criminal sentencing. If this concern is real, it suggests an 
independent reason for the state not to privatize its prisons: even 
granting that similar concerns exist elsewhere in the criminal justice 
system, the state ought not to foster yet another potentially influential 
industry that could seek to compromise further the possibility of 
 
 404. As many as half the incarcerated offenders in the United States serving sentences of 
over one year were convicted of nonviolent offenses. This category includes property, drug, and 
public-order offenses. In state prisons in 2001, just over half the inmates—614,200 people—were 
serving time for nonviolent offenses. See PAIGE M. HARRISON & ALLEN J. BECK, BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BULLETIN NO. NCJ 195189, PRISONERS IN 2001, at 
12–13 (2002), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/p01.pdf (“[A]n estimated 
589,100 inmates in State prison . . . were held for violent offenses . . . . In addition, 238,500 
inmates were held for property offenses, 251,100 for drug offenses, and 124,600 for public-order 
offenses.”). Moreover, in 1996, roughly three-quarters of jail inmates were in custody for 
nonviolent offenses. See CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL REPORT NO. NCJ 164620, PROFILE OF JAIL INMATES 1996, at 1 
(1998), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/pji96.pdf (“About 26% were being 
held for a violent offense; 27% for a property offense; 22% for a drug offense; and 24% for a 
public order offense.”). In federal prisons in 2000, the comparable figure was 90 percent, up 
from roughly 83 percent in 1990. See HARRISON & BECK, supra, at 14 (“[Between 1990 and 
2000,] the percentage of violent Federal inmates declined from 17% to 10%.”). Some calculate 
that America has over one million prisoners convicted of nonviolent offenses. JOHN IRWIN ET 
AL., JUSTICE POLICY INST., AMERICA’S ONE MILLION NONVIOLENT PRISONERS 2 (1999), 
available at http://www.justicepolicy.org/downloads/onemillionnonviolentoffenders.pdf. To put 
this calculation in some perspective, it suggests that the number of nonviolent offenders 
incarcerated in the United States is larger than the combined populations of Wyoming and 
Alaska. Compare JUSTICE POLICY INST., THE PUNISHING DECADE: PRISON AND JAIL 
ESTIMATES AT THE MILLENNIUM 3 (2000), available at http://www.justicepolicy.org/ 
downloads/punishingdecade.pdf (“By the end of [2000], JPI estimates there will be 1,169,118 
non-violent offenders in American jails and prisons.”), with Wyoming QuickFacts from the US 
Census Bureau, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/56000.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2005) 
(estimating the population of Wyoming in 2004 to be 506,529), and Alaska QuickFacts from the 
US Census Bureau, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/02000.html (last visited Nov. 14, 
2005) (estimating the population of Alaska in 2004 to be 655,435). 
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legitimate punishment to promote that industry’s own financial 
interests. This is especially so given the likely limitations of available 
mechanisms for constraining any undue influence by private parties 
on criminal justice policies. 
But exploring this concern in the context of private prisons has 
revealed a problem that extends well beyond this context, arguably 
reaching the core of our majoritarian system. That this is so vindicates 
the assertion, made above, that considering private prisons from the 
perspective of liberal legitimacy provides a lens through which to see 
in a new light practices in the criminal justice system that may have 
been too readily taken for granted. At the same time, however, the 
apparent extent of the problem may seem to undercut the value of 
the exercise; having revealed so deep a problem, I can offer no easy 
remedy. 
The difficulty is that, absent widespread commitment to ensuring 
that criminal punishment satisfies the demands of the parsimony 
principle, there will be no broad sympathy for the view that society 
needs to exclude illegitimate considerations like the financial 
advantage of voters from the process of establishing sentencing 
policies. This means that to address the problem properly, there can 
be no half measures. So long as one continues to assume that criminal 
justice policy is appropriately shaped through an interest group model 
of politics, where all parties with a stake in the outcome vie for 
policies friendly to their own interests, looking to prisons for 
economic prosperity will seem entirely unobjectionable. Indeed, on 
the interest-group model of politics, it seems exactly right. The only 
adequate remedy is broad acceptance of the idea that the parties 
charged with determining the nature and extent of criminal 
punishment have an obligation to make such determinations in 
isolation from any possible knowledge of their own personal 
interests—or those of their constituents. 
Broad acceptance of this approach, however, is a tall order; it 
would, as Simone Chambers recently noted, require that legitimate 
punishment come “to be understood democratically, not just 
philosophically.”405 Certainly, any such process of “public opinion 
formation” will not happen overnight.406 But the first step is to make 
explicit the potential conflict between legitimate punishment and 
 
 405. Chambers, supra note 18, at 477. 
 406. Id. 
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conceiving of incarceration as a source of financial gain. Having done 
so, it will then be possible to challenge state officials to act in ways 
that minimize this conflict as much as possible, and to do all they can 
to rise above this impulse themselves. 
In the private prisons literature, it has largely been assumed that 
prisons are no different from any other government function to be 
privatized. Private prisons have thus been treated as an issue of 
privatization and not one of criminal justice policy. The foregoing 
analysis, however, makes plain what is lost with this move: it makes it 
impossible to see that the state’s use of private prisons reflects a 
larger trend toward viewing incarceration in economic terms and 
regarding prison inmates as the economic units of a financial plan. If 
anything, private prisons appear to be the logical extension of this 
vision, which already informs myriad aspects of this country’s criminal 
justice system, including the practice of prison administrators 
contracting out the provision of basic services to cut the cost of 
corrections; underinvestment in mechanisms for accountability and 
oversight; and the tendency of private prison providers, correctional 
officers, and the voters themselves to look to increased incarceration 
as the means to their financial well-being. 
From the perspective of liberal legitimacy, there is a serious cost 
to the widespread adoption of this economistic view:407 society 
becomes less likely to see those it punishes as human beings and more 
likely to lose a sense of the severity of the burdens punishment 
imposes. Indeed, from the perspective of liberal legitimacy, the most 
troubling thing about private prisons may be what they reveal of this 
country’s collective failure of respect and responsibility toward those 
it incarcerates. 
CONCLUSION 
The debate over private prisons has largely been framed as a 
choice between alternative management structures judged on the 
basis of their relative efficiency. But framing the issue in terms of 
 
 407. By my use of the term “economistic,” I do not mean to suggest that economists do not 
care about the quality of prison conditions. See generally Hart et al., supra note 148 (arguing 
that the incomplete character of private prison contracts creates a risk of prisoner abuses that 
may tell against the appropriateness of privatization in this context). I am merely trying to 
characterize a particular view, pervasive in policy circles and in the political culture more 
broadly, that reduces incarceration to its component parts and conceives of the prison 
environment, inmates included, in economic terms. 
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comparative efficiency is the wrong way to think about private 
prisons, for at least two reasons. First, this approach leads to an 
undue focus on the value of efficiency, when what should be of most 
concern in the incarceration context is whether the penal practices at 
issue are in fact legitimate. Second, comparative efficiency uncritically 
accepts the current state of prison conditions as the appropriate 
baseline for analysis, judging private prisons to be good enough when 
conditions of confinement within them meet the standard set by 
public prisons, thus providing no opening for challenging this (low) 
baseline as unacceptable. 
Focusing on the comparative question, that of whether the 
management structure of prisons should be public or private, is to 
lose sight of the bigger picture. The real question is why all prisons, 
public and private alike, fall so far short of satisfying society’s 
obligations to those it incarcerates. Exploring the state’s use of 
private prisons from the perspective of liberal legitimacy has helped 
to answer this question by making plain what is wrong with private 
prisons in the form currently on offer, and, in so doing, exposing as 
problematic several practices operating within the penal system as a 
whole which tend to be taken for granted and thus no longer 
questioned. The foregoing analysis has, for example, exposed the 
danger of delegating to prison officials extensive discretion and power 
over a largely vulnerable and dependent prison population in the 
absence of adequate accountability mechanisms—and demonstrated 
that this danger is particularly acute when those officials are 
motivated by private purposes at odds with the possibility of humane 
punishment. It has revealed the threat posed to humane conditions of 
confinement when state officials seek to save money by contracting 
with for-profit entities for the provision of crucial prison services. 
And it has indicated the corrosive effect, both on the possibility of 
legitimate punishment and on citizens’ trust in the criminal justice 
system itself, of the unquestioned idea that sentencing policy is 
appropriately influenced by advocacy groups with a financial interest 
in increased incarceration. The examination of private prisons from 
the perspective of liberal legitimacy suggests that a meaningful 
commitment to the possibility of legitimate punishment requires that 
all these practices be curtailed, or, at the very least, engaged in warily, 
not only in the private prisons context, but in the context of the penal 
system in general. 
As noted in the opening pages of this Article, a recurring theme 
among opponents of private prisons is that incarceration is an 
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inherently public function, one that cannot be legitimately delegated 
to private actors. But, as the foregoing discussion has revealed, the 
fact that punishments of incarceration are served in prisons 
administered by state employees is no guarantee of their legitimacy. 
To the contrary, public prisons too can be sites of unchecked 
discretion exercised by individuals with their own personal interests 
and agendas, whether those individuals are state-employed 
corrections officials or private contractors engaged by public prison 
officials to provide discrete prison services as a way to save states 
money. And the punishments served in public prisons are as likely as 
punishments served in private prisons to be shaped by the efforts of 
political actors seeking to further their own financial interests. 
Still, there is arguably something to the view that punishment, if 
it is to be legitimate, should be a wholly public function, untainted by 
private motives and interests. But if so, it is not just the use of private 
prisons, but the current approach to criminal punishment in general—
shot through as it is with scope for furthering private purposes at the 
expense of convicted offenders—that sorely needs to be rethought. 
